Second Nature and Ethical Life: Habit, Culture, and Critique in Hegel's Science of Right by Novakovic, Andreja
!!!!!!!
Second Nature and Ethical Life: 






Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  





































Second Nature and Ethical Life: 






My dissertation investigates the status of reflection in Hegel’s account of modern 
ethical life.  I ask, on the one hand, why Hegel places so much significance on 
unreflective attitudes, and on the other, which forms of reflection remain compatible 
with what he calls the habit of the ethical.  This question exposes crucial commitments 
underlying Hegel’s project in the Philosophy of Right and interrogates the flexibility of his 
account and its openness to normative change.  Yet my inquiry also has broader 
implications for the nature of social criticism.  I argue that even reflection of the 
overtly critical variety emerges from and remains indebted to our habitual 
comportment and that this is why it must retain a valued place in ethical life. 
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This ethical life, which reflection may consider to be particularity,  
is not something positive, or opposed to the living individual  
which is thereby tied to chance and necessity, but is alive.”1 
 
The question that I pose to Hegel in this study is in the first instance not one that Hegel 
himself seems to ask, at least not in its initial formulation.  I want to know how Hegel 
conceives of our ordinary perspective when we are faced with the distinctly practical task 
of finding our way about in our social world.  Hegel is very interested in our social world, 
but he approaches it from a highly philosophical standpoint.  Whatever it is that he thinks 
this standpoint has to tell us, it clearly differs from the one we occupy when we engage in 
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various forms of evaluation, whether in order to determine what to do or what to 
continue doing.  This may sound like a question that Wittgenstein might have asked of 
Hegel, had he been interested in hearing his answer.  And Wittgenstein is admittedly an 
inspiration and a largely tacit interlocutor for me. 
 At the same time, it is not a question that falls outside of Hegel’s project, 
especially not outside of the Philosophy of Right, where Hegel delivers such a philosophical 
account of our social world.  As unparalleled as his ambitions there may be, he claims that 
he is in a significant sense merely explicating this ordinary perspective.   In fact, he 
suggests that it is only philosophy of the sort he himself practices that can explicate this 
perspective in a way that does not distort it beyond recognition.  Upon closer examination 
we discover a surprising thesis spanning this text, namely, that it is only our most ordinary 
of perspectives as well as our most philosophical that can do justice to the nature of what 
he calls modern “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit).  Everything else is a product of the “restless 
activity of reflection and vanity” (PR, 17). 
 He advances this thesis obliquely, in a passage that may initially look like a 
devaluation of a point of view that remains embedded within ethical life.  As he puts it,  
 That relationship, or rather that relationless identity, in which the ethical is the actual 
 vitality [Lebendigkeit] of self-consciousness, may indeed turn into a relationship of belief 
 and conviction, or a relationship mediated by further reflection into insight through reasons, 
 which may also begin with certain particular ends, interests, and considerations, with hope 
 or fear, or with historical presuppositions.  But adequate cognition of it [this relationship] 
 belongs to conceptual thought [dem denkenden Begriffe]” (PR §147). 
 
We might suspect that Hegel is here ranking different attitudes that someone could adopt 
toward the ethical laws that structure the social world.  The lowest is the one in which we 
fully identify with the laws we live by, in fact identify with them so thoroughly that these 
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laws simply are our way of life.  A more advanced attitude is one that is also more 
reflective, first attaining to the level of belief or conviction in their goodness, and next 
rising even higher, to an insight grounded in reasons as to why we should consider them 
good.  The highest is the cognition that belongs to conceptual thought, a form Hegel 
associates with philosophy. 
 But it is misleading to assume that mediation through further reflection constitutes an 
advance in Hegel’s eyes.  He might be implying that these reflective stages are all 
necessary in order to arrive at philosophical cognition, but this does not mean that they 
are necessarily better than the stage at which be began.  There are even reasons to suspect 
that these reflective stages mark levels of distortion that only a philosophical account can 
mend.2  But what the philosophical account is ultimately an account of is our embedded 
starting point, so the relation we had to our social world prior to reflection.  Hegel calls it 
a relation-less identity and suggests that “conceptual thought” is the only form of 
reflection that can come to know it in way that is adequate to it. 
 The following is an attempt to get a hold of these two ends of the spectrum, so to 
grasp what kind of relation to ethical life each of them entails.  My first task is to explain 
why Hegel in a sense prioritizes less reflective attitudes over those that are more reflective.  
In particular, I have set myself the task of explaining why Hegel wants to rehabilitate the 
notion of habit.  Is habit really in tension with the seeming benefits of reflection?  Do we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 It may be difficult to see how an insight based on reasons would not constitute an advance over an 
unreflective attitude. But note the kinds of reasons Hegel associates with this supposed insight – reasons such 
as particular ends, interests, hope, fear, and historical presuppositions.  This suggests that Hegel thinks this 
stage of “further reflection” introduces considerations that are in some sense external to the law in question.  
It provokes us to answer the question as to why we should follow this law not by looking at its internal 




really need to reflect in order to achieve a conviction in or an insight into the goodness of 
our ethical laws?  These are the questions that will help us define the ordinary end of the 
spectrum, since the embedded perspective is one that Hegel seems to associate with 
habitual conduct.  Those who inhabit ethical life, especially those who do so fully, 
typically do not reflect about the ethical laws expressed in what they do. 
 But I think Hegel’s account of habit, as compelling as it may be, would not be 
enough to demonstrate that Hegel’s conception of our ordinary perspective is worth 
exploring.  What makes this conception especially distinctive, I think, is not its emphasis 
on the unreflective per se, but precisely its incorporation of reflection in a variety of ways.  
So we must be careful not to assume that Hegel thinks the only way we relate to ethical 
life is unreflectively, or that every instance of reflection can only obscure this relation 
from view.  A significant portion of my study is thus devoted to investigating those 
modes of reflection in which Hegel thinks we do – and should continue to – engage. 
 In addition to the ordinary, there is another interest at stake for me, an interest in 
the vitality of ethical life.  As the above epigraph indicates, Hegel conceives of ethical life 
as in some sense living.  He means this in more than a metaphorical sense, for life 
according to Hegel is marked by as a specific structure and processes that even a social 
order can display.  So a question worth raising is what imbues modern society with life 
and ensures its longevity.  I think part of the answer is habit, for Hegel thinks that a form 
of life comes to life, so to speak, precisely when its ethical laws have “struck root” in us, 
when they are incorporated into our second nature.   But what we find is that habit can 
also usher in the death of ethical life.  Hegel frequently characterizes a dead society in 
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terms of “positivity,” which suggests that its ethical laws have ossified and their adherents 
grown indifferent to them, both of which seem to be side effects of excessive habituation.   
 Since there seems to be some connection between them, the needed “negativity” 
must come in two forms – as an element of flexibility in the social structure and as the 
presence of processes that revive our commitment to its perpetuation.  Both of these are 
bound up with reflection, since it is reflection that has the power to shape both ethical 
laws as well as our attitude toward them.  In short, reflection looks to be integral to any 
form of life that is living, including modern ethical life.  This to me suggests that a form 
of reflection, which avoids merely distorting ethical life, cannot be the exclusive 
possession of philosophy.  To put this in positive terms, there must be valuable forms of 
reflection “always already” at work in our ordinary modes of social engagement.  Once I 
have clarified the status of our unreflective attitudes in Hegel’s estimation, I turn to these 
other modes, showing that they can range from the broadly evaluative and primarily 
affirmative to the overtly critical.  It is the latter mode that is also the most contentious, 
because it may look like Hegel wants to preclude the possibility of criticism, both for us as 
social participants, but also for himself as philosopher.  In short, it looks like neither of us 
is in a position to criticize the social world, even if for different reasons.   
 My way of addressing this question is indirect.  Instead of trying to find traces of 
critique within the Philosophy of Right itself, I focus instead on certain points of connection 
between this text and an earlier one, the Phenomenology of Spirit.  As I admit, this is a 
controversial strategy because the two texts appear at first sight to differ in subject and 
method.  In fact, Hegel gives us reasons to think that the Phenomenology could not be 
brought to bear in the way I propose because it is not yet part of his “system,” merely a 
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prelude to it, whereas the Philosophy of Right is.  Although I do not defend this strategy in 
the abstract, I am hopeful that my reading of various chapters from the Phenomenology will 
demonstrate its relevance for at least Hegel’s account of modern ethical life.  So a 
substantial part of this study will consist of an exploration of the analogies between these 
two texts.  The philosophical reason for pursuing such textual analogies has to do with 
the question of critique that the Phenomenology foregrounds.  It is concerned, among other 
things, with the ways various historical societies have come to criticize their own ways of 
life.  My aim is to show that, even if the modern social order lacks their structural 
shortcomings, these processes of contestation and reform remain vital in it. 
 This study is divided into four chapters, each addressing an increasingly more 
robust form of reflection within and about modern ethical life.  In the first chapter I 
focus on the nature of habit in order to assess its ethical status.  Although habit itself is 
not yet a form of reflection, it bears on reflection in a range of ways, most notably by 
granting us the needed distance from our nature that allows us to become reflective about 
those aspects of ourselves that appear fixed.  But habit also exhibits limitations that 
require supplementation.  Thus the second chapter addresses a reflective activity that I 
think has the function of curbing the perils that accompany all habit, including the habit 
of the ethical.  It is an activity that Hegel associates with Bildung.  As I argue, we engage in 
this activity in all “cultural” participation, which is in turn an essential ingredient in social 
life.  What this shows is that we need to affirm the customs we perpetuate if we want to 
prevent them to turning into “positive” fossils. 
 What this does not show, however, is that we need to (or even can) object to 
customs as in need to change.  I concede that this formulation is a bit misleading, because 
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cultural reflection can have transformative effects on custom, even though these 
transformations are so pervasive that they happen as if behind our backs.  But the 
question still remains how we might overtly criticize a given custom.  What could 
occasion such criticism and to what grounds could we appeal when doing so?  Actually, 
the question is even more difficult that this makes it sound: how might we criticize not 
only a way of life for failing to live up to the ethical law to which it claims to be 
committed, but this very law itself?  This I address in the third chapter. 
 I framed this study in terms of a contrast between the ordinary and the 
philosophical standpoint, indicating that they are not to be collapsed into each other.  
One significant difference between them has to do with this issue of critique.  Even if it 
turns out that Hegel does think that we can criticize ethical life, he definitely does not 
think that philosophy should be entangled in this business in any direct way.  So the 
question remains what philosophy has to offer us, those living inside ethical life and 
coping with its internal challenges at various reflective levels.  Although this is the final 
question to which I turn, its answer bears retrospectively on the preceding chapters 
because it clarifies what kind of project Hegel is even engaging in – whether he himself is 
merely describing our ordinary relation to ethical life, or whether he is in fact evaluating it. 
 Since I will be citing from multiple texts and lectures, I should add that I 
translated the quoted passages, unless otherwise noted.  But I translated the passages from 
the Philosophy of Right and The Phenomenology of Spirit with the assistance of those done by H. 

















Of all of Hegel’s purportedly necessary transitions,3 there seems to be something 
especially disconcerting about the one from “Morality” to “Ethical Life” in his Philosophy 
of Right.  Although in this transition we first enter into an objectively rational social order, 
it seems to come at the expense of our previous subjective attitude.  Hegel defines the 
perspective distinctive of morality as the “reflection of the will into itself” (PR §105) and 
he traces the consequences of such an ever more reflective withdrawal from the world.   
Once we discover that it leaves us empty-handed, we are supposed to realize that we 
require objective criteria for determining principles of action, criteria that only a social !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 What these transitions involve and what makes them necessary is a question I will address in the fourth 




order can provide.  But we are also supposed to realize that we need a correspondingly 
new outlook as well.  Hegel describes it in the following passage: 
 In the simple identification of individuals with actuality (Wirklichkeit), the ethical (das 
 Sittliche)  appears as their general manner of conduct (allgemeine Handlungsweise), as custom 
 (Sitte) – the habit (Gewohnheit) of the ethical appears as a second nature, which is put in 
 place of the first purely natural will and which is the soul, meaning, and actuality 
 permeating its existence (PR §151). 
 
Strikingly enough, this outlook seems to retain nothing of the “moral” point of view, for 
it replaces reflection with something that looks to be its opposite, habit.   
 Thus it is no surprise that this transition has given rise to a host of concerns.  If 
Hegel is indeed privileging habit in this way, does it mean he wants us to refrain from 
engaging in reflection altogether?  And if so, how can this avoid amounting to a “blind” 
immersion in social life?  Such an immersion would not just be pernicious on political 
grounds, cementing an unquestioning acceptance of the status quo.  It would also involve 
a kind of regress to an earlier stage in history, perhaps to that of the Greeks, at least in the 
way Hegel himself characterized them.  As Allen Wood remarks, “[the] ethical attitude 
seems primitive or immature by comparison with the reflective moral attitude with which 
Hegel often favorably contrasts it.”4  This would not be all that surprising, given that the 
Greek polis is one of Hegel’s inspirations for modern ethical life.  But it would mean that 
he is asking us to renounce one of our central values.   Reflection is, after all, crucial to 
our self-understanding, as Hegel himself is well aware.  He in fact praises us for it in his 
“Preface”: “It is a great obstinacy [Eigensinn], an obstinacy that does honor to the human 
being, to be unwilling to acknowledge in attitude anything which has not been justified by 
thought – and this obstinacy is the characteristic of the modern age” (PR, 27). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




 As worrisome as these implications might be, it seems to me that we would first 
need to get a clearer sense of what Hegel means by habit and of what contribution it is 
meant to make to modern ethical life before we are in a position to assess their depth 
and scope.  So my main aim in this chapter is to develop a Hegelian conception of habit 
with the above questions in mind.  I hope that it will dispel at least some worries, for I 
suspect that many of them derive from a certain conception of habit, a conception I 
think Hegel seeks to challenge.  But I am aware that it will probably not dispel all of 
them.  It seems to me that part of the difficulty has less to do with habit, and more to do 
with reflection.  Although it is common to talk about reflection as if it were a single 
activity, it can take numerous forms that are at least in this context better kept apart.  It 
might be right to say that all reflection is generally speaking an exercise in “abstraction,”5 
but such abstraction can take place on a wide range of levels.  On one end of the 
spectrum is something like deliberation about what to do in a specific situation, namely 
what principles to invoke and how to apply them in action.  On the other end of the 
spectrum is something like a critical interrogation of those very principles, a questioning 
of their overall validity for action.  Although the viability of critical reflection is clearly in 
the background, habit is most overtly in tension with deliberation, for it looks like I 
cannot simultaneously act out of habit and pause to think about how to proceed.  So in 
the following I will focus primarily on the relation between habit and deliberation and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 This is the way Hegel characterizes reflection in the Introduction: “The will contains the element of pure 
indeterminacy or of the ‘I’s pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content, whether 
present immediately through nature, through needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined in some 
other way, is dissolved; this is the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thinking of 
oneself” (PR §5).  Here he is drawing a clear connection between reflection and abstraction, and is moreover 




leave the question of critique at first to the side.  It is a question to which I will return in 
the third chapter. 
 Since the problem that habit appears to present is bound up with the picture of 
“blindness” it tends to invite, we need to unpack this metaphor.  I take it that habit, even 
though it comprises our second nature, is nevertheless thought to make animals of us, for 
it replaces instinct with a new set of dispositions that are no less automatic and 
involuntary than those provided by our first.  In this vein we might think of the behavior 
of animals as paradigmatically blind, that is, if we assume that they are not following 
norms at all but acting out of natural necessity.  In this case their behavior would count 
as blind at an elementary level, because animals do not seem to be aware of why they are 
doing what they do.  Even if their behavior follows certain law-like patterns, it is not 
because they are deliberately adhering to laws.  But animal behavior would certainly 
count as blind at a higher level, given that they do not conceive of what they are doing as 
the right (or the wrong) thing to do.  Another way to put this would be to say that 
animal behavior is not guided by any kind of “insight” at all, let alone insight into the 
good. 
 Whether or not these claims are as a matter of fact true of all non-human 
animals is not at issue here, only that we incline to imagine animal behavior in this way 
and that it provides us with a paradigm of blindness we want at all cost to avoid.  
According to the standard picture, human habits are similarly determined by mere 
behavioral dispositions without engaging the thought or will of the agent, and so fall 
prey to both levels of blindness. When human beings act out of habit, they might be 
aware of what they are doing, so it is not as if they are sleepwalking.  But they are not 
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aware of why they are doing it, nor are they aware of why doing it is the right thing to 
do.  Full-fledged insight, so the story goes, is only earned through reflection.  It is only 
when I pause to deliberate and consider that I am able to proceed in a “sighted” – 
namely, deliberate and considered – manner.  To put this slightly differently, it is only 
when I have explicitly thought about what I ought to do that I am acting on norms I 
take to be good ones to uphold.  Of course it is not necessarily a problem if some of our 
behavior is a matter of habit for us, like brushing one’s teeth.  What would be a problem 
is if ethically relevant actions, such as giving alms to the homeless or simply passing 
them by, were to become habitual and correspondingly blind. 
 Although Hegel does not speak in terms of blindness, there is an analogue within 
his own vocabulary, for “immediacy” seems to capture some of the same features.  Since 
it is one of Hegel’s most fundamental terms, it has numerous definitions, not all of 
which are relevant to this context.  But one could say that, on a very general level, 
something is immediate if it is given to me in some brute way.  This can mean that it 
simply has not yet been reflectively endorsed by me and so remains immediate so long as 
it does not yet express my thought or will.  Thus I might acquire many characteristics 
long before I am in a position to evaluate them, and these would remain immediate until 
I do.  And this condition would be overcome as soon as I do evaluate and endorse them.  
But there seems to be another level to immediacy that speaks to the problem of habit 
more directly.  Something is immediate, even if I can (and do) reflectively endorse it, if it 
does not actively engage my thought or will.  This means that the needed distinction is 
lacking, for I cannot adequately distinguish myself from what determines how I behave.  
!
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Here the behavior of animals seems to be paradigmatically immediate, for it is not 
mediated by any conception they have of themselves as distinct from their instincts. 
 One could suppose that Hegel has such immediacy in mind when he describes 
habit as a “simple identification” with ethical life, where simplicity suggests an absence 
of distinction.  To identify with ethical life is to identify with my particular social role in 
it.  So to say that my identification with my social role is simple is to say that I cannot 
draw a line between it and myself and conceive of myself without it.  This identification 
is kept simple by habit, since those who act out of habit cannot help but enact the 
demands of their social role, whatever they happen to be, because these demands have 
become entrenched in fixed behavioral tendencies to meet them.  But it is not clear 
whether Hegel could be referring to immediacy of this kind.  The problem is that, if 
habit proves to be so immediate, Hegel would be in deep trouble, because he would 
have to deny that participation in ethical life could ever count as ethical in any relevant 
sense, for such participatory behavior would not even be norm-governed at all, let alone 
governed by norms that we take to be good ones to uphold.  
 This seems to me to be a bullet that Hegel would clearly never bite.  Even 
though he abandons a strictly moral standpoint on action, he claims that his account of 
ethical life can accommodate a notion of virtue, which he sometimes refers to as the 
“ethical disposition” (sittliche Gesinnung).  He moreover suggests that this disposition must 
incorporate insight into the good, without which it would fall short of subjective 
freedom.6  So he needs to be able to square these two claims, namely, to show that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Hegel’s argument for this is indirect and embedded in his critique of conscience.  The lesson we are meant 
to learn from the failures of conscience is that there can be such a thing as “true conscience,” which is “the 
disposition to will what is good in and for itself” (PR §137), but that “true conscience is contained in the ethical 
disposition” (PR §137R).  What this means is that the kind of moral requirement imposed by true conscience, 
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habitual comportment he so privileges could even be regarded as a manifestation not 
just of trained patterns of behavior, but also of a specifically ethical “frame of mind”.7 
 Interestingly enough, Hegel suggests an even bolder thesis.  He is suggesting not 
that virtue could take the form of habit, though it could take other forms as well.  
Rather, his thesis is that virtue is habit.  I take this to be implied by the above passage 
(paragraphs 151), in which Hegel insists on a strong identification between the ethical 
and the habitual.  This identification is a strong one because Hegel goes beyond 
conceding that what we do out of habit can, under certain circumstances, count as 
ethical conduct.  His claim rather is that we cannot be ethical without habit, that we 
cannot be regarded as virtuous unless acting ethically is something we habitually do.  
Virtue for him seems positively to require a “habit of the ethical”. 
 So this habit of the ethical presents us with two puzzles.  First, how can the 
ethical ever appear in the form of habit, or how can our habitual conduct ever count as 
an expression of virtue?  Second, why must the ethical appear in the form of habit, or 
why is it only our habitual conduct that counts as an adequate expression of virtue?  
These puzzles have to my knowledge remained undetected.8  The standard strategy for 
defending Hegel on this front is to point out that he only ascribes this habit of the 
ethical to those who already inhabit modern ethical life, which he thinks is an objectively 
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namely the requirement that I can grasp the goodness of the norms I am asked to follow, can and even must 
be met by the ethical disposition, whatever this turns out to be. 
 
7 This is the translation of Gesinnung that Fred Neuhouser recommends.  See Neuhouser (2000), 85 (2n). 
 
8 One exception is perhaps Goldstein, though I do not see how he resolves the puzzle.  He does state that 
“despite the appearance of unreflective obedience, Hegel’s conception of habit [involves] … a robust self-
awareness that integrates modes of knowing from Kantian duty to ancient virtue to modern rectitude” (2004, 
483). But all he can show is how habit preserves the content of duty, virtue, and rectitude, not how habit 
itself can be regarded as a form of knowledge. 
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rational social order.9  For example, as Ido Geiger qualifies, “Hegel holds that such 
immediate action is moral, if its agent has been acculturated within a just society.”10  But 
this does not yet explain why Hegel thinks it is better, even if only for those inside a just 
society, to act in this immediate way.  Nor does it explain how Hegel can hold this view 
without conceiving of “immediate” action in a significantly different way.  The best it 
can do is to point out that Hegel is not encouraging us to make a habit out of heeding 
the dictates of an ethically objectionable social order. 
 There has been a more promising strategy for making sense of Hegel’s position.  
According to this strategy, habit is supposed to address the issue of motivation.  To be 
more precise, habituation has the central function, not of making our conduct habitual, 
but of reforming our inclinations to accord with our duties.  In this way it provides us 
with additional motives for doing what we know we ought to do.  As Fred Neuhouser 
puts this, “The force of Hegel’s emphasis on habit is to make a point about how socially 
free individuals are motivationally constituted – that their desires, dispositions, and 
values are formed by their upbringing such that their social participation is largely 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Some commentators have tried to argue that §151 describes agents who have not yet reached maturity.  For 
example, Thomas Lewis calls this “pre-reflective ethical life,” arguing that the “individual begins in immediate 
identification with ethical life as an existing system of customs and values,” before moving on to reflect on 
them (2008, 38).  Similarly, Allen Wood interprets Hegel’s claim that in habit spirit becomes present in the 
world as implying “that spirit also exists in other, later, more developed forms” (198). But as Paul Franco 
(1999) has pointed out, “there is little evidence…to suggest that Hegel means this passage to be understood 
in this developmental way” (1990, 230).  I agree with Franco that Hegel gives us every reason to believe that 
he is here talking about fully formed ethical agents.  What we find within the chapter of “Ethical Life” is not 
a kind of development in which the earlier characterizations of the free will are fundamentally challenged and 
substantially revised.  It is a characterization that is meant to be subsequently elaborated, not abandoned.  
Moreover, Hegel invokes habit again in his discussion of the political disposition, which he defines as a 
“certainty based on truth (whereas merely subjective certainty does not originate in truth, but is only opinion) 
and a volition which has become habitual” (PR §268). 
 10!Geiger (2007), 3.!
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spontaneous, or ‘comes naturally’ to them.”11  This strategy has significant advantages, 
for it does not require that we think of ethical conduct itself as a matter of habit.  In 
other words, our activity could still be preceded by deliberation and in this way directed 
by our thought and will.  What habit adds is a new set of desires to do our duty, and so 
allows us to find sensuous satisfaction in acting ethically. 
 This strategy also fits rather well into a tradition to which Hegel is evidently 
alluding.  It seems relatively clear that Hegel means to invoke Aristotle, who likewise 
grants habit a significant place in his ethical theory.  According to Aristotle, we learn 
what we ought to do through instruction, whereas habituation addresses itself to the 
non-rational part of the soul and makes it receptive to the dictates of the rational part12 
by instilling what are usually translated as “virtues of character”.  In this way habit 
cultivates the right kinds of desires and allows us to take pleasure in the right sorts of 
things.  And even though we would also need corresponding “intellectual virtues” to be 
become virtuous in the full sense, habituation is nevertheless assigned an indispensable 
task from the perspective of moral education.  Thus Aristotle stresses, “it does not make 
a small difference whether people are habituated to behave in one way or in another way 
from childhood on, but a very great one; or rather, it makes all the difference in the 
world.”13 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Neuhouser (2000), 112. 
 
12 Aristotle describes it as the non-rational part’s capacity to “listen” to reason “as if to one’s father” 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1103a4). !




 There are good grounds for thinking that Hegel wants to appropriate these 
elements of Aristotle’s theory, for he clearly disparages the austerity of the Kantian 
picture, according to which we ought to act solely out of duty, irrespective of whether our 
inclinations are thereby satisfied.  It is worth noting that Kant objects to habituation in 
part because he thinks it generates inclinations so conducive to morality that they could 
usurp the motive of duty.  At the same time, I am not persuaded that Hegel appeals to 
habit in order to rehabilitate inclination as an appropriate source of motivation.  Even if 
reforming our inclinations is one upshot of habit, I do not think that in Hegel’s 
estimation this comprises its primary contribution.  Habituation has for Hegel a far more 
rational task, so to speak, for it bears directly on our claims to ethical knowledge in the 
first place.  In short, Hegel holds that we cannot be said to know our duty unless we 
demonstrate a commitment to doing it, and we only demonstrate such a commitment 
through the habit of the ethical.  So it is habituation that brings about the frame of mind 
Hegel associates with the ethical disposition, and it is habituation that brings about the 
kind of insight we are after, so the very insight we thought habit was incapable of 
exhibiting. 
 It is especially surprising, I think, that Hegel’s official account of habit in his 
“Anthropology”14 has not been brought to bear on his rather elliptical remarks in the 
Philosophy of Right.15  As we will see, this “anthropological” account does introduce 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14!It might be helpful to place this text, which is not self-standing, but comprises a sub-section of “Subjective 
Spirit” in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.  The Encyclopedia is meant to serve as the comprehensive 
exposition of Hegel’s “system”, and so incorporates the subject matter of the Philosophy of Right as well, in the 
later division called “Objective Spirit,” albeit in abbreviated form. !
15 One exception is Thomas A. Lewis (2008).  In this paper he does relate Hegel’s discussion of habit in the 
“Anthropology” to the role of habit in ethical life, but he nevertheless associates it with “pre-reflective ethical 
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difficulties of its own, for it seems on the face of it to confirm the standard picture of 
habit as essentially blind.  So I admit that we might not see its connection to the habit of 
the ethical at first sight, and that drawing such a connection can even make matters 
worse, for here Hegel explicitly characterizes habit as “immediate” in the problematic 
sense.  But a closer look at this account does reveal habit to be capable of a more 
complicated structure than this invocation of immediacy initially suggests.  In the 
“Anthropology” we discover a form of habit that is sighted in a way that the habit of the 
ethical would have to be in order to be considered ethical. 
 In the following my aim will be to resolve both puzzles, and so disambiguate the 
habit of the ethical and clarify the basis of its centrality in modern ethical life.  I will 
begin by motivating the kind of difficulty that habit seems to pose for Hegel, especially 
in light of his anthropological account.  I will do this by bringing his account in dialogue 
with Kant’s, which is explicitly developed from a “pragmatic point of view,” and so with 
a view to the ethical contribution of habit as such.  I will then explain why I think Hegel 
nonetheless wants to identify virtue with habit, what leads him to think that only habit 
can adequately express a truly ethical disposition.  Finally, I will return to habit in the 
“Anthropology” in order to question whether the account he gives in that context really 
poses the kind of difficulty it seemed to at first glance.  Although I hope to show that 
the difficulty can be resolved and that the habit of the ethical can assume its central place 
in the modern social order, I will conclude by returning to some of the dangers that we 
might think even the habit of the ethical so conceived could never completely shed.  
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Despite his optimism, Hegel seems to be well aware of them and traces them back to the 
ineliminable proximity between habit and death. 
 
I. Pragmatic Point of View 
It is instructive to explore the difficulty facing the habit of the ethical with the help of 
Kant, who denies in rather blunt terms that habit could ever be ethical in the first place.  
As he puts it in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, “as a rule all habits are 
reprehensible”16 and so unsuitable to the ends of ethics.  Given the central tenets of his 
moral theory, especially the significance he places on autonomy, this verdict is not all 
that surprising.  As Kant sees it, habit is “a physical inner necessitation to proceed in the 
same manner that one has proceeded until now”,17 and so appears to introduce a 
compulsion inimical to free activity.  When a certain activity becomes habitual, it falls 
outside our immediate control and so ceases to be relevantly up to us.  In other words, 
we are no longer willing our own actions and so are no longer fully in charge of what we 
do.  As this characterization shows, one need not subscribe to Kant’s robust conception 
of autonomy in order to see the problem, for habit proves incompatible with freedom in 
a fairly minimal sense.  When I act out of habit, I seem to no longer be following norms 
at all, irrespective of whether or not these norms ultimately stem from my rational 
nature.  To put this in Kantian terms, I am no longer acting on a conception of the law, 
even though to an observer my behavior probably looks to be exceptionally lawful. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16!Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 7:149. 
 
17 Ibid 7:147 and 7:149.!
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 Although Kant is talking about habit in general terms, he appears to be 
particularly concerned to deny that virtue can have any relation to habit, let alone require 
it.  As he puts it in the Anthropology, “virtue is moral strength in adherence to one’s duty, 
which never should become habit but should always emerge entirely new and original 
from one’s way of thinking”,18 adding that habit “deprives even good actions of their 
moral worth before it impairs the freedom of the mind”.19  His unyielding stance is 
clearly intended to be a response to Aristotle, who regards habit as integral to a virtuous 
life.  Although some have attempted to stress its significance,20 virtue does not seem to 
occupy a central place in Kant’s official theory, mainly because he does not think it 
provides a criterion by which to evaluate the moral worth of an action.  Each action is to 
be evaluated on the basis of its corresponding motive, and not on the basis of the agent’s 
overall character.  But Kant does think he can give an account of virtue that fits his 
theory.  In his words, virtue is moral strength in adherence to one’s duty, a strength that 
persists from one action to another and lends consistency to the series of discrete deeds 
that comprise one life.  Although Kant does not put it in quite these terms, one could 
say that for him one attains the requisite moral strength by becoming thoroughly 
principled, by choosing to live one’s life in a principled manner.  Virtue for him would 
then amount to nothing more, and nothing less, than adherence to principles.21 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Ibid 7:147. 
 
19 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 7:149. 
 
20 See for example Barbara Hermann (2007b). 
 21!I admit that it is perhaps confusing to talk of a plurality of principles in Kant’s case, for he seems to be 
interested only in one principle: the moral law.  At the same time, he suggests that all action, even action that 
is morally impermissible, is guided by rules that can be articulated as maxims.  As Patricia Kitcher (2003) has 
shown, maxims for Kant must possess a certain rule-like form already if they are to be measured by the 
master principle of the categorical imperative, which asks whether the rule they contain could become a law. !
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 As I mentioned, Kant’s objection to habit on this front is frequently tied to his 
rather ascetic picture of moral motivation that grants no positive prospect to any motive 
other than duty as such.  If habituation is meant to incline us to act morally, it can never 
supplant the motive of duty without robbing our dutiful actions of moral worth.  
Admittedly, this does not yet mean that we should instead do nothing to rid ourselves of 
inclinations to act immorally, inclinations that directly conflict with duty and compete 
with its influence on our will.  In that case habituation could plausibly play a negative 
role of eradicating wayward desires, or at least lessening their power over us, without 
cultivating better desires in their stead.  But as a new study by Robert Stern provocatively 
argues, Kant seems to think that the very concept of duty hinges on a friction with 
inclination that is responsible for the experience of necessitation distinctive of morality.  
We are not and should not aspire to be holy wills, wills that face no temptation to do 
anything other than what is right and good.  Since holy wills are not subject to 
imperatives in the first place, the categorical imperative so central to morality has no grip 
on them.22 
 Though I do find this convincing as an interpretation of Kant, I think we could 
even temper Kant’s ascetic picture without thereby losing the basis of his final verdict 
against habit.  Even if we concede that habituation can contribute to the ends of ethics 
by disciplining our desires and so moderating the friction they impose, it is still clear that 
habit could never produce actions of moral worth.  Given Kant’s conception of habit as 
a physical inner necessitation to proceed in the same manner as before, it is clear that 
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any attempt to turn principles into habits is to give up on principles altogether, to strip 
them of their role as conscious and deliberate guides of our conduct.  So Kant seems to 
share the standard picture of habit we ourselves have brought to the table.  Interestingly 
enough, the problem is not that habit would make holy wills of ours.  In fact, it is quite 
the opposite.  As he puts it, “the reason why the habits of another stimulate the arousal 
of disgust in us is that here the animal in the human being jumps out far too much, and 
that here one is led instinctively by the rule of habituation, exactly like another (non-
human) nature, and so runs the risk of falling into one and the same class with the 
beast”.23  When we act out of habit, we are not properly speaking choosing the next step 
we take, and so we are in a sense no longer actively following rules at all.  A necessitation 
structurally no different from instinct has taken over our conduct. 
 While Hegel clearly wants to shed various dualisms at the basis of Kant’s theory, 
including the dualism between duty and inclination, he cannot so easily escape the 
problem Kant thinks faces the habit of the ethical.  Whatever inspiration he may have 
found in Aristotle’s theory, Hegel remains concerned with the possibility of freedom and 
regards it as no different from the possibility of living an ethical life.  Unlike for Kant, 
who equated freedom with autonomy, freedom for Hegel is a multifaceted ideal that 
involves a two-fold structure, for it contains an objective as well as a subjective 
component.  We are objectively free when we inhabit a rational social order, one whose 
instituted norms are as a matter of fact good and right, and inside this order we do not 
need to apply the categorical imperative in order to figure out what to do.  But even if 
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we are lucky enough to inhabit such an order, we must also be subjectively free, namely, 
we must grasp these instituted norms as good and right.24  This is an aspect of the 
“moral” perspective which Hegel thinks is best crystallized in Kant and which he does 
not want to abandon. 
 Although subjective freedom in this sense is not exclusively a matter of 
motivation, it does bear on the reasons I have for doing what I do.  One might say that 
Hegel rejects the dualism between duty and inclination not because he denies that they 
can be conceptually distinguished or that they can practically conflict.  Rather, he rejects 
this dualism because he deems it too abstract, and so a product of excessive abstraction.  
As an agent acting within the rational social order, I am moved neither by considerations 
of duty nor by those of inclination, but by the rational social order itself.  To translate this 
into a bit of Hegelese, this order is the “universal” made “concrete” through the 
demands of my specific roles.  Granted, I probably do not have the social order as whole 
in mind whenever I act, and sustaining it is probably not my reason for enacting my role 
within it.  But because the survival of this order is at stake in each of its official 
institution, even in most of its informal practices, I am faced with it in the largely 
mundane situations in which I find myself.  Thus Hegel tells us that someone who is 
subjectively free “does not have the self-consciousness of [her] own particularity, but has 
it only in the universal.  This must be done, so I want to do it – for the sake of the thing 
(die Sache), not for my own sake, must the thing be done” (VRP, 291).  In short, it is die 
Sache that moves me to act, and not any idea I might have about what duty demands or 
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24 Hegel identifies this as the “right of subjectivity”, which he defines as the requirement “that whatever [the 




what I wish I could do instead.  And die Sache is nothing other than whatever is at stake 
in the specific situations that confront me day in and day out. 
 Even this mere sketch provides clues into Hegel’s alternative proposal.  It shows 
that Hegel is critical of the kind of mediation that both considerations of inclination and 
of duty introduce, for choosing either requires that we step back from the situation that 
is calling us to act and preoccupy ourselves with our inner lives instead.  But it also 
shows that Hegel cannot really be recommending that we act ethically because it is our 
habit, or that acting ethically become so habitual that we act on the basis of no reasons at 
all.  Both of these outcomes would mean that we are no longer acting for the sake of die 
Sache, that we have lost sight of it altogether, and that we cease to grasp what we do as 
being good or right.  As Hegel overtly admits, “It is of course not irrelevant whether I 
do something from habit or custom or from persuasion of its truth” (PR §140A).  So 
Hegel inherits the problem that the habit of the ethical presents, even if he does not 
want to take Kant’s moral theory (especially his account of motivation) on board. 
 It is for this reason striking that the picture of habit we find in Hegel’s version of 
an “Anthropology”, though significantly more developed, echoes Kant’s own.  Hegel 
also defines habit along the lines of a physical inner necessitation, calling it a 
“mechanism”.25  This is for Hegel the lowest form of natural necessity, one that is even 
lower than the necessity exhibited by mere organisms, and so it must be most distant 
from whatever necessity freedom might impose.  And there are other similarities worth 
noting.  Even the general subject matter of Hegel’s “Anthropology” converges with that 
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25 Hegel claims that “habit is a determination of feeling, as well as intelligence and will, that has been made 




of Kant’s, for it is likewise concerned with a set of subjective faculties abstracted from 
any specific form of social life.  And although Hegel’s is not written from an explicitly 
“pragmatic point of view,” it can also be read with a view to how these subjective 
faculties are eventually actualized in ethical life.  Part of Hegel’s argument is, after all, 
that “Subjective Spirit” anticipates what he calls “Objective Spirit” (a portion of the 
Encyclopedia that covers the same territory as the Philosophy of Right) and so can only 
become fully realized within the social context it provides. 
 Despite these broad similarities, the particular place of the “Anthropology” 
within the Encyclopedia as a whole must be kept in mind, for this chapter is suppose to 
contribute to a larger story tracking the development of a self-conscious I out of the 
shortcomings within the natural state of self-feeling, a state we share with other animals.  
This means that habit is here viewed from a specific systematic vantage point, one that 
could potentially limit its ethical relevance.  To be more precise, Hegel is here interested 
in the contribution habit makes to our emergence out of mere nature.  Indeed most of 
his examples are of habits that help us cope with our natural surroundings, rather than 
those that might help us navigate our social world.  So it is not self-evident that this 
account can shed any light on what he means by the habit of the ethical. 
 It is also important to note that, despite his interest in anthropology, Hegel does 
not consider habit to be a uniquely human phenomenon and he already introduces it at 
the end of his preceding “Philosophy of Nature”.  In fact the kinds of habits that Hegel 
here describes are for the most part those we share with non-human animals, for animals 
too might need to train certain dispositions in order to inhabit their surroundings more 
successfully.  Catherine Malabou for instance challenges the very distinction between 
!
26 
first and second nature, arguing that “the account developed here shows that, for Hegel, 
nature is always second nature”.  She goes on to raise the question, “If all animals are 
habituated animals, how do we distinguish the boundaries of that exemplary living being 
called man.”26  This is a fair question, for Hegel seems to be surprisingly indifferent to 
such boundaries. 
 But despite this fraught context in which habit is first introduced, I do not think 
its placement within the Encyclopedia makes it irrelevant for our purposes, since Hegel 
does claim to be delineating the very form of habit, one that is ultimately independent of 
its initially natural content and can eventually come to bear an ethical content as well.  So 
we would next need to delineate this general form of habit as such before we can 
determine its subsequent relevance to ethical life. 
  
II. Anthropological Account 
Hegel defines habit at this formal level as “the soul’s making itself an abstract universal 
being and reducing the particulars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of 
its being” (E §410).  In order to make sense of this definition, we should note that habit 
is being introduced at a crucial juncture, namely, as a solution to the madness of “self-
feeling.”  Because at the level of self-feeling I was unable to distinguish myself from my 
feelings, these in short drove me in conflicting directions and ultimately tore me apart.  
Habit represents an advance because it allows for a different kind of self-relation.  In 
other words, it is habit that first introduces the distinction between my self and my 
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feelings, and so reduces them to the level of “determinations”.  In one commentator’s 
helpful formulation, they are now no longer me, but mine.27  This self-relation turns out to 
be relevant to assessing the supposed immediacy of habit and its potential compatibility 
with reflection.  But whatever this self-relation amounts to, it is significantly an 
achievement of habituation. 
 In fact Hegel seems to be far more interested in this process itself than in its 
result.  And it is not difficult to see why he might be, for habituation is unequivocally a 
kind of activity, an active molding through repetition and practice, and so a deliberate 
effort to take possession of my own body and make it conform more effectively to my 
will.  Although habituation is not always intentionally undertaken, habituating myself 
does require the exercise of my intellect and the conscious control of my movements 
and limbs.  Through practice and repetition, I alter some of my natural determinations 
(by learning to stand upright) as well as give myself new determinations, produced by me 
(by learning, say, to fashion a spear).  This makes habituation for Hegel a “spiritual” 
process, which means that it is mediated by my thought and will.  During it I am guided 
by a conception of what I aspire to become, and I am making something out of myself 
and so positing a newly fashioned self where there was once only raw material in me.  
He even announces at this rather early point in the system that that “the form of habit 
encompasses all sorts and stages of the activity of spirit” (E §410), suggesting that 
habituation is a paradigmatically “spiritual” process and that all others will eventually 
emulate its basic structure.  Spirit is identified with the activity of self-determination, and 
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this activity is presumably most vivid when I am compelled to abstract away from what 
was given to me in order to earn my identification with it.  Any habituation I might 
undertake positively requires both of these acts – of abstraction and of identification – 
from me. 
 The result of this process is, however, a thornier matter.  So let me start with one 
of its benefits that Hegel singles out to be of lasting value.  Hegel states that, at the most 
basic level at least, “habit possesses the greatness to be freed from that to which one is 
habituated” (E §410).  He is thinking of habituation as a process of liberation, of 
emancipation from our prior imprisonment in “first” nature, and so understands its 
enduring contribution in primarily negative terms.  To be more precise, habits free us 
from the overwhelming and maddening imposition of sensations, from the distracting 
effects of drives and desires, and even from the mental exertion involved in acquiring 
skills like learning how to carve and throw a spear.28  In this respect, habit can even 
contribute to activities of a higher sort, though only indirectly.  By eliminating these 
extraneous sources of imposition, distraction, and exertion, it clears our attention for 
more cerebral matters, like philosophy.29 
 There is a further benefit, which strikes me as even more valuable, though also 
more difficult to discern.  The process of habituation goes beyond quieting the influence 
of feeling broadly construed, for it also lifts us from our immersion in the sea of feeling 
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28 Hegel distinguishes between three types of habits – habits of hardening (Abhärtung), specifically to 
sensations; habits of indifference (Gleichgültigkeit), specifically toward the satisfaction of desires; and habits of 
skill (Geschicklichkeit).  I will return to this taxonomy below. 
 
29 For example: “[Habit] is free from them [sensations, etc.] insofar as it is not interested in and preoccupied 
with them; by existing in these forms as its possession, it is likewise open to further activity and occupation – 




and raises us above this sea.   As Hegel’s very definition suggests, habituation introduces 
a new self-relation made possible through its laborious effort to differentiate myself 
from my determinations.  In this way it seems to establish a potentially reflective relation I 
might adopt to that which determines me.  Granted, at this stage I do not yet know how 
to reflect on my determinations, particularly what standards to employ in deciding which 
among them to shed and which to keep.  Hegel nevertheless calls habit the achievement 
of a “reflexive universality”, which is more than a structural point and carries some 
pretty robust implications.  It means, for one, that I now can abstract away from at least 
some of my determinations, which in turn means that I now must in some sense identify 
with each of them.  Once habituation is complete, the principal lesson it has taught me is 
that my nature is not my fate and that I have the power to reform myself, which renders 
me accountable for those determinations that I could in principle alter.  But even if I 
find that there are aspects of my nature that are not malleable by me, I have to own up 
to all of my determinations, including those that I did not willingly acquire.  From the 
perspective of habit, I can never again abnegate credit for who I have become.  I take 
this to follow from the self-relation that habit introduces, for to have “determinations” is 
to take them to be mine and so to grant them minimally my tacit assent. 
 The problem seems to be that we are at most actively reflecting while we are in 
the process of forming habits.  Once these are fully formed, we no longer need to reflect 
about what we are doing, even if we remain in principle no less capable of doing so.  But 
Hegel even notes that reflection can be practically incompatible with habitual behavior.  
For example, “Adopted directly, without thinking, his upright stance continues through the 
persistent involvement of his will.  Man stands upright only because and insofar as he 
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wants to stand, and only as long as he wills to do so without consciousness of this” (E 
§410).  In claiming that I can will this posture only as long as I am not conscious of it, he 
is pointing out that, for some habits at least, I cannot think about what I am doing while 
I am doing it.  It is only because I am not attending to my posture that I can stand 
upright, for turning my attention to it could destabilize it in a similar way in which 
attention has on occasion made me forget the code to my apartment building, which I 
otherwise enter unthinkingly every day.30 
 But habitual behavior does not seem to be Hegel’s primary concern in this 
chapter.  His taxonomy divides habits into three categories – those that strengthen us 
against sensations, those that make us indifferent to our desires, and skills – of which 
only the last contains habits that manifest themselves in anything like full-fledged 
activity.  One of the reasons why Hegel is especially concerned with these “negative” 
habits (as I call those of the first two categories) has to do with their unequivocally 
liberating function, since it is they that free up our consciousness without impinging on 
it.  Through repeated exposure, habituation makes us increasingly oblivious to various 
feelings, sensations, or desires that would otherwise capture our attention.  As Hegel 
puts it, the soul is “free from them insofar as it is not interested and occupied with 
them” (E §410).  This is especially true of those habits that fortify our bodies, like the 
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30 This is somewhat reminiscent of Hubert Dreyfus’s concept of expertise he calls “embodied coping”.  
Dreyfus argues that this expertise requires that it be and remain unreflective and it is fundamentally 
threatened by the intrusion of reflection.  He provides the following example to illustrate this point: “As 
second baseman for the New York Yankees, Knoblauch was... voted best infielder of the year, but one day, 
rather than simply fielding a hit and throwing the ball to first base, it seems he stepped back and took up a 
‘free, distanced orientation‘ towards the ball and how he was throwing it – the mechanics of it, as he put it. 
After that, he couldn‘t recover his former absorption and often – though not always – threw the ball to first 




hardening of the skin to cold temperatures, but also of those that lessen the force of our 
natural desires like thirst or hunger.  In both cases, we become so accustomed to 
something that we cease to notice it, thus banishing it from our minds.31  And Hegel’s 
point is that such habits are able to free up our consciousness precisely because they are 
themselves “unconscious” (bewusstlos). 
 As far as negative habits go, this strikes me as a relatively unproblematic claim.  
These seem to be most obviously unconscious precisely because they are not really habits 
at all, but rather passive filters standing guard against various unwanted influences.  And 
they are most obviously liberating because without them we would have less control 
over our mind and will.  What we need to examine is whether this is true of habitual 
activities as well, whether “positive” habits are similarly unconscious.  The positive 
habits Hegel describes fall for the most part in the category of skill, and he argues that 
even skills must be in a certain sense unconscious in order to fulfill their own liberating 
function.  In learning a skill, we initially need to pay a great deal of attention to what we 
are doing, but we truly possess a skill only when we can go on automatically.  For 
example, someone who is first learning how to play the piano is conscious to the 
position and motion of every finger, but a virtuoso has mastered the art to such an 
extent that she is no longer aware of the different steps she is taking while playing.  It is 
as if her hands now have a mind of their own.  Being skilled in this way is liberating 
because it makes my body into a more efficient instrument, which it becomes once I no 
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31 For Hegel, habituation is a more effective measure than efforts to eradicate sensations and desires 
altogether.  He criticizes the ascetic solution, since ascetics are completely preoccupied with the very 
determinations they are trying to negate.  According to Hegel, someone who has grown so accustomed to 




longer need to be aware of its every movement.  A skilled body allows me to attain my 
aims more effectively because it does not require as much cognitive exertion on my part.  
In this respect, skills do resemble the so-called activity of standing upright, even when 
they are consciously cultivated and directed at higher ends. 
 But the liberation these habits enable seems to come at a significant cost.  Even 
though all habit has an invaluable function of liberating us from aspects of our given 
nature, it can regrettably fulfill this function only by putting another nature in its place.  
This looks to be the conclusion to which Hegel himself arrives, for it often sounds as if 
he thinks that, once we are saddled with a host of fully formed habits, these inherit the 
status of immediacy from which we in turn need to be liberated.  To put this slightly 
differently, the process of habituation may well be an exercise of freedom, but once this 
process has come to an end, we end up with something that looks far too much like the 
very thing we sought to escape – subjection to compulsion beyond our direct control.  
Thus Hegel is happy to remind us that “habit has with right been called a second nature 
– nature, for it is an immediate being of the soul – and a second, for it is an immediacy 
posited by the soul” (E §410).  Insofar as it is a second nature, it is a product of free 
activity.  But what we are dealing with remains nature and thus a form of blind immediacy 
determined by mechanical necessity. 
 It is not difficult to see that, if this were true of the very form of habit, habit as 
such would prove to be unsuitable to ethical action.  In other words, it is one thing to 
admit that some habits are bad because of their content, because of the kinds of 
behaviors they produce.  And such habits would presumably strike us as compulsory, 
because we would be unable to see our own volition reflected in them.  Consider, for 
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example, exemplary instances of implicit biases, such as the habit of addressing oneself 
automatically to the members of one social group rather than those of another while 
conversing at a philosophy department reception.  I may wish this habit away, may wish 
that I made an equal amount of eye contact with all of my interlocutors, irrespective of 
whether they are, say, men or women.  So when in these contexts I direct or avert my 
attention in habitual ways, I would be acting unfreely.  But is this due to the particular 
habits I have developed, or is it part and parcel of habit as such?  In other words, am I 
always unfree whenever I act habitually, even if my habits seems to me to be good ones, 
like that of recycling? 
 The standard reading of Hegel’s account has answered that, yes, habit as such 
must be unfree.  While cultivating habits comprises a significant stage in our ethical 
development, it is a stage that needs to be surpassed in order to attain an even higher 
form of subjective freedom.  At best habit is preserved as a background to our free 
activity, because certain habits need to remain in place in order for us to be able to 
engage in more sophisticated projects.  As Hegel himself points out, we would be unable 
to do philosophy unless we were used to sitting hunched over and reading for long 
periods of time and unless we had learned to ignore certain sources of temptation, like 
that to go online.32  A popular Internet blocking software meant to compensate for the 
failure of habit is even appropriately named “Freedom”.  But it is indisputable, according 
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32 Hegel explicitly mentions the dependence of philosophy on habit in his Addition to §151 of the Philosophy of 
Right, when he writes that “habit belongs to the ethical just as it belongs to philosophical thinking, since the 
latter demands that spirit be cultivated against arbitrary ideas and that these be eliminated and overcome so 
that rational thinking can have free reign”. !
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to this reading, that Hegel thinks freedom itself could never become habitual without 
ceasing to be freedom at all. 
 Although he is my no means alone,33 John McCumber provides an especially 
lucid articulation of such a reading.  According to McCumber, habit has no more than 
the instrumental value of liberating us from our first nature, and to this end it does not 
matter which habits we develop.  Even bad habits can play such a liberating role “to the 
extent that, by replacing or supplementing characteristics acquired at birth, habit lifts us 
up and out of nature itself, toward the ‘second nature’ we ourselves have created”.34  But 
given that all habits are unconscious and largely passive, they reintroduce a form of 
compulsion that we would need to transcend.  Thus he concludes that Hegel “views 
habit as, like falsity, a phenomenon of transition which, though not good in itself, can 
help bring about a better state of affairs.  This, its liberating role, is its ‘essential 
determination’”.35 
 While there is admittedly considerable textual evidence in support of such a 
reading, it cannot reflect Hegel’s final word on the matter, especially within the 
Encyclopedia at large.  Thus it is worth recalling the systematic context of the 
anthropological account.  Since its particular purpose is to explain the transition from 
mere nature into “spiritual” territory, Hegel is here considering habit first and foremost 
with this transition in mind.   But this is not its only systematic place.  In fact habit 
returns in “Objective Spirit”, where Hegel investigates modern ethical life.  And as we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Another example of this is Lewis, where he writes that “the more internalized or natural a habit is to us, the 
more it is something given, necessary, and not fully free” (2008, 56).!
 





have seen in the companion text, The Philosophy of Right, Hegel grants habit in modern 
ethical life what may look to be a puzzling centrality, given its supposed formal 
shortcomings.  His concern in this social context is, however, no longer the transition 
out of first nature, but rather a return back to nature, so to speak.  As he puts it, in 
ethical life “self-conscious freedom has become nature” (E §513) once again.  So even if 
McCumber is right to read the anthropological account in the literal way that he does, he 
is in any case too quick to conclude that any resemblance our second nature might bear 
to our first pits it against freedom.  Next I want to consider what attracts Hegel to this 
very resemblance. 
 
III. Ethical Disposition 
In proposing that we turn self-conscious freedom, which we presumably won through 
liberation from nature, back into nature, I take Hegel to be obliquely objecting to Kant 
on terms that are in large part Kant’s own.  As Kant sees it, virtue can never become 
habitual without losing its basis in principles, for as soon as we make them our habit, we 
stop following them in a free manner, which means that we stop strictly speaking 
following them at all.  Hegel’s proposal challenges this line of thought, for it suggests 
that such a self-conscious relation to principles indicates precisely the opposite – that we 
are not yet following them freely.  According to Hegel, freedom is only fully realized and 
so only is freedom in the fullest sense when it appears in seemingly natural guise, as the 
habit of the ethical.  Note that Hegel’s claim is quite strong.  He is not simply saying that 
habit is one form that being principled can take, but that we prove to be principled only 
when principles have for us assumed a habitual form.  In the following, I will trace the 
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line of thought that leads Hegel to this striking conclusion, one that runs so unabashedly 
counter to the Kantian picture of virtue. 
 My suggestion is that, in order to make sense of this reappearance of habit in 
ethical life, we need to look to Hegel’s competing picture of virtue.  To be fair, Hegel 
was not fond of the term “virtue” or Tugend.  He mentions it every once in a while, and 
not always unfavorably, but virtue for him remains too closely wedded to virtuosity and 
to the moral genius of exceptional individuals.36  He thinks that, in a rational social order 
such as our own, virtuosity and genius are no longer needed and virtue becomes, even if 
not thoroughly commonplace, nevertheless largely mundane.  Whereas for the Greeks, 
for example, ethical action required heroic personal qualities, this is no longer the case in 
modern ethical life, in which virtue need not stand out against the backdrop of an 
inadequate social world.  In our world, virtue is almost invisible because it rarely requires 
anything above rectitude, or the “ethical order reflected in the individual character” (PR 
§150).  This is for Hegel an indication not of lowered expectations on our part, but of 
the rationality of modern social life, which does not demand the same level of personal 
sacrifice. 
 At the same time, Hegel does speak of something quite similar, which he calls 
the ethical disposition and which he characterizes as a “simple, undeviating, fixed 
orientation” (LNR, 132). This disposition is in many respects the modern inheritor of 
what virtue was for the Greeks, and as we will see, it retains elements of an outlook 
Hegel associates with figures like Antigone.  Here a fuller definition he offers: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 As Hegel puts it, “Virtue consists rather in ethical virtuosity, and if we speak less about virtue nowadays 





  An ethical disposition on the part of the subject involves setting aside reflection, which 
  is always ready to pass over from universal substance to the particular.  It involves  
  knowing and recognizing the universal element of substance, the laws, as an eternal  
  mode of being subsisting in and for itself and as the distinctive essence of self- 
  consciousness; and it involves acting in, and being simply oriented toward, its  
  substantive vocation (LNR, 132). 
 
It bears noting that Hegel begins by contrasting the ethical disposition with a reflective 
stance, suggesting that one possesses it only when one has set reflection aside.  There 
are, however, two aspects of Hegel’s definition that do bring it remarkably close to the 
Kantian conception.  According to Hegel, possessing an ethical disposition involves 
knowing and recognizing the “universal element of substance,” which Hegel specifies as 
its laws.  So even though it is unreflective, the ethical disposition so defined does seem 
to recall the kind of moral strength Kant speaks of.  In both cases, virtue is what ensures 
dependability and consistency in one’s conduct, though not through mere behavioral 
dispositions, but through a corresponding frame of mind.  In other words, virtue 
consists primarily in a certain kind of ethical knowledge, knowledge that provides my 
behavior with an “orientation” toward what is good and right. 
 We could even venture to say that for both Kant and Hegel, being virtuous 
amounts to being principled, dependably and consistently so.  I take this to be suggested 
by Hegel’s insistence on the undeviating orientation toward substantial laws.  Although it 
might seem odd to translate this into the language of principles, I do think this move is 
justified, for laws and principles share a rule-like form.  The difference between them 
seems to be that laws are regarded as “out there” in an objective sense, whereas 
principles involve an element of subjective identification.  So principles are laws that 
have become at least to some degree internalized by us.   
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 Now, Hegelian principles would nevertheless have to differ in significant 
respects from the Kantian variety.  They could not, first of all, be nearly as abstract, and 
certainly neither reducible to nor derivable from anything as formal as the categorical 
imperative.  Rather, the relevant principles would have to attach to the specific social 
roles we inhabit, roles through which we partake in ethical life.  This is best visible in the 
case of professions or occupations.  For example, it is in my position as a doctor that I 
am bound by a certain code of conduct, captured in the Hippocratic Oath, and this code 
is not the same as the one pertaining to a teacher.  Moreover, in my capacity as a 
daughter and a friend I adhere to a different, perhaps less formal code.  Since we occupy 
numerous roles without access to a “master principle” like Kant’s moral law, these could 
come into genuine conflict, in which case I might find myself torn between them.  But as 
long as everything is going well, they lend dependability and consistency to what I do, 
and it is in this respect that they serve a function similar to those of the Kantian variety, 
namely, to lend unity to my conduct. 
 In fact Hegel is much more explicit than Kant in stressing that virtue is not 
manifest first and foremost in discrete actions, but in the way I lead my life.  To quote 
Hegel, “When the human being performs this or that ethical action, he is not 
immediately virtuous, but indeed then, when the manner of conduct is a steadiness of 
character” (PR §150A).  In other words, it is not enough that I muster moral strength 
every once in a while, or even most of the time.  I am only virtuous if and when all of 
my actions cohere in a certain way.  So the steadiness of my character must span over 
the manner of my conduct as a whole.  As Hegel states in a rather ruthless passage, 
“what the subject is, is the series of his actions.  If these are a series of worthless 
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productions, then the subjectivity of willing is just as worthless; but if the series of his 
deeds is of a substantive nature, then the same is true also of the inner will of the 
individual” (PR §124).  Since my life is presumably still in progress, what matters is not 
the sum total of my deeds, but the broader patterns they tend to display.  It is these 
patterns that betray my frame of mind and expose it as virtuous, or not. 
 While Hegel is not interested in reducing the ethical disposition to traits of 
character, neither does he think it can be equated with merely recognizing that certain 
principles are good ones to uphold.  For Hegel the ethical disposition has to consist in a 
commitment to live in a principled manner, for only such a commitment could lend the 
requisite unity to my conduct and ensure that my orientation remain “simple, 
undeviating, and fixed.”  Though it may already sound like a departure from Kant, this 
element is not wholly missing from Kant’s own conception of virtue.  Kant in fact 
emphasizes that virtue is founded on what he calls a “revolution of the heart” – and 
“heart” here in the sense of Gesinnung.37  According to Kant, my character must be 
grounded in a deliberate decision to lead a principled life.  This is the only way I can 
become responsible for my virtue because it is the only way I can be said to have chosen 
the principles I live by, aligning myself either with that of morality or that of self-love.38  
In the absence of such a decision, I might nonetheless recognize that the moral law is 
the one I ought to heed, but do so without aligning myself with it and so without making 
it authoritative over me. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Reason 6:47. 
 
38 Though principle of self-love does not for Kant count as a proper principle, because its content is too 
contingent on the whim of our desires.  This means that Kant does not acknowledge two kinds of character – 




 Although Hegel never engages Kant directly on this front, this seems to me to be 
the point where their respective conceptions of virtue most vividly diverge.  I think it is 
fruitful to trace this divergence in some detail.  Now, it is not clear to me whether Hegel 
thinks that we would ever need to make a deliberate decision of a revolutionary sort, 
namely, whether we must commit ourselves in a self-conscious manner to the principles 
to which we end up being committed.  At times he indicates that good upbringing is all 
that is needed in order to cultivate an ethical disposition.  He was fond of citing the story 
of the father who asked a Pythagorean for advice on how to raise a virtuous son, a 
question to which Pythagorean replied: by making him the citizen of a state with good 
laws (PR §153).  He even describes good upbringing as a process as gradual as 
habituation itself.39  Such passages do suggest that Hegel would probably consider such a 
deliberate decision superfluous, needed at most in cases of paralyzing conflict, when 
circumstances force us to pick between competing principles.  It is clear, however, that 
he would consider it in any case insufficient in achieving its end. 
 What Hegel thinks proves a genuine commitment, irrespective of the manner in 
which it is made, is a corresponding decisiveness in demeanor.  This is an aspect of virtue 
that the Kantian account not only lacks, but also cannot adequately accommodate.  On 
Kant’s picture, it makes no difference from an ethical point of view whether the right 
thing is something I do with reluctance, or whether it is something I am already ready to 
do whenever the situation should call for it.  I must in a sense be ready to do it – that is 
true.  But I can be ready to do it even if it remains difficult to do.  All that matters is that 
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I do the right thing, and for the right reason, regardless of whether doing so does or 
does not come easily to me.   
 There are moments in which it sounds as if Kant thinks it is somehow better if 
performing my duty does not come easily to me.  He says this not because such an inner 
struggle raises the moral worth of my action, but because it demonstrates the strength of 
virtue, which stands out most vividly when it perseveres in the face of sensuous 
opposition.  Other times it sounds as if Kant thinks it is simply impossible for us to 
make duty an easy matter, given our fallen condition.  In a revealing passage from the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant suggests that we can never eradicate this reluctance on our 
part: 
  The moral imperative makes this constraint known through the categorical nature of its 
  pronouncement (the unconditional ought).  Such constraint, therefore, does not apply to 
  rational beings as such (there could also be holy ones) but rather to human beings, rational 
  natural beings, who are unholy enough that pleasure can induce them to break the moral 
  law, even though they recognize its authority; and even when they do obey the law, they 
  do it reluctantly [ungern]…and it is in this that such constraint properly consists.40 
 
But I do not think we need to emphasize these moments in order to understand Hegel’s 
dissatisfaction with Kant’s view.  In other words, we do not need to charge Kant with 
idealizing the curmudgeon.  Kant can very well admit that we should do our best to 
remove this reluctance by overcoming those pleasures that induce us to break the moral 
law.  What he cannot admit is that it is somehow better from an ethical point of view 
that we do, namely, that we prove to be more virtuous (or only truly virtuous) when we 
do the right thing not just for the right reason, but without strain or restraint.   
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 Of course Hegel cannot with any plausibility be denying that doing the right 
thing can sometimes be demanding, nor can he be implying that whenever it is, our 
actions are thereby of lesser worth.  What he contests is that someone can be called 
virtuous for whom principled action is a struggle.  This is why Hegel in the end lauds the 
attitude Antigone exhibits, for her deed – albeit requiring great personal sacrifice – was 
nevertheless done with great decisiveness.  Hegel even stresses that her decisiveness was 
not an artifact of any deliberate decision on her part.  According to his famous 
characterization in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Antigone never chose to obey the divine 
law at the expense of its human counterpart.  Though she was simply assigned to the 
former, her obedience displayed an unwavering commitment to its execution.41  But this 
is not the element of Antigone’s attitude that Hegel lauds.  He even suggests that 
Antigone was to a large extent in denial about her own implication in the divine law 
precisely because she assumed that nature was responsible for her commitment to it and 
thus she failed to see that it was a commitment she herself had made. 
 What is so great about Antigone, despite all of her limitations, is that she did not 
hesitate.  Interestingly enough, Hegel explains this lack of hesitation not as evidence that 
she was plagued by no competing inclinations, but simply as a testament to the depth of 
her commitment to the law.  At the end of the preceding chapter – one of his more 
scathing criticisms of Kantian ethics – Hegel contrasts the perspective involved in 
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41 “But the ethical consciousness knows, what it has to do, and it is decided [entschieden] whether to belong to 
the divine or to the human law.  This immediacy of its decision [Entscheidung] is an being-in-itself [Ansichsein] 
and has therefore also the significance of a natural being, as we have seen; nature, and not the contingency or 
circumstances or choice (Wahl) assigns the one sex to the one, and the other to the other law” (PG §465).  It 
is worth noting that Hegel describes this consciousness as entschieden, so decided, even though it never (takes 
itself) to have come to an Entscheidung or decision.  Even if it did in some sense decide, there was nothing to 




looking to test particular laws (by, say, the measure of the categorical imperative) with 
what he there also calls the ethical disposition, which “consists in sticking steadfast to 
what is right, and abstaining from all attempts to move or shake it, or derive it” (PG 
§347).  Antigone enters the scene as the embodiment of Hegel’s preferred frame of 
mind.  From her perspective, laws simply are.  This means that she does not need first to 
inquire into the basis of their authority in order to know them to be valid.  But it is not 
as if they simply are, out there, independently of her.  Rather, she has integrated them to 
such an extent that they have become the “essence” of her self-consciousness.  She and 
the laws have grown inseparable, for not only is her sense of self bound up with them, 
but their very survival as laws that continue to be is at stake in her action. 
 While it is clear that Hegel does not want us to blame nature for our 
commitment to the laws of modern ethical life, he nevertheless hopes to retain 
significant aspects of Antigone’s relation to those of her own social order.  He even 
alludes to her in an opening paragraph of “Ethical Life” in his Philosophy of Right, 
suggesting that modern laws should similarly possess “being in and for themselves” for 
us, as the divine law did for Antigone.   This means that we should not regard them as 
awaiting our validation, though we should know them to be valid, which is to say, be 
convinced of their goodness.  It is this knowledge that makes our relation to them an 
expression of the ethical disposition, without which it would fall significantly short of 
subjective freedom. 
 But what proves our knowledge is not our ability to validate them, by subjecting 
them to a test of the Kantian sort, for example.  Rather, what proves our knowledge is 
our commitment to them.  And the more decisively we enact them, the more 
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convincingly we demonstrate our conviction in their goodness.  It is this element of 
decisiveness that Antigone introduces and that Hegel finds missing in Kant.  To return 
to this contrast with Kantian virtue, Hegel’s point, I take it, is not that such decisiveness 
would embellish or enrich our dependability and consistency.  It is rather that without it 
we cannot be said to be truly dependable and consistent in the first place.  Even in cases 
in which our ethical disposition is grounded in a deliberate decision to lead a principled 
life, such a disposition cannot be acquired overnight, and this precisely because, as Hegel 
puts it, “what one has to do, one must do straight away without further hesitation” 
(LNR, 132).  In other words, my commitment to ethical principles remains flimsy and 
unstable so long as heeding them does not come naturally to me, but remains labored 
and forced. 
 Though this goes beyond Hegel’s own description, I want to suggest that the 
ethical disposition can be characterized as whole-heartedness in the sense of an undivided 
identification.  Here I am deliberately alluding to Harry Frankfurt’s well-known use of 
this term.  Although Frankfurt makes somewhat different use of it,42 he nevertheless 
seems to have a similar phenomenon in mind, and his is the kind of relation that Hegel 
also advocates.  In Hegel’s words, “[Ethical laws] are not something alien to the subject, 
rather the subject bears a witness of spirit to them as to its own essence, in which it has 
its self-feeling and wherein it lives as in an element indistinguishable from itself – a 
relation that is more identical than even faith and trust” (PR §147).  Although this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 For example, for Frankfurt in his paper “Identification and Wholeheartedness” the objects of whole-
hearted commitment are some among our first-order desires, which we reflectively permit to motivate our 
will.  First of all, Hegel is not concerned with our commitments to particular desires, but to ethical principles.  
Secondly, for Hegel it is not essential that this commitment be made at a reflective, or “second-order” level.  




language of identification is quite strong, Hegel’s point is not that the virtuous agent 
cannot distance herself from the laws in question, should the need for such distancing 
arise.43  It is that she has integrated these laws into her sense of who she is – into her 
very nature – so that she ceases to look upon them as imperatives or limitations on her 
will.  This is for Hegel to be fully free in her adherence to them. 
 If we think of the ethical disposition in terms of whole-heartedness, I think we 
can get a better sense of why habit becomes indispensable to virtue on this account.  The 
view I am ascribing to Hegel is something like the following: my commitment to a 
principle proves whole-hearted only when I no longer need to remind myself of what it 
is in order to live it out.  To put this slightly differently, if I have to call to mind my duty 
whenever I am called upon to act, then the “revolution of my heart” was half-hearted at 
best, arrested at the level of wishful thinking.  As Hegel points out, to identify with my 
duty is to see it no longer as a mere duty, a duty in the abstract sense.  At that point, 
doing what I ought to will have become second nature to me, and my conduct will 
exhibit a principled consistency and committed stability precisely in being decisive, 
unhesitating, and seemingly natural.  While habit is admittedly not always a sign of a 
whole-hearted commitment, a commitment without it is not yet a genuine commitment, 
for it has not yet become internalized, incorporated, and made one’s own. 
 Although I think this line of argument does raise a largely internal challenge to 
Kant, it becomes all the clearer why virtue might require a commitment of a whole-
hearted kind as soon as we leave Kant’s starting point even farther behind.  Because 
Kantian principles are authored by me and so have their origin in my individual will, the 
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43 As I will elaborate in the third chapter, this would not hold true of Antigone, only of the modern agent. 
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issue of my identification with them does not arise in quite the same way as it does for 
Hegel, who believes that I initially discover them as the laws of the social order into 
which I am born.  This means that Hegel must explain how I am ever able to identify 
with these laws to such an extent that they look to me no different than if I myself had 
authored them, though I did not.  So the “simple identification” to which Hegel’s 
contentious passage refers is from his point of view not in any tension with subjective 
freedom, but articulates a difficult, though essential requirement for the realization of 
subjective freedom. 
 In light of this requirement, it is not surprising that Hegel thinks habituation 
might be up to the task of bridging the initial gap between the objective and the 
subjective and thus shedding the external guise in which laws at first appear.  
Habituation is after all a process of appropriation, of giving myself determinations that I 
can consequently regard as posited by my will, and so paradigmatically a process of 
“inheriting, earning, and owning”44, to borrow another commentator’s phrase.  Hegel 
makes a similar point in the “Anthropology”, when he states in rather strong terms that 
“habit is what is most essential to the existence of everything spiritual in the individual 
subject… so that the content, religious, moral, etc. can belong to him as this self, this 
soul, and no other” (E §410). His point seems to be conversely that without habit this 
content could never belong to me, but would remain from my perspective something 
imposed from without. 
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 This also explains why habituation is for Hegel indispensable to good upbringing 
in a way that it could not be for Kant.  As Hegel states, “education (Erziehung) consists 
only in becoming suitable to the world, but in such a way that one grasps it internally.  
One becomes accustomed (gewöhnt) to this or that, one only receives it.  Thus his 
transformation (Umbildung) towards the customs (Sitten) is not a limitation on the 
individual.  It is his liberation.  It would be a limitation only if I wanted something else” 
(VPR, 89).  So becoming virtuous must for Hegel involve a transformative process in 
which I go from merely receiving the laws of the social world to grasping them internally.  
Though this process is as gradual as habituation itself, in it I am growing increasingly 
convinced that these laws are right and good because I am growing increasingly 
committed to them as my own subjective principles of action. 
 At the same time it is not yet clear why this transformative process must 
culminate in the habit of the ethical.  Even if we accept these considerations in favor of 
whole-heartedness and concede that a self-conscious decision on its own would not be 
enough, we are entitled to conclude only that habituation must comprise an important 
stage in the cultivation of virtue, and not that in the end being virtuous consists in 
habitual action.  Habit after all poses a difficulty that Hegel seems to have to 
acknowledge, for he follows Kant in depicting habit as a blind mechanism operating 
independently of the intellect and will of the agent.  Given that Hegel shares this 
anthropological picture, it continues to look like acting out of habit is fundamentally 
incompatible with deliberate adherence to principles, and so it remains unclear how 
doing the right thing can ever become habitual without ceasing to be an expression of 
virtue at all.  The aim of this transformative process is supposed to be an internal grasp of 
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ethical laws, and not a relapse to a relation of immediacy from which I am no longer 
even conscious of which laws I am following, let alone whether they are good ones to 
follow. 
 
IV. Principled Habits 
In order to address this question, we need to return to the standard reading and 
reconsider whether Hegel’s anthropological account really does compel him to dismiss 
fully formed habit as essentially unfree.  Hegel certainly does describe many of our habits 
in these terms, as being akin to reflexes that, even when freely acquired, are no less 
automatic than their merely natural counterpart.  His example is the habit of standing 
upright, a behavior to which we are by now so accustomed that we hardly notice we are 
engaging in it.  And this might even hold true of many of our skilled behaviors, such as 
knitting.  When someone first learns how to knit, she has to pay considerable attention 
to the movement of her hands, making sure she does not drop a stitch, or take the yarn 
from the wrong side of the needle.  She has to learn to distinguish a knit from a purl.  
When knitting has become second nature to her, she can twist those needles back and 
forth while carrying on a conversation about the guise of the good. 
 But even though many of our habits may be mechanical in similar ways, a closer 
look at the “Anthropology” reveals a richer understanding of the range of habits of 
which we are capable.  While Hegel focuses on those habits we might be said to share 
with non-human animals, he does at crucial points suggest that human habits do exhibit 
a more complex structure that sets them apart from merely fixed behavioral dispositions, 
even if some of our behaviors – like standing upright – do exhibit that character.   What 
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is important about these human habits is that exercising them requires a certain 
employment of our intellect that makes the necessity they impose on our behavior 
distinctly normative. 
 I think such a structure is already visible in many of our skills.  While it is true 
that, when I become skilled in a certain activity, I no longer need to think about every 
movement I make, this does not mean that I am unaware of what I am doing or why I 
am doing it.  The difference is that I now conceive of my own action as a single process, 
rather than as a sequence of discrete steps.45  Moreover, my awareness of my own action 
is mediated in a further way.  An agent puts her skills to use in pursuit of certain ends 
that direct her activity as a whole, including those movements of which she is 
unconscious.  We have already seen that the skilled body becomes an instrument for the 
attainment of these ends.  But skills are rarely mere means to extrinsic ends, for they 
become part of one’s identity.  When I learn how to play the piano, I not only make my 
body into a better tool for producing melodies, I also come to conceive of myself as a 
piano player.  It is in virtue of this identity that I care to play well, and not merely 
“efficiently,” and thus to subject my activity to musical norms.  In this way skilled 
actions can be guided by a determinate self-conception that is formed through 
habituation and in turn manifested in habitual conduct.46  As unconscious as various 
aspects of my activity may become, this activity as a whole remains nonetheless 
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45 “This [general manner of conduct] is one which is integrated into a simplicity to such an extent that in it I 
am no longer conscious of the particular differences among my individual activities” (E §410A). 
 
46 As Hegel puts it, “In habit the human being relates himself not to contingent and singular emotions, 
representations, desires, etc., but to himself, to a general manner of acting (allgemeine Weise des Tuns) that is 




expressive of a self-conception, moreover of a self-conception to which only habit 
entitles me. 
 What really complicates the standard reading, however, is the role Hegel 
ultimately reserves for the presence of consciousness in habitual conduct itself.  I take 
this to be the true lesson of his anthropological account, one that is initially obscured by 
a picture that looks rather generic and that for this reason seems to have remained 
effectively buried within this account.47   Although Hegel does emphasize that habit frees 
up our minds for other matters, he also challenges the stark antithesis between habit and 
attention that is presupposed by his contemporaries.  This antithesis is once again 
especially pronounced in Kant’s Anthropology.  Kant writes that attention is only 
enlivened “through the new…Everyday life or the familiar extinguishes it.”48  Through 
repetition, habituation familiarizes us with our environment, making us inattentive to our 
surroundings.  It is the encounter with something unfamiliar that ruptures our habituated 
expectations and so enlivens our attention.  As we will see, Hegel does not deny that 
habit has this tendency towards inattentiveness, which he describes as its deadening 
effect.  But he nevertheless suggests that certain habits seem to require that the mind be 
both present and absent at once, and not that one come at the exclusion of the other.49 
 The crowning illustration of this structure is for Hegel the habit of writing.  In 
fact his description of writing turns out to be especially illuminating for our purposes.  
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47 I have not come across another interpretation that notes, let alone explains, this aspect of Hegel’s account. 
 
48 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 7:163. 
 
49 “Thus we see that in habit our consciousness is at the same time present in the thing, is interested in it and 




As we learn how to write, we admittedly grow oblivious of the particular features that 
distinguish one instance from another.  But through this very same training, we likewise 
become attentive to what these diverse instances share.  In a highly rich and revealing 
passage, Hegel writes, “if the activity of writing has become a habit, then our self has so 
completely mastered all of the relevant details, has so infected them with its universality, 
that they are no longer present to us as peculiarities and we only have the universal 
before our eyes” (E §410A).  Here our behavior is not simply unconscious, for in it the 
mind is both present and absent, interested and indifferent.  One could say that such 
behavior expresses a grasp of how to proceed from one instance to the next in a 
consistent manner. 
 Hegel explains this double-aspect through the concept of a “rule,” since 
following rules requires simultaneous attention to commonalities and disregard for 
difference in exactly this way.  But the term “rule” may strike us as misleading, for when 
an agent has acquired the relevant habit, the rule itself becomes dispensable.  In fact 
habit indicates that the agent has internalized the rule to such an extent that she has no 
further use for it.  Sometimes rules are useful during the process of habituation, for I 
may need to think about the rules for placing commas before I am successful at putting 
them in the right places.  But it looks as if, even when rules serve such an educational 
purpose, habituation is complete only when we know how to go on without their aid.  
So when we learn how to write, we are taught syntactic, grammatical, and stylistic rules, 
but once writing has become second nature to us, we no longer need to continually 
rehearse the Chicago Manual of Style.  It is for this reason that Hegel describes habit as 
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possessing “the form of recollection” (E §410A) – once we acquire the habit, the rule 
itself recedes into memory and formulating it would require calling it back to mind. 
 But Hegel’s point, I take it, is that rules have not thereby ceased to guide our 
behavior.   Let me explain what this means with the help of Gilbert Ryle, who makes a 
similar point through the example of the skilled arithmetician: “In a certain sense of 
‘think’ he never thinks of the rules.  In another sense of the word, however, he is 
thinking of the rules all the time; for he is continually applying them currently and 
skillfully.  The rules are now habits of operating.”50  This skilled arithmetician seems to 
resemble the habitual writer, for both are keeping the rules in mind precisely because 
they need no further reminders.  So in one sense, a habitual writer does not think about 
them, but in another sense, she is thinking of nothing else, for her gaze is now directed 
away from the particular and solely toward the universal aspects of what lies before her.  
As we can see, when it comes to habits with such a normative structure, Hegel admits 
that these are guided by insight into how to proceed, though this insight is an implicit 
one.  Rather than applying the universal to the particular, she recognizes the universal in 
the particular even while her attention remains fully absorbed by the specific situation at 
hand. 
 At this point it is helpful to recall how Hegel characterizes ethical insight, namely 
the kind of insight that should motivate us to act.  He objects to the motive of duty and 
to that of inclination on similar grounds, because he regards them both as products of 
abstraction, of turning our attention away from the situation in which we find ourselves 
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and toward aspects of our inner lives.  So the thought of what I ought to do as such is 
for him no less an artifact of excessive introspection than the thought of what I want to 
do.  Rather, what should move us to act is die Sache, which I spelled out as the universal 
made concrete in the specific situation confronting me.  Now we see that it is precisely 
habit that directs our attention toward die Sache in the right way, for habit crowds out 
abstract considerations about the law as a law and its tentative applicability by fixing our 
gaze on what really matters, namely, its manifestation here and now.  In other words, 
habit overcomes the abstract form of the law without sacrificing its universality.  But 
Hegel understands this universality differently from Kant.  A law is universal not because 
it is binding on all rational beings, nor because it conforms to sheer lawfulness as such, 
but because its enactment bears on the survival of the rational social order, so of our 
form of ethical life.  So this law does not need to be anything grander than, say, a 
professional code. 
 In order to illustrate how this might work, let us return to an earlier example, a 
physician committed to the Hippocratic Oath.  As a first-year medical student, she 
participates in something called the “white coat ceremony,” during which she is asked to 
recite this oath, to call to mind its explicit formulations, and to note which types of 
actions it commands and which it prohibits.  But even though the oath outlines the code 
of conduct to which her profession commits her, it would be very odd if she needed to 
run through its provisions whenever faced with a patient.  Once she becomes a doctor, 
her conduct itself becomes an expression of the code.  One might say that the rules it 
contains have become her second nature.  And this seems to be true even in professions 
that lack a ceremonious oath of this kind.  In my capacity as a teacher, I have made a 
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habit of giving extensive feedback on student papers, perhaps more extensive than they 
are in a position to appreciate.  I do this because I think students deserve to receive 
feedback that is at least as thoughtful as the papers they submit, and to benefit from 
whatever expertise I might have.  I take this to be a pedagogical principle inscribed into 
my role, though it is not a principle I often feel the need to invoke, for when I grade 
papers, I simply am a teacher, and not playing the part. 
 It is nevertheless crucial for Hegel that internalizing rules in this way does not 
amount to dispensing with them for good, for it must at least be possible for us to 
translate our habits back into rule-like form, even if we as a matter of fact rarely do so.  
Despite the privileged status he accords the habit of the ethical, it is this translatability 
that limits the extent to which Hegel can be read as a new-Aristotelian on this front.  
Although I did not stress this connection, there is an obvious way in which the 
conception of virtue I have been ascribing to Hegel does deliberately overlap with that 
of Aristotle.  As we have already seen, both hold that habituation must comprise a 
significant component of moral education.  Moreover, both might accuse Kantian virtue 
as being mere continence, namely self-control in the face of contrary inclinations, rather 
than concord between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul.51  But Hegel 
does retain Kantian elements worth highlighting, specifically the continued significance 
of principles, even once these have become submerged into our habitual conduct.  This 
is something that seems to be absent from Aristotle’s account, since virtue for Aristotle 
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consists in knowledge of particulars and so possesses a content that cannot be captured 
“under any set of rules”.52 
 In order to get a better sense of the ground between Kant and Aristotle that 
Hegel attempts to occupy, it might be helpful to contrast his view with one that may at 
first glance look much like it, the form of neo-Aristotelianism advanced by John 
McDowell.  Like Hegel, McDowell foregrounds the significance of second nature and 
insists on its indispensable role in ethical action.  The virtuous agent, according to 
McDowell, simply knows how to respond to a particular situation without needing first 
to call to mind general rules of conduct.  Her behavior, even if not thoroughly habitual, 
is nevertheless largely unreflective, though the mind remains at work in it.  Once we 
have acquired the right second nature, “the practical intellect does not dictate to one’s 
formed character – one’s nature as it has become – from the outside.  One’s formed 
practical intellect – which is operative in one’s character-revealing behavior – just is an 
aspect of one’s nature as it has become”.53  
 So far McDowell does echo the Hegel I have been presenting, for Hegel likewise 
holds that ethical habits are guided by an insight of a certain sort.  But this is as far as 
their agreement extends.  In his paper “Virtue and Reason,” McDowell argues that the 
insight constitutive of virtue cannot at all be captured in general rules.   He calls it 
“uncodifiable,” by which he means that it resists being translated back into a code.  So 
the virtuous agent knows what to do not just without needing to invoke rules 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104a7. !




prospectively, but also without being retrospectively able to explicate what she knows in 
rule-like form.  According to McDowell, to think otherwise is to fall prey to a prejudice 
about the nature of reason – “the idea that acting in the light of a specific conception of 
rationality must be explicable in terms of being guided by a formulable universal 
principle”.54  Independently of how strong McDowell’s argument in favor of 
uncodifiability may be – and it seems to be rather weak55 – there are reasons to worry 
about the implications of such a view, reasons that I think an engagement with Hegel 
can bring to our attention. 
 First of all, Hegel deems it important that ethical knowledge not be esoteric, 
limited to those who are already virtuous.  We must be able to communicate what it is 
that we know when we want to explain or justify our actions to others.  It would not be 
satisfactory if all we could say were, “you have to see things the way I see them.”  
Sometimes it sounds as if this is all that McDowell’s virtuous agent can ultimately say, 
given that the relevant insight is a matter of perception, and given that its content is 
inextricably wedded to the particular context at hand.  But for Hegel this would be to 
conflate virtue and virtuosity, even if the virtuosity in question is not a natural talent, but 
a skill cultivated through good upbringing.  As crucial as good upbringing may be in first 
enabling us to make ethical judgments, it cannot be a condition for understanding these 
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55 McDowell enlists Wittgenstein’s rule-following skepticism in order to argue for the uncodifiability of 
ethical knowledge.  But he seems to overestimate the reach of this skepticism.  Just because rules do not 
interpret themselves and depend on perception and judgment does not mean that they are impotent in 
guiding conduct at all.  Wittgenstein is contesting only a certain philosophical conception of rules.  And he 
certainly does not advocate that we stop thinking of mathematics – his primary example – as a rule-governed 




judgments, even when made by someone else.  This means that as a virtuous agent I 
must be capable of formulating my insight in terms sufficiently general to become 
intelligible to others, especially to those affected by my deeds. 
 But there is a further reason why it is important for Hegel that ethical knowledge 
be codifiable.  Even if we do not need to lean on principles very often in our lives, he 
thinks we need them should we stumble upon an unfamiliar situation, one in which we 
are unable to proceed “naturally,” or should there be a reason to question the ways we 
would otherwise “naturally” proceed.  Here I have two slightly different scenarios in 
mind.  The first involves finding myself in a situation that is sufficiently unfamiliar that I 
cannot simply react as I otherwise would, but need first to pause and to deliberate about 
how to approach it.  It is not far-fetched to think that this process of deliberation would 
in large part involve determining how to stay true to the principle that has been at work 
in my previous responses.  Even if the principle in question fails to guide the next step, I 
will still need to be able to articulate what it is in order to decide whether it can continue 
to provide guidance in this new context. 
 The second scenario arises quite easily out of the first.  Here I discover that the 
new context shows that the principle in question needs to be put into question.  More 
specifically, I realize that the new situation challenges the legitimacy of my previous 
principle and compels me to reassess my commitment to it.  I think that this is in the 
end Hegel’s central concern.  In short, he holds that we need to be able to revert to 
principles when our habitual modes of engagement are shown to be in need of 
reevaluation, perhaps even revision.  So principles are essential in contexts of critique, 
for they are the kinds of objects that we can come to assess in a critical light.  While 
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McDowell does insist on the possibility of criticizing aspects of our second nature, it is 
not surprising that he has notably little to say about what this would involve. 56  Because 
of the way he conceives of our second nature, it looks like it can at best change behind 
our backs and cannot be turned into an explicit target of critical reflection. 
 But for Hegel this is precisely why we cannot and should not abandon principles 
without too high a cost.  So we could say that their primary function is to ensure not 
stability in our conduct, but openness to normative change.57  Even when it turns out 
that the principles we currently have cannot be adequately extended into new contexts, 
having them, no matter how inadequate they may be, enables us to ask ourselves how to 
improve them.  Perhaps we only need to invoke them in those moments in which they 
fail, but for Hegel this still means that there must be a translatability between habits and 
principles, that it must be possible for us to move from one form that the ethical can 
take to the other.  So in insisting on this translatability, Hegel is likewise asserting that 
habits and principles are ultimately not so very different in kind.  As he puts it, “When 
the ethical is actual in individuals, then it is the soul in general, the general manner of 
their activity.  On the one hand, it can be expressed as a law, but what the law is, is the 
manner of actuality; it is second nature” (VPR, 88). 
 While we might assume that having an explicit grasp of principles is superior to 
the insight that habit involves because it would make us more conscious of what we are 
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about our norms without needing to step outside of our normative framework.  See for example McDowell 
(1996), 81.  This is a conception of reflection that I will address in the third chapter. 
 
57 Barbara Hermann cites a similar reason in favor of Kant’s view of character against Aristotles, suggesting 





doing in following them, this does not seem to be Hegel’s view.   Ethical knowledge for 
Hegel requires a practical expression, for I cannot claim to know something I do not 
express in my action, nor can I claim to know something I express in isolated or 
sporadic deeds.58  I know only as much and as little as I display in my conduct as a 
whole.   This for Hegel implies that to be convinced in the goodness of certain principles 
is to have incorporated them into my nature and in this way overcome any lingering 
doubts.59 
 
V. Life and Death 
My aim up to this point has been to show that habit in Hegel’s estimation is not a 
provisional form that the ethical may or may not take, but that the habit of the ethical is 
the final form of subjective freedom.  He esteems it so highly because, when the ethical 
has become habitual to me, it means that I have incorporated certain principles to such 
an extent that I know both who I am and what I ought to do in one and the same stroke.  
It is then that “the human being knows the law, but not as something foreign, but 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 This view is similar to the conception of moral authorship that Sabina Lovibond (2004) proposes.  She tries 
to defend Socrates’ claim that akrasia is a form of ignorance by distinguishing between knowing something 
and merely believing that you know it.  The weak-willed agent might say, “I know that smoking is bad, but I 
can’t help myself.” But in failing to act on the belief he is avowing, he reveals that he does not really know it, 
that this belief is merely a mouthpiece for public opinion.  Lovibond argues that someone is an author of his 
moral judgments only when what he claims to know has become part of his nature and he is immediately 
motivated by his judgments, whereas the akratic person is a mere “actor” who mimics what he has heard 
others say.  Lovibond concludes that the aim of ethical formation is to cultivate such authorship. 
 
59 Nietzsche suggests a similar conception of incorporated knowledge: “the strength of knowledge does not 
depend on its degree of truth but on its age, on the degree to which it has been incorporated, on its character 
as a condition of life... knowledge became a piece of life itself… To what extent can truth endure 
incorporation?  That is the question; that is the experiment.” (Gay Science, §110)  Though Hegel would deny 
that knowledge has only little to do with truth, he would agree with Nietzsche that knowledge is only 




instead as his own.  It is not even a relation of belief, for in it we are already positing a 
kind of reflection, but rather it is that in which individuals have their self-feeling, in 
which they know themselves” (VPR, 87).  Hegel hopes to clarify this unreflective 
relation through a telling analogy with first nature: “The subjective knows [the ethical] as 
the objective, but it is its own, wherein it lives (fish in the water – lung and air)” VPR, 
85).  Although we are not (unlike fish in the water) “blindly” immersed in ethical life, we 
have nevertheless overcome our reluctance to take part in it and so see no need for 
further reflection.  As Hegel puts it, “it is thus also their soul, their nature – freedom, 
which has become necessity” (VPR, 88). ! That said, I admit that this conclusion could leave us dissatisfied.  Even if we 
accept that it accurately captures Hegel’s position, we might nevertheless question 
whether it represents a desirable aspiration in the first place, whether whole-heartedness 
in our commitment to the ethical is worth cultivating, if it tends to crowd out reflection.  
But we might also question whether this is even Hegel’s considered view.  Habit as 
Hegel casts it was from the very outset entangled in a “dialectic” of freedom and 
necessity and so positioned inside an ongoing negotiation between the two, whereas 
such a seamless transformation of freedom into necessity would seem to bring this 
dialectic to a definite halt.   In conclusion I want to reconsider whether my 
reconstruction of Hegel’s own position has been too neat and whether there are not 
ultimately better reasons to read Hegel on habit along the standard line.!
 A more sophisticated version of this line has been advanced by Christoph 
Menke, who argues that Hegel wants to make very different use of the concept of 
second nature than the use Aristotelians make of it – and than the use I take Hegel to be 
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making of it as well.  According to Menke, second nature is not meant to refer a positive 
ethical achievement at all.   It is rather a “critical concept,” in fact, a concept whose 
function is to critique the Kantian picture of freedom on deeper grounds.  On one level 
Menke seems to be in agreement with me that Hegel thinks subjective freedom requires 
second nature for its actualization and that Hegel faults Kant for failing to see this.  But 
all this demonstrates, Menke thinks, is that there is something fundamentally flawed 
about subjective freedom, if it can only be actualized through second nature.  So Hegel 
invokes second nature as the punch line of an antinomy, so to speak, in order to show 
that freedom so conceived necessarily results in its very opposite, unfreedom.60  What 
makes Menke’s version more sophisticated than others is that he does not argue that 
habit must therefore comprise a transitional stage that is to be surpassed in pursuit of 
even higher forms of freedom.  According to Menke, habit in all its limitations is here to 
stay. 
 I admit that this reading has significant virtues.  It could be considered more 
convincing on independent grounds, because it may strike us as a more realistic 
assessment of the habit of the ethical, one that refuses to idealize it in the way I may 
have done.   It could also be considered more convincing as a reading of Hegel, for it 
takes into account Hegel’s persistent ambivalence toward habit.  And it seems fairly 
undeniable that Hegel continues to speak about habit in critical terms well beyond the 
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60 See Menke (2010): “‘Natürliches Bestimmtsein’ des Subjekts heisst, dass sein Wille von natürlichen 
vorgegebenen Bestimmungen determiniert ist.  ‘Natürliche Verfassung’ des Geistes dagegegen heisst, das er in 
sich selbst naturhaft ist.  Die Unfreiheit, von der der Geist sich im Werden seiner autonomen Gestalt befreit, 
besteht nicht darin, das er von aussen durch Natur bestimmt ist, sondern wie oder als Natur erscheint: Unfrei 
ist der in Natur verkehrte Geist.  Damit wird der Begriff der ‘zweiten Natur’, im Unterschied zur aristotelischen 




“Anthropology.”  Even in the Philosophy of Right he concludes his identification of the 
ethical and the habitual with the following warning: 
  The human being also dies out of habit, that is, if he has become completely habituated 
  [eingewohnt] to life and has become spiritually and physically blunted, and the opposition 
  between subjective consciousness and spiritual activity has disappeared, for the human 
  being is active only insofar as he has not yet attained something and wants to exert and 
  prove himself in relation to it.  When this has been achieved, the activity and vitality  
  disappear, and the indifference [Interesselosigkeit] that ensues is spiritual or physical death 
  (PR §151A). 
 
Although Menke does not explicitly refer to this passage, it would seem to confirm the 
pessimistic appraisal he ascribes to Hegel.  Hegel is here reminding us that there is 
something pernicious about all habit that even the habit of the ethical cannot completely 
shake, and it would not be unreasonable to suspect that the relevant danger is the specter 
of unfreedom that haunts habit from the start.   
 While I do want to take this passage seriously as a warning against any uncritical 
idealization of second nature, I am not convinced that it makes second nature into a 
critical concept either.   So let us try to clarify of what Hegel is warning us.  To start we 
need to ask why Hegel links habit with death and how literally we are to take talk of this 
kind.  If the problem with habit lies in its resemblance to first nature, it should surprise 
us that Hegel is not associating it with life instead.  After all, it is living creatures that 
acquire habits and it is habits that enable them to stay alive.  This seems to be as true of 
us as it is of animals, for in both of our cases habit can serve the end of survival, whether 
our individual survival or the survival of whatever larger group each of us is a part.  But 
it is worth recalling something I previously noted only in passing: that even in the 
context of the “Anthropology” habit does not have an unproblematic connection to 
organic life.  Recall that Hegel there characterizes habit as “mechanical” and so subject 
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to a form of necessity that is lower than the kind of necessity imposed by natural 
instinct.  A mechanical behavior is automatic and so resembles the motion of a mere 
machine, rather than that of a living organism, which must be more sensitive to changes 
in its environment and thus be able to respond to its environment in more flexible ways 
if it is to survive.  So it looks like the mechanism that habit introduces, specifically the 
rigid movements it instills, can conflict with the ends of life.  
 If we take this talk of death to be an allusion to this mechanical side of habit, we 
need to ask what it could mean to describe the habit of the ethical as similarly 
mechanical, especially if we conceded that it is not reducible to mere behavioral 
dispositions.  In a rather straightforward sense, it could mean that the habit of the ethical 
imposes a rigid frame of mind that makes us incapable of adjusting to new ethical 
contexts and of altering our old ways in the face of social change.  Although this might 
not be a perpetual problem in the modern social order, it would become a problem in 
contexts of critique of the kind I mentioned.  In those contexts, the translatability 
between habits and principles would become even more difficult than I indicated, for it 
would be further hindered by the resistance imposed by our habits themselves, and not 
merely by the fact we have long forgotten the explicit principles underlying them.  If the 
habit of the ethical proves to be resilient in this way, then it could potentially threaten 
our social survival, because it would, simply put, make us inadaptable to changing 
circumstances.  But since it is not yet unclear how seriously Hegel took the prospect that 
modern ethical life might require changes substantial enough to conflict with our 
habitual modes of conduct, we would first need to examine whether he even allows 
room for these contexts of critique. 
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 There is, however, a different sense in which the habit of the ethical could be 
considered mechanical in a more problematic way.  Even in the absence of changing 
circumstances, we could become so thoroughly habituated to our world that this world 
grows dead to us.  It might not be a danger that animals face, but it is the one I think 
Hegel fears most.  In other words, we could become so accustomed to doing the right 
thing that we cease to do it because it is right, but because we have a habit of doing it.  It 
would be to act out of mere habit, no longer moved by die Sache at all.  What we habitually 
do would then turn into an empty ritual, detached from any ethical significance it might 
have once possessed.  This need not threaten my own individual survival, for I might 
very well remain perfectly adept at responding appropriately to my circumstances.  But it 
could threaten the survival of the social order as a form of ethical life, and so an 
embodiment of the “living good” (PR §142) that we are committed to sustaining.  
 Even if we read Hegel’s warning in this way, it is not clear how seriously we are 
to take it.  Is Hegel suggesting that habit always turns into mere habit, that this is its 
inevitable course, even if it begins as an adequate expression of subjective freedom?  
This would make second nature into the punch line of an antinomy, proving that it is 
impossible to actualize freedom without producing unfreedom in its stead.  But given 
that he confines it to the Addition, I do not think Hegel means to be making a 
suggestion this strong, one that would systematically invert the main claim of the 
paragraph.  Rather, I take him to be saying something less fatal about the structure of 
habit, though equally troublesome.  I take him to be articulating a tendency internal to 
habit, a tendency that it must (and can) ward against, for all habit does indeed incline in 
the direction of mere habit, though it is not therefore doomed to this fate.  I do not 
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think this amendment is at odds with my reconstruction, for it is simply part and parcel 
of the complexity of Hegel’s position.  On the one hand he does think that habit can 
express freedom most fully.  On the other hand he also thinks that habit always retains 
the possibility to ceasing to express freedom at all.  This seems to hold true even of the 
habit of the ethical, which might be our highest achievement, but which is a necessarily 

















Even though Hegel privileges a habitual comportment within ethical life, this is not all 
that social participation amounts to for him.  Being an active participant in the practices 
of ethical life turns out to involve a higher degree of reflection than habit on its own 
incorporates.  It involves, for one, a critical engagement with our practices, should they 
call for such an engagement.  But even when reflection does not take the form of 
criticism, it remains a crucial, though largely inconspicuous aspect of social participation.  
This is in part why the dangers that habit introduces are not so worrisome after all.  
According to Hegel, we are never merely unreflectively immersed in ethical life.  Rather, 
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we partake in shaping the very practices in which we immerse ourselves.  This process of 
shaping practices is one he associates with culture.  Just like the process of habituation, it 
contains a moment of reflection.  Unlike habituation, however, it establishes a relation to 
our practices that is itself more overtly reflective than the one introduced by habit, in 
which reflection is initially employed but eventually overcome.  So the habit of the 
ethical, even if it is conceived as sufficiently sighted to counter many of the 
aforementioned charges, needs to be supplemented and tempered by culture.  In this 
chapter I will offer a Hegelian account of culture in the context of modern ethical life. 
 There are several difficulties one faces when giving such an account on Hegelian 
grounds.  First of all, Hegel himself does not provide a unified conception of what might 
be categorized as “culture” in the relevant sense.  There is a cluster of related terms 
within his vocabulary.  Kultur is the most obvious equivalent, but it is not a term he 
himself employs.  Rather, he prefers to talk in terms of Bildung, which refers both to the 
process of acculturation and cultural formation as well as to culture as its end product.  
Then there are cultural forms associated with the domain of “Absolute Spirit,” notably 
art and religion, though also philosophy (which will be the subject matter of my fourth 
chapter).  While these are in a sense our highest cultural achievements, they do not 
represent the whole of culture.  There are more mundane practices that fall within what 
we might call culture and it is they that seem to be the main concern of the Philosophy of 
Right.  But my effort to give a Hegelian account of culture will take all of these terms into 
consideration, as varied as they may seem.  My reason for attempting to provide such a 
unified account has to do with the phenomenon I want to illuminate, namely the 
phenomenon of cultural participation.  Even though cultural participation can take a 
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variety of forms – hence the variety of terms Hegel employs to capture “culture” – I 
hope to show that these forms exhibit a consistently reflective structure throughout. 
 The other difficulty concerns any effort to give such an account in the context of 
modern ethical life in particular.  Now, I admit that to speak of culture in this context 
may strike many as odd, given that it is a not a term that Hegel himself employs in the 
Philosophy of Right.  He speaks neither of Kultur nor explicitly of Bildung (except, as we will 
see, in his treatment of civil society).  And the domain of “Absolute Spirit” is not 
officially integrated into that account either.  So my claim that culture plays not only 
some role, but a vital one at that, must first be justified.  I think one reason to think that 
ethical life includes culture has to do with Hegel’s way of talking about social practices, 
which he tends to call Sitten or customs,61 a term that is frequently associated with 
concepts like culture, or more disconcertingly, tradition.  Thus his use of it has raised 
concerns in many respects similar to those invited by habit.  Insofar as “custom” refers 
to some given set of practices, it suggests something we are habituated to heed, which 
could suggest that Hegel is advocating blind conformity with whatever traditions happen 
to be in place, one that is incompatible with any evaluation of them.62  Hegel may even 
look like a traditionalist about custom. 
Traditionalism is generally understood to be a conservative response to social 
change, privileging whatever practices are already in place.  Traditionalists claim that 
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61 This is the root of Sittlichkeit.  Although it is a term that is quite common in German usage and simply 
means “morality” (as in Kant), Hegel means to distinguish it from Moralität and to invite the association with 
custom. 
 
62 Here the term “blind” has slightly different connotations than those we have seen in the previous chapter.  
But it does not necessarily mean the same thing as “uncritical” either.  Rather, a blind immersion would be 




these practices ought to be preserved because they are traditional, and sometimes they 
argue that they ought to be preserved because they are part of a particular culture, 
namely one’s own.  In asserting that ethical conduct consists in habitual conformity to 
custom, it may seem as if Hegel is assigning a normative role to culture as such.  Here 
the status of culture is closely bound up with the issue of reflection.  Traditionalism 
would seem to insulate given customs from reflective scrutiny and to treat them as 
immune to any form of re-evaluation.  So another way to put this would be to say that 
Hegel is in effect promoting an unreflective perpetuation of customary practices, as 
opposed to a reflective attitude towards custom, which could issue in social change.  
According to this interpretation, Hegel espouses a conception of culture as a static and 
fixed set of customs that have immediate and absolute authority over our conduct. 
This was until relatively recently the standard reading of the Philosophy of Right.  As 
W. H. Walsh writes in 1969, “[Hegel’s] attitude is rather that, because [a principle] 
succeeded in getting itself accepted, it must have been right.”63  Walsh seems to read 
Hegel as a traditionalist – although he himself does not use this term – who holds that 
we ought to adhere to whatever principles happen to be accepted simply because they 
have been accepted.  He goes on to argue that this makes Hegel a relativist who denies 
that there is an impartial perspective from which to evaluate the customs of a particular 
community.  According to Walsh, Hegel is not doing ethics proper but engaging in a 
purely descriptive enterprise which Walsh characterizes as a “sociology” of ethics.   
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Although few scholars still interpret Hegel in this way, such readings have been 
widely influential.  Along similar lines Hegel has frequently been cited as an inspiration 
to communitarianism.  Communitarians tend to be especially accommodating to 
traditionalism, for they defend the requests made by particular communities to maintain 
their local practices, even when these practices look to be objectionable to outsiders.  
Communitarianism is primarily a school of political thought because it emphasizes the 
role that the state ought to play in protecting the cultures of immigrant and other 
minority groups.  Thus communitarians tend to speak in favor of cultural or group 
rights.  But this school also introduces broader issues regarding the ethical role of 
culture.  Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, argues in After Virtue that virtues can only be 
defined relative to a particular community with shared practices and that individual 
agents can only come to embody these virtues as members of such communities.  Given 
the social fragmentation pervasive in modern political and economic institutions, 
McIntyre calls for “the construction of local forms of community within which civility 
and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the dark ages which are 
already upon us.”64  For McIntyre, it is the preservation of particular traditions that has 
the power to save us from moral decline.65  Although McIntyre does not mention Hegel 
in this work, he seems to have been inspired by a Walshian-style reading of the Philosophy 
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65 Although McIntyre is frequently read as a traditionalist, I do not think this is entire fair.  For example, he 
advocates what he calls “living traditions,” which are not monolithic and which do incorporate a variety of 





of Right according to which Hegel turns out to be a champion of traditionalism and thus 
a predecessor to contemporary communitarian projects. 
But it was Charles Taylor who was most explicit in proposing a communitarian 
reading of Hegel himself.  While his interpretation was important in reviving interest in 
Hegel’s work, today it is largely discredited.  I want to give a brief overview of his 
reading because, even though I ultimately disagree with Taylor, I think he does 
emphasize an important aspect of Hegel’s view that is often overlooked.  Taylor stresses 
the role of culture in Hegel’s account of ethical life, arguing that Hegel recognizes 
membership in a particular culture to be a necessary condition for any meaningful 
human activity, for “what we are as human beings we are only in a cultural 
community.”66  In saying this, Taylor is not merely noting the fact that all human beings 
inhabit some culture or another, for he wants to make the more contentions claim that 
cultural membership provides us with the most important basis for social identification.   
Taylor finds evidence for his reading in Hegel’s views about internal 
differentiation.67  According to Taylor, Hegel thinks that the state as a whole is too thin 
to serve as a source of identification and so needs to be internally differentiated into 
what he calls “estates” (Stände), which are smaller communities that are grounded in 
particular professional roles and inevitably come to differ in “culture, values, and modes 
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67 The lesson he takes from Hegel is that “differentiations of some fairly essential kinds are ineradicable… 
Moreover, they are recognized in our post-Romantic climate as essential to human identity.  Men cannot 
simply identify themselves as men, but they define themselves more immediately by their partial community, 
cultural, linguistic, confessional and so on” (1979, 114).  It is important for Taylor’s argument that this 
differentiation cannot come merely at the institutional level (and so via our various social roles), but must 




of life.”68  From this Taylor draws the overtly communitarian conclusion that such 
communities “in turn demand a certain measure of autonomous life within each state.”69  
So Taylor’s concern is perhaps less in defending traditionalism or ascribing traditionalism 
to Hegel per se, and more in making room for cultural pluralism.  According to his 
reading, Hegel’s account of ethical life must incorporate such pluralism in the form of 
diverse estates, which can be understood as relatively independent communities that 
coexist within a single state and that provide their members with the requisite basis for 
identification. 
So in thinking about the status of culture in ethical life we are led to two sets of 
questions that are not in the end disconnected from each other.  One set has to do with 
traditionalism and the extent to which our relation to custom can be a reflective one, 
rather than one of immersion.  The other has to do with pluralism about customs and 
the extent to which Hegel’s conception of ethical life can accommodate such internal 
diversity in values and modes of life.  Taylor’s communitarian reading seems to be more 
directly concerned with the second issue.  At the same time, to insist upon pluralism in 
the way he does is to insist that these plural communities can legitimately perpetuate 
their customs without ever having to evaluate them.  As far as his reading of Hegel is 
concerned, I think Taylor is exaggerating the role of culture in Hegel’s thought when he 
characterizes it as the most important basis for identification.  It does strike me, 
however, that he is right to say that participation in a distinctly cultural community is an 
important ingredient of social participation, as Hegel understands it.  So I do agree that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!






the function of estates is to introduce a certain level of cultural pluralism into ethical life, 
though perhaps not because ethical life on its own (and so likewise the state as such) fails 
as an adequate basis of identification.  It seems to me that this function of estates is 
something that few other readings have sufficiently emphasized. 
An example of the alternative reading, which is far more prominent today, can be 
found in Allen Wood.  Wood admits that “Hegel’s conception of ethical life has often 
been interpreted as committing him to ethical relativism and traditionalism,” but given 
that “customs and traditions often represent a culture’s dead past (what Hegel calls 
‘positivity’), the ethical advice it yields would often be wrong and without any rational 
foundation.”70  According to Wood, Hegel’s project involves delineating universally valid 
standards that any form of ethical life would have to me meet in order to count as ethical 
in the first place.  So Hegel is not undertaking a merely descriptive endeavor of the kind 
Walsh ascribes to him.  He is not engaging in a sociology of ethics, but in ethics proper.  
This means that Hegel takes himself to be offering the kind of rational foundation that 
can yield genuine ethical advice.71  While I am not convinced that such a rational 
foundation is meant to yield ethical advice exactly, I think Wood is right to point out 
that Hegel claims to be undertaking a normative project whose aim is to vindicate 
modern ethical life by demonstrating its rationality.  I also think Wood is right in 
emphasizing that custom and tradition can recede into a dead past and so cease to serve 
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71 For example: “Hegel’s conception of the ethical is commonly understood to be an endorsement of cultural 
pluralism and relativism.  But we have seen that on closer inspection it turns out to be just the opposite: a 




as a source of guidance.  This is a threat that clearly preoccupied Hegel similarly to the 
deadening effects of habit. 
But Hegel does give us a picture of what it means for a culture to be living and this 
picture is strikingly at odds with the kind of traditionalism that Wood fears.  Where 
Wood goes wrong, I think, or at least where he tends to exaggerate, is in the implications 
he takes this project to have for Hegel’s conception of modern ethical life and its 
flexibility with respect to the demands of culture.  He states that, “[if] we look closely at 
Hegel’s detailed discussion of modern ethical life, it is striking how little he concedes to 
ethnic diversity, how little room he leaves for the impact of varying cultural traditions on 
the social and political structures of modern states.”72  He even goes so far as to say that 
Hegel is “an apostle of a single modern world culture founded on universal principles of 
reason”73 and so rises above all particularity and diversity.  I should note that it does 
seem right to me to say that Hegel is not intent on preserving ethnicity in modern ethical 
life.  Hegel thinks that social participation transforms those customs we may have 
inherited in virtue of our ethnic heritage and introduces us into new communities whose 
shared bonds may no longer be ethnic ones.  But this does not mean that these new 
communities do not share cultural bonds, bonds that are not less particular and diverse.  
In this sense I think Wood is neglecting the role of estates in retaining a level of 
pluralism within the bounds of a rational social order. 
The bigger problem with Wood’s reading, however, emerges at a higher level.  
Wood concludes that Hegel is seeking one world culture, so to speak, one that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Wood (1990), 207. 
 




transcends local forms of pluralism.  He moreover thinks that Hegel’s outline for what 
would count as a rational form of ethical life is meant to determine the contours of this 
culture.  But there is little basis for drawing such a strong implication from Hegel’s own 
account.  To be more precise, I think that there is indeed a reason that Hegel does not 
provide us with a list of duties or virtues and so does not fill in the ethical guidance that 
the rational order is supposed to yield.  And I think this is no omission on Hegel’s part, 
for it is not as if Hegel thinks he could provide us with such a list, but chose not to do 
so.74  Rather, it seems far more consistent with his text to say that he does not think it is 
part of the philosopher’s task to tell us what these duties and virtues are because the 
rational structure of ethical life, which is the object of his investigation, underdetermines 
them.75  This indicates that they belong to the domain of culture and that they are given 
the requisite content only in a cultural context.   
In short, Hegel’s philosophical outline, even if it does delineate universal standards 
that any form of ethical life must meet in order to count as ethical, is nevertheless 
compatible with a multiplicity of cultures, though perhaps not with all of them.  It places 
constraints on custom, but it does not fully fix it either.  For instance, the family must 
exhibit a certain structure in order to count as rational and so be compatible with 
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74 According to Wood, “the Philosophy of Right does not really try to give us a doctrine of duties, since it 
attempts no detailed exposition of [social] relationships.  But it does furnish an outline of the institutions 
within which these relationships are to be found, and so it might be seen as giving a sketch of that structure 
from which a doctrine of ethical duties can be derived” (1990, 211).  What I am denying is that there can be 
any such derivation of our duties from this sketch or outline. 
 
75 Hegel issues several related reminders about the limits of his philosophical project.  Early in the 
“Introduction” he states that he wants to delineate them in order to “rule out any possible idea [Vorstellung] or 
even expectation, as if through the systematic development [of philosophical right] should give rise to a 
positive code of laws, that is, of the kind an actual state would require” (PR §3).  More concretely, Hegel 
mocks Fichte for thinking he could philosophically derive the most rational passport regulations, in his case, 




modern ethical life.  It must nurture and affirm the individuality of its members and it 
must adequately prepare them for participation in public life.  More specifically, marriage 
must display a reciprocal relation that transcends mere contract and that sustains a bond 
of substantial endurance.  But I think that these constraints on family and marriage still 
tell us very little about the concrete obligations within these relations, and I take it that 
these constraints can be met by a fairly wide array of customary practices that shape this 
institution in various cultural contexts.  This means that Wood is too quick to dismiss 
the prospect that Hegel’s account of modern ethical life could be compatible with 
pluralism in cultural forms of life, even if these forms are not of primary philosophical 
interest to Hegel. 
A more moderate version of this strand in Hegel scholarship can be found in 
Michael Hardimon, who has also stressed the differences between Hegel and 
contemporary communitarianism, but on slightly different grounds.  Hardimon echoes 
Wood when he claims that Hegel is not interested in local forms of identification, but in 
our identification with broader structures that extend beyond narrowly cultural divides.  
But unlike Wood he provides a more complicated account of social identification.  It is 
this that is the target of his Hegelian critique of communitarianism.  According to 
Hardimon, communitarians deem our social roles to be so central to our self-conception 
that these cannot be abandoned without some loss of self.  He criticizes this 
understanding of social identification on two fronts.  He claims that Hegel at least would 
reject such an understanding because he thinks that we can as a matter of fact always 
abandon these roles, in spite of their centrality in our self-conception.  We might be 
unwilling to do so, but this is not the same as to say that we are incapable of it.  
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Hardimon’s more compelling argument, however, has to do with the nature of this 
purported self-conception of ours.  Communitarians, as Hardimon understands them, 
assume that we do have an explicit self-conception that already takes our social roles in 
account.  This gets things the wrong way around.76  What Hegel points out is that we do 
not already conceive of ourselves as occupants of our roles.  Rather, our social 
identification must first be made explicit to us.  So Hardimon’s target is really the 
presence of reflection in Hegel’s understanding of social identity, which he thinks 
communitarianism distorts.  Reflection does in a sense sever this identification by 
introducing a moment of alienation – of distance from the roles we once immediately 
inhabited – but in doing so, it opens up the possibility of reflectively reconstituting this 
identification, and so making it part of our self-conception for the very first time. 
Because I think Hardimon is correct on all of the above fronts, my dissatisfaction 
with his reading is somewhat subtler.  On the one hand, I find it helpful to think of 
reflection as containing these two opposed moments – of severing our implicit 
identification in order to mend it in an explicit way.  On the other hand, I worry that this 
response overlooks a more basic difference between these two accounts of social 
identification and that Hegel’s conception comes out looking more immediate than it is 
meant to be.  While Hardimon is probably right to say that communitarians make 
identification too self-conscious, reflection for Hegel is nonetheless in a sense already 
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76 “One of Hegel’s central aims in the Philosophy of Right is to help his readers recognize that they do in fact 
conceive of themselves as members of the family, civil society, and the state… from a Hegelian standpoint, 
the communitarian view that modern people start out explicitly conceiving of themselves in terms of their 
social roles gets things backwards… Coming to explicitly think of oneself as a family member, member of 
civil society, and citizen is, in Hegel’s view, one of the crucial steps in the subjective process of reconciliation” 




present at the level of social participation and does not first enter the scene when we 
abstract away from our social roles.  This becomes even clearer when we move from 
social to cultural identification, for to identify with a culture, even in some supposedly 
immediate sense and so prior to any act of alienating abstraction, is to contribute to it in 
a way that inevitably transforms the culture with which you identify and that establishes 
a reflective relation to it.  These are effects you cannot avoid without turning your 
culture into the kind of “dead past” to which Wood refers.  
Many have noted that there is something paradoxical about the notion of a 
“cultural identity,” because participating in a culture seems to be at least in tension with 
self-conscious identification.  If I feel the need to insist upon my cultural identity, I am 
only proving that my culture has already lost its grip on me and that I no longer inhabit 
my culture as I once did.  Anthony Appiah alludes to this tension in the following 
observation: “You might wonder, in fact, whether there isn’t a connection between the 
thinning of the cultural content of identities and the rising stridency of their claims.”77  
In a similar vein Samuel Scheffler remarks that “culture” is an ethnographic concept 
employed in describing, interpreting, or explaining the practices of a community from 
the standpoint of an outsider.  It is not a concept employed by the members of that 
community in their own deliberations or justifications.  According to Scheffler, “to 
describe something as being (merely) a cultural norm of value can sometimes be a way of 
debunking it: of denying that it has the kind of authority that its adherents take it to 
have.”78  These observations seem to suggest that there is at least something highly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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peculiar about the notion of a cultural identity, for those who are truly part of a culture 
typically are not self-conscious of this fact. 
Hegel is indeed aware of this tension inherent in self-conscious identification and 
he even suggests that highly reflective cultures inevitably come to erode their confidence 
in their own customary practices79 because they invite skepticism about their 
foundations.  At the same time, he also challenges the opposition between participating 
in a culture and reflecting on it assumed by this view.  In order to illustrate what Hegel 
takes their proper relationship to be, I will turn to his conception of Bildung as he 
outlines it in the Phenomenology of Spirit, specifically in the chapter titled “Bildung”, but to 
a certain extent also in his chapter on “Lordship and Bondage”.   This is a conception 
that is of relevance to the Philosophy of Right as well, for it outlines the underlying 
structure of all Bildung, even the sort implicitly operative in modern ethical life.  So once 
I have drawn this alternative picture, I will turn to the role that culture plays in the 
Philosophy of Right, specifically in his account of civil society.  The interpretation I want to 
propose admits that culture is integral to Hegel’s account of modern ethical life, but not 
as it has been traditionally conceived.  I will argue that Hegel considers participation in a 
culture to be an ongoing process that involves the continued production of and 
reflection about the culture we inhabit. 
So my aim in this chapter is to propose an account of culture that shows that 
Hegel takes our relation to custom to be far less unreflective than worries about 
traditionalism suggest, even when this relation remains strictly speaking uncritical.  This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Allen Wood points this out.  He writes, “Hegel even thinks that reflection inevitably exposes the limitations 
of every ethical order, and so tends, in the long run, to undermine both the ethical attitude and the ethical 




means, first of all, that Hegel provides us with a way of distinguishing between being 
habitually immersed within a culture and actively participating in its constitution.  This 
also means that Hegel does not take culture to be something that is merely given to us, 
inherited from our predecessors, but rather something that we continue to shape.  So 
what I argue is that the traditionalism charge rests on a misunderstanding of Hegel’s 
conception of culture.  He is instead suggesting that we are already reflecting whenever 
we participate in our customs, but in ways we often fail not notice because these forms 
of reflection are utterly pervasive in modern ethical life. 
 
I. Alienation and Self-Cultivation 
Bildung is notoriously untranslatable, since none of its English analogues seem to capture 
all of its connotations.  Although it is roughly synonymous with Kultur, which is 
etymologically akin to our own term, Hegel almost never mentions Kultur and 
consistently uses Bildung in its place.  There are at least three respects in which Bildung 
differs from Kultur that are especially relevant for Hegel.  First of all, Kultur tends to be 
associated with the particular norms and practices that distinguish one cultural 
community from another, while Hegel takes Bildung to include a universal ideal as it is 
embodied and expressed in the customs of a particular culture.80  Secondly, Bildung 
encompasses not only the notion of culture as an end product, which is the domain of 
Kultur, but also the processes involved in forming a culture.  In other words, Bildung 
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a Volk, and which aspires to authenticity) [and] the French ideal of civilisation (which is meant to be a universal 
ideal, and which aspires to progressive rationality).”(2007, 119) But this opposition is highly misleading, for 




refers both to an achievement as well as to the ways of achieving it.   Thirdly, Bildung 
refers both to the formation of a shared culture as well as to individual cultivation, which 
is why it is sometimes translated as “education.”  As we will gradually uncover, these 
three aspects of Bildung are all significant for Hegel’s view of culture.  According to 
Hegel, a culture is never merely parochial, but incorporates universalistic aspirations in 
relation to which it forms and reforms its own local practices.  Nor is a culture ever a 
finished product but depends on the continued formative activity of its members for its 
vitality.  Finally, Hegel also thinks that the formation of a shared culture and the 
cultivation of its individual members are inextricably linked. 
We can begin to explore Hegel’s notion of culture by looking to the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, where Bildung plays a central methodological and constitutive role.  In the 
Preface Hegel offers the following definition: 
Bildung in this respect, regarded from the side of the individual, consists in [spirit’s] 
acquiring that which lies at hand, devouring its inorganic nature, and taking possession of 
it for itself.  But this is, regarded from the side of universal spirit as substance, nothing 
other than [substance’s] acquiring self-consciousness and generating its own becoming and 
reflection into itself (PG §28). 
 
Here Hegel defines Bildung from two points of view, with respect to the individual and 
with respect to “spirit as substance,” namely the society which the individual inhabits.  In 
other words, he is suggesting that one and the same formative process can be considered 
from two perspectives, from that of the individual member and from that of the social 
whole.  It is also important to note that Hegel associates this process with “self-
consciousness” and “reflection into itself,” though what this means is not immediately 
clear.  I will return to this later.  But I want to first take up Hegel’s claim that Bildung is a 
process of “devouring one’s inorganic nature” and “taking possession of it for oneself.” 
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John McDowell, who is largely responsible for introducing this term into the 
vocabulary of Anglophone philosophy, identifies Bildung with something like 
“acculturation” or “initiation into a culture,” which he also characterizes as the 
formation of a second nature.81  Although I am not the first one to point out that 
acculturation in McDowell’s sense is not to be equated with Hegel’s own conception of 
Bildung,82 I want to emphasize not merely the difference, but the tension between these 
two processes.  Acculturation as the acquisition of a second nature does resemble Bildung 
in its aim, for both are directed at an individual’s identification with ethical life.  But 
Hegel thinks that acquiring a second nature, albeit integral to full identification with 
social practices, has a tendency to alienate us from them.  He frequently calls habit 
deadening precisely because it lapses into mere habit, something we look upon as 
nothing more than a routine.  It is in part due to these alienating side-effects of 
acculturation that Bildung cannot end with initiation, and in a certain sense only begins 
once initiation is complete. 
One way to understand this distinction is to ask what Hegel means by one’s 
“inorganic” nature, which he claims needs to be appropriated.  He does not mean 
“inorganic” in the sense of “inanimate,” though inanimate objects might also fall within 
this category, since Hegel is concerned with man-made aspects of the world.  Nor is he 
talking about something that is literally dead.  The relevant contrast is with what is alive 
or living in a figurative sense, for Hegel is also concerned with the “life” of institutions, 
practices, and communities.  To call a practice dead is not necessarily to imply that it has !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 See for example McDowell (1996), 87 – 88.  
 




vanished, like for example letter-writing in the age of email.  It can also mean that those 
engaging in the practice do so with indifference and fail to see value in it.  So one’s 
“inorganic nature” could also include the practices that comprise one’s cultural heritage 
and that are inherited from prior generations.  Although these are only fully one’s own 
when they have become second nature,  Hegel’s idea seems to be that heeding these 
customs habitually cannot prevent them from becoming “inorganic,” namely from 
turning into something dead to which we are no longer actively committed. 
In fact, Hegel claims that habit is not only deadening to the individual, but also to 
the community.  For example he writes, “the people [Volk] lives now in the habit of its 
being, and this habit is that which brings about a natural death” (VPG, 46).  He is not 
arguing that we ought routinely to subject all of our customs to critical evaluation, for it 
is Hegel’s view that genuine participation in a culture already demands that we are also 
engaged in keeping alive the customs we habitually follow.  But Hegel is not only 
contrasting habit and culture.  He also holds that the two ways of relating to one’s 
practices are in certain respects interdependent.  As we will see, cultural participation is 
ultimately a way of reflecting on the practices that have become our second nature, while 
preserving the life of these practices in turn requires exercising a kind of reflection 
internal to culture. 
This picture of cultural participation emerges from the chapter of the Phenomenology 
that Hegel explicitly entitled “Bildung”, which follows upon his discussion of Greek 
character and the Roman person.  Because of its position between the Ancient world 
and the French Revolution, the account of Bildung that this chapter provides contains 
numerous features that seem to be peculiar to the epoch he is describing.  That epoch 
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begins with medieval Christianity (which Hegel elsewhere calls “unhappy 
consciousness”) and evolves through various stages, such as the knightly ethic of honor, 
the aristocratic manners of the 17th century, and the emergence of absolute monarchy.  
Moreover it tracks the development of a bourgeois class that became increasingly 
rebellious and hostile towards the Ancien Regime.  I admit that these historical peculiarities 
do present a challenge for extracting a more general account of culture from this 
chapter. 
A question worth asking is why Hegel limits his discussion of Bildung to a mere 25 
pages and associates it with a single historical society, given that in the Preface he claims 
that Bildung is both the content of the Phenomenology as a whole as well as the process that 
its reader is supposed to undergo.83  I want to address this question by examining how 
Hegel characterizes Bildung in this chapter and why he thinks it involves alienation 
(Entfremdung) and externalization (Entäusserung).  My aim is to show that modern culture 
serves as Hegel’s model for Bildung in general because it highlights crucial features 
present in all cultural life, for – unlike its predecessors – modern Bildung rests on the 
discovery that every culture is culture through and through.84 
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83 This question is raised by Quentin Lauer (1983), 103. 
 
84 Hegel’s strategy for exploring the relevant features of modern Bildung depends on his contrast between the 
Moderns and the Ancients.  This may raise certain doubts about Hegel’s account, considering that his 
characterization of the Greeks is at best highly schematic, and often clearly inaccurate.  It is, however, 
important to remember that Hegel does not purport to be doing empirical history and is in a certain sense 
indifferent to whether his description of the Greeks really fits what we otherwise know about them.  Rather, 
the Ancient world plays a methodological function in his thought.  He exaggerates its simplicity, uniformity, 
and immediacy in order to emphasize certain important elements of modern ethical life, which – even if they 
were already present in Greek Sittlichkeit – acquire an unprecedented status in modernity.  Thus I will employ 




Hegel describes the world at the outset of Bildung as one that has become 
“external” and “alien,” and also as “the negative of self-consciousness”: 
[The] world has here the determination of being something external, the negative of 
self-consciousness.  But this world is a spiritual being… its existence is the work of self-
consciousness, but likewise a reality that is immediately given and that is alien to it,  
which has a being of its own and in which it does not recognize itself (PG §484). 
 
This passage strongly suggests that Hegel is talking about an experience of alienation, for 
he claims that the agent is not able to recognize himself in the world.  Moreover, he 
claims that the world has grown “alien” and “external,” which indicates that alienation 
and externality as somehow related.  But in order to understand what kind of alienation 
Hegel has in mind, we first need to examine its source. 
Let me begin with Michael Forster’s helpful reading of this chapter.85  Forster 
interprets the emergence of this alienated world as the aftermath of skepticism, 
specifically the “skeptical culture” that developed in Ancient Greece and Rome.  
According to Forster’s reading, members of Greek ethical life enjoyed a particular form 
of cognition in which the community was in agreement regarding its fundamental 
principles and individuals deferred to its authority in their private judgments.  Because of 
this pervasive convergence, the Greeks were never conscious of these principles as 
principles.  They were not aware of them as products of thinking and thus potentially 
erroneous, and they were not aware of the fact that there could be competing principles 
about which disagreement was possible. 
Skepticism undermined this form of cognition by presenting equally compelling 
arguments for and against a given principle and thus shattering the immediate and 
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absolute authority it was thought to have.  In doing so, it gave rise to a new form of 
cognition, which saw in the world nothing but the “harshness and objectivity of 
everyday reality,” to use Forster’s formulation.  According to Forster, agents came to 
regard their world as “objective” and “harsh” because it was no longer inhabited by the 
gods and because they had to acknowledge that their principles might be mere 
projections that fail to accord with reality.  One way in which the agent copes with this 
alien world is to construct another world over and above this one, a realm inhabited by 
an omniscient and omnipotent God.  In fact Hegel defines the world of Bildung as one 
that is fundamentally divided in two: “This spirit thus forms (bildet) for itself not just one 
world, but one that is doubled, divided, and opposed” (PG §486).  Forster argues that 
this second world is meant to solve the epistemological problems raised by skepticism 
because agents no longer have to figure out which principles to follow but need only 
heed God’s commands, since God as the ideal knower possesses the justification of 
these principles that we are unable to discover.  The formation of this other world can 
be described as a process of self-alienation, for the world of God is alien to our own.  
We constructed it, and yet we cannot recognize ourselves in it, for the perspective it 
affords is inaccessible to us.  It turns out that this self-alienation is already the work of 
Bildung in its effort to overcome its initial alienation. 
Although Forster is able to explain how the construction of a double-world 
responds to the alienating effects of skepticism, he stops short of exploring other aspects 
of alienation at stake in this chapter.  The agent must also find a way of recognizing 
himself in his own world and so overcoming its objectivity and harshness, and this 
problem is not settled by merely erecting another world.  Hegel casts this failure of self-
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recognition in two different ways.  First of all, he suggests that the problem has its roots 
in the abstract formalism of Roman Law, in which each agent is treated as a person, a 
mere bearer of rights devoid of any particularity and indistinguishable from any other.  
The agent wants to distinguish himself by expressing his particularity and so becoming 
recognized as a concrete individual.  From this point of view, overcoming alienation is a 
matter of acquiring a particular status or position in the eyes of others. This position 
distinguishes him from other members of society while nevertheless giving his 
individuality a socially acknowledged expression.  Bildung here becomes synonymous 
with self-cultivation.  What matters is that his position is not occupied by just anyone, 
and this is in part why cultured agents pass judgment on those in other social positions 
and deem them “bad.”  But even among those who occupy the same position – those 
Hegel calls the “nobles” – there is competition for the attainment of honor, at first 
through victory in war, and later through battles of wit. 
Hegel claims that the cultured or cultivated individual is “universal” in a different 
sense from the mere person: “This sameness with all is thus not that sameness of right, 
not that immediate recognition and validity (Gelten) of self-consciousness simply because 
it exists [as in Ancient Rome]; rather, the fact that it counts (gelte) is due to the alienating 
mediation of having made itself suitable to the universal” (PG §488).  What he wants to 
emphasize is that, in order to attain a socially recognized position, I must become a 
‘type,’ and this requires subduing what is merely particular or idiosyncratic about myself.  
For example, in order to become a courtier, I need to be able to discipline my speech 
and manners in such a way that they meet the expectations to which a courtier is held, so 
that the monarch – as well as the servants, serfs, and other courtiers – can recognize me 
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as a courtier.  Although the standards associated with these types are in a sense already 
given to me by the social world I inhabit, turning myself into a type is my own doing and 
so counts as an achievement worthy of praise. 
Hegel describes this process of cultivation as one of self-alienation, for “we may 
say that self-consciousness is only ‘something,’ it has reality only insofar as it alienates 
itself from itself” (PG §488).  What he means is that, in order to become cultured, I must 
relate to myself as an object to be formed or reformed, even if I only ever explicitly 
attend to some specific aspect of myself.  I must also be able to regard myself from an 
external standpoint and assess my own worth from the perspective of others.  
Recognition is of course already an important element in upbringing, which presupposes 
that the child comes to desire the parents’ approval.  But cultivation involves considering 
one’s own behavior and actions from a more impersonal point of view.  We no longer 
want to do merely what a particular individual asks of us, but we want to perform 
actions that any cultivated person will recognize and esteem.  So part of the reason 
Hegel calls Bildung a process of self-alienation is that it requires adopting this alienated 
perspective on one’s own conduct and considering how it would look to an anonymous 
observer. 
But Hegel suggests a second way of interpreting the failure of self-recognition, 
which Bildung is supposed to mend, and this interpretation seems to have a wider 
application beyond early modern Europe.  He claims that agents do not recognize 
themselves in the world because they do not see it as a product of their work, even 
though “this its existence is the work of self-consciousness” (PG §484).  We can think of 
this alienation as akin to the stage of adolescence, at which the individual comes to adopt 
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a negative attitude towards the status quo as such.  The problem he is faced with is not 
that he has not been properly acculturated, that he lacks the dispositions and inclinations 
that make him suitable for social life.  This initiation has presumably already taken place.  
Rather, he does not identify with his social world despite having a familiarity with and 
mastery of its practices, because he does not see himself as the author of these practices, 
given that they were there long before he entered them.   
In saying that this world is in fact the “work of self-consciousness,” Hegel wants 
to remind us that it is the achievement of the “spiritual” activity of previous generations.  
Nevertheless, each new generation needs to appropriate this inheritance in such a way 
that it can consider it the product of its own work.  As he writes in the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History, “The individual finds the work as a completed world before 
him, which he has to incorporate for himself” (VPG p. 45).  This in itself is not a unique 
insight.  Others, such as for example Hans-Georg Gadamer, have likewise acknowledged 
that cultures and traditions need to be appropriated by those who inherit it, but 
Gadamer at least takes interpretation to satisfy this need.86  What is interesting about 
Hegel’s position is that he thinks such appropriation cannot be achieved merely by 
interpreting one’s culture in a new way.  For him it is importantly a matter of producing 









II. Work and Externalization 
Hegel’s master-slave dialectic offers the clearest illustration of this relationship between 
Bildung and productive activity.  This dialectic involves three elements: the master, the 
slave, and the thing.  First we need to review the background briefly.  In the framework 
of desire – the first form of self-consciousness – the agent wanted to prove himself 
independent of the thing by consuming it and so negating its status as something self-
standing.  Because this kind of consumption had the contrary effect of revealing the 
agent to be the dependent party, he sought something that could mediate his relationship 
to the object of desire and so ensure his own status as a self-standing being.87  The only 
thing that could perform this mediating task turns out to be another agent.  After what 
Hegel calls a “life-and-death struggle,” one agent enslaves the other and positions him 
between himself and the object of desire.  Now it is the slave who has direct dealings 
with the material world, whereas the master merely enjoys the product of the slave’s 
labor.  Most importantly, the master enjoys continual recognition as a free agent, which 
the “thing” itself could not provide. 
But in Hegel’s well-known analysis, it is precisely the slave’s engagement with the 
thing that makes him freer – or in a better position to eventually realize full freedom – 
than the master.  Whereas the master withers into a parasite completely dependent on 
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87 To put this in less Hegelian terms, at this stage I am looking for something that can guarantee that I remain 
independent from the material world, while at the same time satisfying my material needs.  Whatever this turns 





the slave, the slave’s work in fact transforms him into a (relatively) self-standing being.88  
Hegel emphasizes that it is work which has this formative effect.  He writes: 
Work… is restrained desire, arrested disappearing, or it forms (bildet).  The negative 
relationship to the object becomes its form and something permanent, precisely because 
for the one working the object is self-standing.  This negative middle or the formative 
(formierende) activity is at the same time the singularity or the pure for-itself of 
consciousness, which now through work steps outside itself into the element of 
permanence; so the working consciousness arrives in this way at a recognition 
(Anschauung) of its own independence in the independent being [of the object] (PG 
§195). 
 
Hegel is here contrasting the unrestrained desire, which was the downfall of the prior 
“configuration of consciousness,”89 which the restraining effect of work.  Because the 
slave has to first reshape the purely natural object in order to make it fit for enjoyment – 
though he himself will never get to enjoy it – he inevitably learns to hold back his desires 
and so gains control over them.  In this respect, work has a formative effect on the slave 
himself. 
But what Hegel wants to stress in saying that work forms (bildet) is that it gives rise 
to products and turns parts of nature into something man-made.  This is what he means 
when he claims that through labor the agent is able to “step outside [himself] into the 
element of permanence.”  By making something that continues to exist once I am done 
making it, I am externalizing some aspect of myself in the form of an object distinct 
from me.  This production makes possible a certain kind of confirmation of my own 
self-conception.  In the object I worked on I see a reflection of who I take myself to be.  
In the case of the slave’s thing, this reflection is very dim, considering that his productive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Of course this is by no means Hegel’s last word on freedom.  In fact, the Phenomenology as a whole suggests 
that the kind of freedom whose potential is embodied in the slave is still very primitive and ultimately 
inadequate. 
 




activity is directed by the will of another.  The master’s will is not only someone else’s 
will, but it is directly opposed to the will of the slave.  Moreover it is the will of a single 
individual, and so determined by his particularities, peculiarities, and idiosyncrasies, 
which are arbitrary and contingent, and which set him apart from others.  Nevertheless, 
Hegel stresses that the slave does behold himself in the object, because the object is 
something he made through his own effort, even if he made it to satisfy the master’s 
demands.  It is this capacity to form that is manifest in the formed object, and this 
capacity turns out to be a central feature of genuine freedom. 
Hegel’s account is considerably more complicated than this summary might 
suggest, because for him the slave’s labor needs to be understood in relation to fear of 
death, which is the reason the slave entered into bondage in the first place.  According to 
Hegel, it is labor as formative activity that dispels this initial fear because it allows the 
slave to leave an enduring imprint on the world and so in a sense overcome his own 
mortality.  But for our purposes it is enough to focus on the relationship between self-
formation and the formation of an object, which the master-slave dialectic thematizes.  
Let us review the central claims Hegel is here making:  First of all, the slave himself 
becomes formed or educated into a free being by forming an object.  It is his labor that 
teaches the slave to be self-disciplined and self-sufficient, a lesson of which the master 
remains deprived.  Secondly, the slave’s labor results in the creation of an object distinct 
from the slave himself.  The thing is initially already there and the slave merely works on 
it, but through his labor he gives the thing a new form.  In this respect the slave is 
externalizing himself in the sense that he is forming something external to him.  
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Laboring activity establishes a certain distance between the slave and the “thing” he has 
produced. 
Thirdly, this distance becomes integral to Bildung because it introduces a reflective 
relationship of a certain sort.  It is important to note that for Hegel, the distance 
between the slave and the thing is not a source of alienation proper, for the slave is able 
to find himself effortlessly in what he has produced.  As Hegel puts it, “the form, by 
becoming externalized (hinausgesetzt), does not become something other (ein Anderes) than 
he; for in fact it is his pure for-itself, which thus becomes truth for him” (PG § 196).  
What this means is that in the object the slave is able to recognizes his own subjective 
activity.  The object provides him with a mirror image of himself, a mirror in which he 
can see his own labor reflected.  This is clearly different from the kind of reflection we 
are usually concerned with.  The slave is not engaging in critical reflection, for he is not 
evaluating or assessing his activity, except perhaps by the standards internal to the craft 
involved.  But this reflection does involve a distanced view of oneself or of a certain 
aspect of oneself, which the object makes possible. 
This seems to be another version of Hegel’s central thesis that a certain distance is 
necessary for the possibility of genuine identification.  As we have seen in the context of 
habit, it is only once I have risen above my determinations and made them mine, and no 
longer simply me, that I can regard them as my own properties.  Here Hegel is making a 
similar move, although one with bolder implications.  He is arguing that the slave can 
only become free and know himself as free because he has externalized himself in the 
form of an object.  Only when he is confronted with something other than he that is at 
the same time of his own making can he attain self-knowledge and find confirmation of 
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his own self-conception in the world.  Even though this thing is not an object of 
contemplation, his relation to it is nevertheless a reflective one because it provides the 
slave with an objective confirmation of his own activity.  The slave beholds his own 
reflection in the world, even while his attention remains fully occupied with his labor. 
Although Hegel alludes to work or productive activity in the Bildung-chapter, in 
that context he says surprisingly little about the structure of work and its contribution to 
Bildung.  I want to suggest that the picture of labor that emerges in the master-slave 
dialectic can supplement Hegel’s remarks about the centrality of work in the later 
chapter.  There he proposes that the alienation (Entfremdung) from which modern agents 
suffer can only be cured through externalization (Entäußerung).  I initially confront a 
world in which I cannot recognize myself because I cannot see it as my own work, and I 
can only overcome this alienation by appropriating this world through work.  In order to 
make the world a reflection of my subjectivity, I need to externalize myself in the world 
and so give my subjectivity an objective expression.  We have seen in the case of the 
slave’s labor that this externalization has two aspects.  On the one hand, work 
contributes to the formation of the agent himself, for it not only makes him self-
disciplined, it also gives his subjectivity an objective manifestation that allows him to 
confront himself in the world.  On the other hand, work reshapes mere things into 
artifacts and so gives what is purely objective a subjective form. 
Because work turns things into a lasting expression of their producer’s own self-
conception, Hegel characterizes it as the formation of a shared culture.  In order to make 
sense of this claim, it is important to note that the relevant self-conception that is being 
expressed is significantly shaped by the social dimensions of labor and ceases to be 
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merely that of an individual agent.  This is to some extent true of the slave’s labor as 
well, since this labor is being directed by the master’s minimal self-conception of a free 
being, even if the master is as of yet unwilling to extend this conception to the slave as 
well.  But what makes this culture shared is not only the fact that the self-conception at 
stake is a social one.  It is also important than this culture is a material or objective one, a 
culture made up of man-made objects, although Hegel does not mean “object” in a 
narrow sense.  He writes, “the spirit of a people is a determinate spirit, and its deed is to 
make itself into a present world, which is in time and space.  Everything is a people’s 
work; its religion, laws, language, customs, art, events, actions, positions towards other 
peoples are its deeds; and every people is only this work” (VPG, p. 45). 
As we have seen, Hegel provides an extensive list of all the different modes of 
cultural self-expression and he argues that a culture is nothing over and above its own 
objective manifestations.  This means that cultural objects are constitutive of a culture 
because they embody a society’s character and self-conception.  But because these 
products are expressive of a culture, they also serve to reflect its character and self-
conception.  We have already encountered this reflective aspect of work on the 
individual level in the slave’s labor.  But in this context Hegel is making a stronger claim.  
He argues that cultural objects both make up a culture as well as mirror it.  There is in a 
sense no culture prior to and independent of its works, but these works at the same time 
reflect the culture in which they were produced.  To put this in Hegelian terms, 
“substance” becomes “cultured” through work that on the one hand constitutes a 
culture and on the other hand reflects it back to us.  This is what I take Hegel to mean 
when he defines the Bildung of substance as the “acquisition of its self-consciousness” 
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and the “bringing-about of its own becoming and reflection into itself.”  According to 
Hegel, participation in a culture always involves a reflective relation to it, for the objects 
we form provide us with a speculum of our cultural context.   
Above I mentioned that Bildung has two central aspects, that it forms both the 
subject as well the object.  It is worth recalling that this double-aspect of Bildung should 
already be familiar to us.  When we encountered Hegel’s definition of Bildung from the 
Preface, I noted that for Hegel there are two standpoints from which we can consider 
one and the same process.  We can either view it as the formative education of an 
individual agent, or we can consider this same process in relation to social substance, and 
in this relation Bildung turns out to be the development of a cultural world.  Hegel insists 
that becoming cultured and forming a culture are merely two ways of characterizing one 
and the same activity.  As he remarks in this chapter: 
For the power of the individual consists in the fact that he makes himself suitable,  
i.e. that he externalizes his own self, so posits himself as the objective (gegenständlich)  
existing substance.  His Bildung and his own actuality is for this reason the  
actualization of the substance itself (PG §490). 
 
The main claim seems to be that even while pursuing their social ambition of cultured 
sophistication, individual members simultaneously contribute to the culture of their 
society. 
 
III. Work of Art and Spiritual Culture 
Given our previous description of cultivation, it might seem strange to characterize it as 
a form of cultural contribution.  Of course working to become cultured does mean that 
one is implicitly honoring and perpetuating certain social practices, but this does not 
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seem enough for actively shaping a culture.  Moreover, Hegel described cultivation as 
highly self-absorbed.  If what I work on is myself and not something other than me, it 
does not look like this process of self-cultivation gives rise to anything like an objective 
culture.  Although the cultivated people Hegel describes in this chapter do not engage in 
productive activity and seem to be concerned only with their own appearance and status, 
the artistic interests of the later nobility do point in this direction.  One could even say 
that wielding witty phrases is already a kind of production, though speech is relatively 
ephemeral.   But Hegel also mentions the nobility’s active support of the arts.  Though 
the artists themselves were usually members of the bourgeoisie, which was thought to 
lack culture, the nobles nevertheless displayed their degree of cultivation by appreciating 
the artistic creations of others. 
Since Hegel is describing an age for which “culture” became an explicit ideal, it 
should not be surprising that Bildung is here taken as synonymous with what we would 
call “high culture.”  This kind of discrimination is already contained in the phrase “being 
cultured” (gebildet), which does not apply to all “acculturated” members of a society, but 
only to those who have risen to a certain standard.  In the context of Hegel’s chapter, 
the arts would rank higher than other artifacts because the standard at stake for the early 
moderns is closely tied to social class.  The kind of society Hegel is here describing is 
one that is divided into the nobility, which has the leisure to pursue less material and 
more “spiritual” ends, and the emerging bourgeoisie, which is occupied solely with the 
acquisition of wealth.  Thus the arts became a mark of culture precisely because they 
were elevated above the “base” economic activity of the bourgeoisie. 
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Considering that Hegel ultimately reveals this class structure to be delusional and 
unsustainable, his own reasons for deeming artworks to be of higher cultural value than 
other objects depends on the kind of reflection they afford.  At this point we have 
already seen several ways in which reflection is internal to Bildung.  In the context of self-
cultivation, it turns out that I can only fashion myself according to cultural standards by 
engaging in the reflective activity of evaluating my own behavior as if it were that of 
another.  In the master-slave dialectic, the slave forms (bildet) himself into a self-
disciplined and self-sufficient creature by forming the merely natural thing into 
something that reflects his own activity.  This is already a more robust form of 
reflection, for in the object the slave is able to confront himself in a way that the merely 
cultivated nobleman does not.  But his reflection is still plagued with shortcomings that 
ultimately prevent him from ever fully knowing himself.  First of all, the thing is still an 
object of consumption, not appreciation or contemplation, and so the slave might catch 
a glimpse of himself in his periphery, though he continues to engage in laboring activity.  
Secondly, what the thing reflects is not the slave’s will, but that of the master, which 
means that the slave can never fully identify with his own product. 
Hegel’s account suggests that works of art at least promise a form of reflection that 
preserves central features of the slave’s Bildung while avoiding its pitfalls.  In the 
Introduction to his Lectures on Aesthetics he argues that the creation of artworks enables 
practical self-knowledge, which seems to resemble the kind of self-knowledge available 
to the slave.  He writes, 
The human being becomes for-himself [i.e. self-conscious] through practical activity, by 
having the drive to reproduce himself (sich selbst hervorzubringen) in that which is 
immediately given to him, that which is for him externally present, and likewise to 




Works of art are external to us because they take the form of sensible objects, though 
they are in fact nothing but objective externalizations of our own subjectivity.  Just like 
the slave’s “thing,” an artwork is produced by spiritual activity and so reflects the 
spiritual character of its producer.  But this is where the comparison ends.  By describing 
the reflective relation we have to works of art in terms like “recognizing oneself” (sich 
wiederzuerkennen) and “grasping oneself in the other” (sich in seinem Anderen zu begreifen)90, 
Hegel indicates that the reflection demanded by art is far more robust than what the 
slave or the master were capable of mustering. 91 
In fact Hegel even identifies the relevant form of reflection as closer to a 
“theoretical” attitude, rather than to a practical one, and he follows Kant in arguing that 
appreciation of artworks is incompatible with regarding them from the standpoint of 
desire.92  One could say that both the master and the slave remain confined to the 
practical standpoint.  While the master sees the thing as a direct source of pleasure and 
enjoyment, even the slave continues to view it in relation to desire, namely as the indirect 
means for his own survival.  But the artwork invites an attitude that is incompatible with 
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90 Hegel also argues that the alienation at stake in art has to do with the distinction between thought and 
sensibility.  Thought externalizes itself in a sensible object, in which it must be able to recognize itself again. 
See VA, 27/28: „And if indeed artworks are not thoughts and concept, but a concept’s own self-
development, an alienation (Entfremdung) into the sensuous, then the power of thinking spirit lies in that, not 
only to grasp itself in its unique form as thought, but to the same extent to recognize itself again in its 
externalization (Entäußerung) into feeling and sensibility, to grasp itself in its other, by transforming the alien 
(das Entfremdete) into thought and thus returning to itself.” 
 
91 This is not quite right, since Hegel does use very similar language to describe the slave’s attitude towards 
the object.  For example, he claims that the slave “becomes conscious” (kommt zum Bewußtsein) and “finds 
himself again” (Wiederfinden). 
 
92 „The human being does not stand in such a relation of desire to the work of art.  He lets it exist as an 
object free for itself and relates without desire to it, as to an object that is only there for the theoretical side of 




either labor or consumption, for is requires that we step outside our familiar 
engagement with things and appreciate an object that has no use for us.  Because works 
of art demand to be noticed and perceived in a way that ordinary objects do not, we 
can only see what they reflect if we are willing to trade our practical immersion for 
reflective appreciation. 
But the most important difference between the slave’s product and a work of art 
is in what each reflects, namely its meaning or content.  To repeat, the “thing” does 
mirror the slave’s laboring activity, but an activity dictated by an arbitrary and 
contingent will.  Although some may want to imagine artistic creation to be an 
individual’s self-expression, it is important to remember that at least during the period 
Hegel is describing, most artists were sponsored and commissioned by the nobility.  
Moreover, Hegel does not even consider such self-expression to be the right sort of 
ideal, and he is relentlessly hostile towards Romantic art precisely because it sought to 
express the unique qualities – and genius – of the artist.  Hegel considers such works as 
arbitrary and contingent as the objects made for the master’s pleasure. 
According to Hegel, true works of art are those whose content is “universal.”  In 
fact he frequently praises the Greeks for achieving this universality, because they 
aspired to create sculptures that left no trace of the individual who made them.  What 
Hegel means is not that an artwork contains some abstract idea that can be grasped 
independently of its mode of expression.  For Hegel, works of art are an example of 
what he calls “concrete universality,” for the universal content their express can only be 
discovered through their particular form.  An artwork is “particular” not only because it 
is sensible and so occupies a place in space and time, although the fact that it can be 
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perceived by the senses is significant for Hegel’s view about its unique purpose.93  It is 
“particular” because it is made in a customary manner and style and so situated in an 
artistic tradition, but also because it deals with a subject matter that is relevant to a 
historical or cultural community in which it was made.  As Hegel points out, “every 
artwork belongs to its time, its people, its environment and depends on the particular 
historical and other representations and purposes,” (VA, p. 30). Hence Homer wrote 
about the Trojan War and Diderot about the new philosophes. 
Nevertheless, Hegel argues that the great works are able to illuminate what is 
universal even while they are about something historically or culturally specific and 
even when they are fashioned in an inherited style.!!When Hegel speaks of the universal 
content of works of art, he has in mind a certain self-conception which is idealized and 
in that sense expresses what we aspire to be, and which makes a claim to universal 
validity.  To put this in Hegelian terminology, works of art are ultimately concerned 
with our “spiritual nature.”  This is obviously a normative conception of art, since 
many actual works fall short of it.  But Hegel does think that the great works of art, 
those that best reflect the culture in which they were created, do exhibit a universal 
content of this sort.   
One might worry that this normative conception is too restrictive and confines 
art to a single task, but it is worth noting that this universal ideal can be expressed in an 
indefinite number of ways.  For example, Hegel is not suggesting that art should be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Hegel argues that the unique purpose of art is to reconcile thought and sensibility, precisely because it 
presents something intelligible and meaningful in a form that is available to the senses and to feeling.  He 
even characterizes this purpose in moral terms as an overcoming of the dualism of Kantian Moralität.  “In 
contrast it is to claim that art is called to disclose the truth in the form of sensible art, to present this 




utopian, despite the idealization in which it is engaged, for it is frequently the case that 
we can only discern our own ideals by confronting the ways we fall short of them.!!
Moreover the universal ideal that interests Hegel is already contained in the customs in 
which we engage.  Hegel argues that the culture of any society, no matter how 
contingent and conventional many of its practices may be, contains a conception of the 
human being as such – expressed in what it takes to be of highest value – and its art 
reflects this conception in more or less transparent ways.94  As he puts it, “art seems to 
proceed from the higher drives and to satisfy higher needs, indeed currently the highest 
and absolute [needs], by being tied to the most universal worldviews and the religious 
interests of entire epochs and peoples” (VA, p. 50).!
What we have seen is that Hegel draws a certain distinction between the forms of 
productive activity in which we ordinarily engage intended to satisfy practical demands, 
and the production of works that serve a predominantly reflective function.  He 
frequently characterizes this as a distinction between “practical” and “spiritual” culture, 
both of which he considers to be integral aspects of all cultural life.  A society’s 
practical culture, on the one hand, comprises the practices it institutes, the skills it 
trains, and the goods it produces to satisfy the material needs of its members.  On the 
other hand, it also encompasses the normative dimensions of culture, the customs, 
values, and standards we habitually uphold in our practices.  According to Hegel, 
practical culture in this wider sense !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 This aspect of Hegel’s notion of culture has been widely acknowledged.  See for example Markus: “Each 
historical culture also formulates directly, and an unconditionally universal way, these ends which it regards as 
ultimate and binding” (1986, 121).  Also Lauer: “To each culture there corresponds an image of man, and 
that image of man is intimately linked to the manner in which men represent (vorstellen) themselves the 




consists in those universal ideas and ends, in the scope of those spiritual powers, that 
rule consciousness and life.  Our consciousness has these ideas, maintains their validity 
as ultimate determinations, follows the interconnections indicated by them in its 
course… but it knows them not: it does not make them the subject-matter and interest 
of its investigation (GPh, 41). 
 
These “universal ideas” seem to be the very ideals of the “universal” we just 
encountered.  But even though possessing general culture means being in a certain 
sense conscious of these ideas, Hegel claims that this is not the same as knowing them.  
What he has in mind, most minimally,95 is that they remain in the background, and 
while we are able to employ them, discover connections among them, and draw 
conclusions from them, we do not in general make them explicit. 
Spiritual culture proceeds from practical culture and from the universal ideas 
operative within it, but its mark is a reflective attitude towards those ideas.  Hegel 
defines spiritual culture in terms of certain modes of reflection, which includes not only 
art, but also religion and philosophy, and which he calls “forms of absolute spirit.”  
According to Hegel, art, religion, and philosophy all present the same universal ideas96 
and only differ in mode of presentation – art through sense-perception, religion 
through “picture-thinking,” and philosophy through concepts.  We already have some 
sense of what it means to say that art reflects the universal.  Philosophy will be the 
topic of the fourth chapter, while the relationship between religion and Bildung is a topic 
in its own right.97  But we can identify at least one important feature these three !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 I should note that knowledge in Hegel’s “scientific” sense is going to involve even higher epistemic 
expectations.  This will be addressed in the fourth chapter. 
 
96 To be more precise, Hegel thinks that the ideas reflected in art, religion, and philosophy do differ in certain 
respects, for they are different versions of the same idea that is gradually unfolding and becoming increasingly 
determinate as it moves from art, to religion, and finally to philosophy. 
 




moments of spiritual culture share: perceiving a work of art, participating in a religious 
ritual, and doing philosophy all demand a temporary withdrawal from practical culture 
and the adoption of a reflective attitude towards it. 
Since spiritual culture is a reflective form of Bildung, we might expect that it 
cannot apply to most historical and perhaps even some contemporary societies.  
Although Hegel does seem to believe that there were and continue to be groups of 
people so ungebildet that they lack any spiritual culture, he also suggests that every 
historically significant society has incorporated these modes of reflection.  This is why 
Hegel throughout the Phenomenology turns to literary works in order to discover how a 
society conceived of itself and to what standards it held itself.  This is most vivid in his 
chapter on Greek ethical life, most of which is devoted to an analysis of Sophocles’ two 
tragedies, Oedipus Rex and Antigone.  But if Hegel credits the Greeks with the 
development of practical as well as spiritual culture, it remains puzzling why he reserves 
the term Bildung for modern Europe. 
One way to distinguish modern Bildung from that of the Greeks is to say that, 
while both the moderns and the Ancients had a culture, it is only the moderns who are 
aware of this fact.  This is not to deny that the Greeks engaged in “spiritual” forms of 
reflection, for they certainly were conscious of their universal ideas through sculpture, 
poetry, and religious rites.  But knowing the ideas and ideals internal to your culture is 
not the same thing as knowing that they are cultural.  In order to explain the difference 
between these two kinds of knowledge, I want to turn to György Markus’ paper “The 
Hegelian Conception of Culture.” Although this paper has not received a lot of 
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attention, it provides a strikingly clear articulation of what the latter knowledge consists 
in.  Markus writes,  
the view which regards modernity as the world of Bildung, contains the correct insight 
that only modern society knows itself as culture, recognizes its institutional world as 
one which came about in, and is sustained by, human activities… But this view at the 
same time misses the fact that all historical worlds are worlds of culture, even if they do 
not know it.98   
 
This description of modern society is reminiscent of the “skeptical culture” Michael 
Forster describes, for according to Forster the Greeks did not know their fundamental 
principles to be principles and so to be standards that they themselves had posited.  
This discovery ensued in skepticism because it seemed to imply two things: that these 
principles could be mere constructs of the mind with no objective validity, and that these 
principles could be mere products of their particular culture and so not universally 
shared. 
The modern culture that emerges out of this condition of skepticism is shaped by 
a new form of reflection more acute than what Bildung in the broader sense requires.  
Although Hegel thinks that modernity does rest on a genuine discovery, its consequent 
indulgence in artifice revealed the shortcomings of this form of reflection.  The man of 
culture grows so preoccupied with perfecting his own qualities that he sees no limit to 
his malleability and capacity for self-formation.99  Hegel argues that the process of 
cultivation, which started out as a desire to become someone in the eyes of others and 
so gain an objective existence in the world, evolves into the fantasy that the individual !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Markus (1986), 119. 
 
99 In his recent book, Robert Pippin points out that in the world of Bildung, “possible ethical worlds are 
understood as if all were mere theatrical masks, as if freedom were not, could not be, a matter of any deep, 
non-alienated identification with who one is, but a complete and permanent state of alienation, of not being 




is self-made, that he is nothing but what he has made of himself.  Thus the cultivated 
individual becomes the enlightened self, “which grasps nothing but the self and 
everything as the self, i.e. it comprehends everything, it cancels all objectivity 
(Gegenständlichkeit) and transforms all in-itself into a for-itself” (PG §486).  This highly 
self-reflective form of Bildung ends up undermining the very reflection it was meant to 
provide.  Bildung had the aim of enabling the individual agent to recognize himself in 
the world, not by “canceling all objectivity,” but by externalizing and expressing himself 
in an objective form. 
Although Bildung in this chapter of the Phenomenology ends up betraying its own 
nature, it is possible to glean some elements of Bildung in general that seem to hold true 
even for cultures far less alienated, and far less self-conscious, than early modern 
Europe.  While the Greeks did engage in reflective practices of various sorts, they did 
not regard their culture as a whole to be culture, namely something of human making.  
As we will see in greater detail in the next chapter, the Phenomenology Hegel characterizes 
Greek culture as divided into two sets of norms, the human law and the divine law, and 
while the human law could perhaps be considered for revision, the divine law was 
immutable and inscrutable because it was authored by the gods.  So what distinguishes 
modern Bildung from ancient culture is not its reflective practices per se, but its 
discovery that all laws are human laws.  Hegel articulates this as the discovery that the 
social world is a work.  The modern agent is at first blind to this fact because he does 
not see it as his own individual work, but in the process of Bildung he comes to 
recognize that even those practices that seemed to be merely given are in fact 
“spiritual” accomplishments and so contain wisdom that may not be immediately 
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transparent to a new initiate.  One could say that modern culture is self-conscious in a 
way that premodern cultures were not, because it realizes that its social world is a work, 
even though premodern cultures were in fact works as well. 
So what does it mean to recognize that the social world is a work?  First of all, 
this recognition entails that no part of culture can exempt itself from reevaluation.  If a 
certain practice comes to seem alien to its participants, they can no longer perpetuate it 
merely because it is already in place, or because it is commanded by some extrinsic 
authority like the gods.  Secondly, this recognition entails that no practice is in principle 
unrevisable.100  Although this is clearly Hegel’s view, it is easy to exaggerate its 
implications.  For example, to say that no practice is unrevisable does not mean that we 
can simply create or eliminate any and every practice or even construct an entirely new 
culture from scratch, as the French Revolution attempted to do.  Moreover, Hegel is 
worried that our reevaluations can become a source of confusion, for they can mislead 
us in various ways, giving rise to shallow criticism and blinding us to the true value of a 
given practice. 
But Hegel does think that modern culture’s self-consciousness has a significant 
positive implication.  Recognizing that the social world is the product of human activity 
means that its survival depends on this activity, without which it would cease to serve 
as a source of practical guidance.  One way to understand this is to say that inheriting a 
culture is a matter of interpreting its practices in such a way that they make sense to 
those who partake in them, so that they can own up to those practices, take 
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100 Whether the basic principles underlying our practices are revisable is a question I will address in the next 




responsibility for them, and regard them as their own.  But Hegel seems to be making 
the even stronger claim that being a member of a culture requires that one is also 
actively contributing to its production, whether by cooking a meal, performing a play, 
or instituting a law. 
Though even purely practical Bildung is engaged in this dual process of producing 
and reflecting a culture, spiritual Bildung retains a privileged and indispensable role.  I 
suggested that for Hegel our commitment to the practices of ethical life can never be 
cemented once and for all, but needs to be continually revived.  Such revivals of 
commitment are precisely what the reflective aspects of culture are meant to enable.  
What Hegel calls “spiritual culture” turns out to be essential to the survival of any 
culture, since it serves to draw our attention to aspects of our social world to which we 
ordinarily do not attend.  This introduces an important contrast between full-fledged 
participation in a culture and a habitual immersion in it.  Habitual conduct does already 
incorporate a kind of internal grasp of customary practices, but Hegel thinks that this 
implicit insight is vulnerable to forms of alienation.  In order to avoid such alienation, 
we need to actively sustain our confidence in our customs by continually re-committing 
ourselves to them.  Culture as reflective activity has precisely this role to play because it 
allows us to confront what we otherwise take for granted. 
 
IV. Civil Society and Ethical Education 
I hope that these considerations help us clarify some relevant differences between 
premodern cultures and modern Bildung and understand why for Hegel modernity 
foregrounds features that hold true of all cultural life, even when only implicitly.  But 
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the world of Bildung in this chapter is also marked by the emergence of a new 
institution, namely civil society.  Hegel characterizes this world as divided into two 
social spheres, the educated nobility that seeks honor, power, and recognition, and the 
bourgeoisie in pursuit of wealth.  Members of the opposing groups judge each other’s 
aims to be “bad,” but it turns out that they are not as different as they wanted to 
believe.  Moreover, Hegel argues that the whole social order, including the high-minded 
nobility, depends on the self-seeking activity of the bourgeoisie.  Echoing Adam 
Smith’s “invisible hand,” Hegel argues that self-interested motives produce wealth that 
ends up benefiting everyone, even if the individuals themselves are completely 
indifferent to the public good.  So the survival of this society, including its higher 
“cultural” aspirations, is ultimately indebted to this “base” economic activity. 
Its dependence on the bourgeois market confirms that Hegel does ultimately 
consider Bildung proper to be a uniquely modern phenomenon.  According to Hegel, it 
is civil society that distinguishes modern ethical life from its predecessors and that 
prevents it from suffering their fate.  Although Hegel reserves his more developed 
account of civil society for the Philosophy of Right, his earlier characterization of the 
emerging bourgeois class in the Bildung-chapter incorporates strikingly similar 
elements.101  But in the Phenomenology civil society is still cast as a necessary evil because 
it remains uncultured, even if it makes culture possible, whereas in the Philosophy of Right 
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101 This resemblance has already been noted by Rósza, who argues that the concept of Bildung provides an 
important point of continuity between the two works.  He writes, “die Bildung steht in enger Verbindung mit 
dem wirtschaftlichen Status der Selbstbestimmung und Selbstidentifikation des modernen Individuums 
überhaupt” (2001, 205). [“Bildung stands in close connection with the economic status of the self-




Hegel describes civil society as itself the site of Bildung, and not merely an unfortunate 
yet necessary condition for its flourishing. 
In my reading of the Phenomenology, I already indicated some of the ways in which 
Bildung might bear on modern ethical life.  I proposed that Bildung incorporates the 
sorts of reflection that help sustain our commitment to social practices, and that any 
culture has been and must continue to be constituted through human activity.  But in 
the Philosophy of Right Hegel has surprisingly little to say about these aspects of Bildung, 
especially about the role of “spiritual culture” in ethical life.  Instead he situates Bildung 
in the sphere of civil society, which is the domain of “practical culture.”  Moreover, he 
focuses his account on the formative education of the individual social member, which 
might suggest that he is rejecting the synonymity between Bildung and Kultur.  Finally, 
even individual education in this context appears to be discontinuous with ethical 
upbringing and looks to be in service of purely instrumental ends.  If I want to deny 
these conclusions, I have to show that Hegel’s depiction of Bildung in civil society does 
bear on questions about the ethics of culture.  By investigating the extent to which 
individual Bildung contributes to the aim of cultivating an ethical disposition, we will 
begin to see what Hegel takes to be the proper role of cultural pluralism in modern 
ethical life and of cultural identity in the life of modern ethical agents. 
Hegel positions civil society as a point of transition between the family and the 
state, even though its basic principle looks to be radically opposed to those of either 
sphere.  Kin take the good of the family to be their personal aim, and citizens orient 
their activities towards the good of their society as a while, while “the concrete person, 
who as a particular is his own end… is the one principle of civil society” (PR §182).  
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Civil society provides an outlet for the particular and arbitrary wills of individuals, 
allowing them to make the satisfaction of their subjective needs and desires their 
primary concern.  But it turns out that I cannot attain private satisfaction without 
entering into relations with others, whose needs and desires place constraints on my 
will.  In Hegel’s words, “in civil society is each his own end, everything else is nothing 
to him.  But without relation to others he cannot attain the scope of his ends; these 
others are thus means for the end of particularity” (PR §182A).  Although the principle 
of universality remains operative in civil society, it is treated as a mere means for the 
satisfaction of particularity.  For Hegel this would imply that “the ethical is here in lost 
in its extremes” (PR §184A). 
As I previously mentioned, Hegel echoes Adam Smith when he characterizes 
such “self-seeking” (selbstsüchtig) activity as inadvertently benefiting everyone else.  He 
claims that “by earning, producing, and enjoying for himself, each precisely thereby 
produces and earns for the enjoyment of rest” (PR §199).  But this argument can at 
best prove that civil society is rational at the institutional level.  It does not yet show 
that its members can be considered rational, given that they only contribute to the 
greater good because they are not concerned with it and continue to be motivated by 
sheer self-interest.  Such agents would seem to resemble animals, whose behavior 
conforms to the laws of nature without their knowing or willing it.  Hegel goes beyond 
the tradition of political economy when he insists that participation in civil society must 
also be shown to be subjectively rational, free, and good, if the institution itself is to be 
justifiable.  He writes, “the interest of the idea [of freedom], which does not lie in the 
consciousness of the members of civil society as such, is the process of raising their 
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singularity and naturalness… to formal freedom and formal universality of knowing 
and willing, of forming (bilden) subjectivity in their particularity” (PR §187).  He calls 
this process Bildung. 
Although Hegel considers Bildung, unlike Erziehung, to be a form of self-
education, this can sound misleading.  For example, Hegel is not talking about what we 
think of as being self-taught rather than taught in educational institutions.  Moreover, 
he is not even talking about an education we decide to undertake.  Fred Neuhouser in 
his insightful elucidation of Bildung in civil society correctly points out that “it is 
intrinsic to the nature of Bildung that it takes place unconsciously and involuntarily, 
behind the backs, so to speak, of the very subjects who undergo the process of 
formation.”102  Bildung must take this unconscious and involuntary form not only 
because unformed individuals at first lack the desire to be formed, but also because 
they lack the capacities necessary for making a conscious and voluntary decision.  
According to Neuhouser, civil society is especially suited to this educative task precisely 
because individuals must enter it in order to satisfy their basic needs and so have no 
choice but to undergo this process. 
But there is an important sense in which Bildung can be described as self-
directed.  For Hegel this has to do with the close connection between Bildung and work, 
a connection he repeatedly reiterates.  He even defines Bildung as a subject’s own 
liberation through “hard work against the sheer subjectivity of behavior, against the 
immediacy of desire as well as against the subjective arrogance of feeling and the 
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arbitrary will (Willkur) of pleasure” (PR §187).  Hegel identifies several aspects of work 
that are central to its formative power.  The first has to do with its submission of 
desire.  As we have seen in the slave’s laboring activity, work has the effect of 
postponing the fulfillment of desires because the desired object must first be produced 
before it can be enjoyed.  The better we become at ignoring our desires the more 
control we gain over our own will.  But work also generates new and higher desires, 
such as the desire for luxuries beyond the satisfaction of natural needs.  Moreover, 
Hegel claims that work generates a significantly different kind of desire, namely the 
desire to be busy.  Thus Hegel remarks that “the barbarian is lazy and is distinguished 
from the educated person (Gebildeten) by his brooding stupor, because practical 
education (praktische Bildung) consists precisely in the habit and in the need for activity” 
(PR §197A). 
Finally, work trains individuals in specific skills and so gives them a sense of 
personal self-worth and pride in what they do.  This acquisition of specialized skills 
seems to be an artifact of the division of labor, specifically the growing social 
interdependence which Hegel associates with “abstraction.”  In the process of 
abstraction, needs and desires becomes increasingly particularized and directed not only 
at specific objects, but even at specific features of objects.  This is accompanied by a 
growing demand that labor be “socially productive,” to borrow Neuhouser’s phrase.  
This means that my labor must be responsive to these highly specialized desires and 
that the goods I produce must meet the desires of others, if my own desires are to be 
met.  It also implies that my own work stands in relation to the work of others.  While 
labor remains an engagement with the world of objects, consumption becomes a social 
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matter, in which the human being relates first and foremost to what has been produced 
by other human beings. 
Although becoming industrious and self-disciplined are important aspects of 
education, it is really the social context of work that has substantive ethical effects on 
individual agents.  As in the Phenomenology, Hegel characterizes Bildung primarily as a 
process in which the individual is educated to the level of the universal.  Much like the 
man of culture in the Bildung-chapter, the member of civil society can only distinguish 
himself as an individual by entering into a certain profession and so committing himself 
to a specific social position and Hegel stresses that is only in virtue of this position that 
he counts as someone.  But unlike the man of culture, the member of civil society cannot 
merely keep to his professional sphere and measure himself solely by its standards.  
Because of the growing economic interdependence among all parts of civil society – 
which Hegel calls the “system of needs” – each member is brought into relation with 
every other member and so must learn to adjust his behavior according to more widely 
accepted norms than the man of culture was willing to acknowledge. 
Hegel characterizes this transformation in several different ways.  For example, 
he argues that Bildung consists in learning how to take the perspective of others into 
consideration and he contrasts this with the manner of the uncultured person, who 
tends to offend people easily.  Although it is not his intention to cause offense, he has 
“no reflection for the feelings of others” (PR §187A).  This is of course reminiscent of 
the cultivation Hegel described in the Phenomenology, since being cultivated also involved 
considering one’s own behavior from the standpoint of others.  But as I already 
mentioned, there is a wider range of others that the member of civil society must take 
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into consideration, because his economic activity puts him in contact with all other 
social members.  Hegel also describes this as a process of adopting a more and more 
universal point of view towards the situation at hand.  What this means is that the 
cultured person is able to take a wider range of aspects of the particular situation into 
account.  He echoes this claim in the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: 
The cultured person [Gebildeter] approaches objects and considers the different sides; 
they are present to him.  Cultured reflection [gebildete Reflexion] has given them the form 
of universality… Thus the cultured person can in his behavior grant the individual 
circumstances their right, while the uncultured person – though with good intentions – 
clings to one side, but in doing so offends many other sides (VPG, 43). 
 
One way to paraphrase this is to say that the cultured person becomes more attentive 
to the multiple facets of the specific circumstances he confronts because he is able and 
willing to consider how that situation looks to those who occupy perspectives different 
from his own. 
It is important to stress that even the practical Bildung Hegel here describes is 
closely tied to universality.  Hans-Georg Gadamer, who is undeniably influenced by 
Hegel’s conception of Bildung, also emphasizes that its general characteristic is “keeping 
oneself open to what is other – to other, more universal points of view.”103  Nor does 
he depart from Hegel when he argues that attaining such a universal perspective is 
nothing over and above taking the perspective of others into consideration.   As 
Gadamer puts it, “to distance oneself from oneself and from one’s private purposes 
means to look at these in the way that others see them…The universal viewpoints to 
which the cultivated man (gebildet) keeps himself open are not a fixed applicable 
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yardstick, but are present to him only as the viewpoints of possible others.”104  This 
suggests first of all that becoming formed or cultured is not a matter of attaining a 
completely impartial perspective, a God’s eye point of view, so to speak.  Rather, it is a 
matter of being able to enter the perspectives of others.  It also suggests that the 
process of Bildung is a gradual one, for our perspective becomes increasingly 
universalized as we as a matter of fact encounter and engage with others.  It is not a 
radical leap from particularity to universality. 
But Bildung issues not only in a perspectival shift, it also produces changes in 
our practices.  According to Hegel, participating in this vast system of needs requires 
that one adopt the habits, customs and even opinions of others: 
Everything particular becomes to that extent something social; in the manner of 
clothing, in the time of eating, there lies a certain convenience which one must adopt, 
because with respect to such things it is not worth the trouble to want to show one’s 
own opinion, rather it is wisest to proceed in them like others (PR §192A). 
 
My self-interest compels me to conform to certain informal practices and codes of 
conduct, which has the effect of standardizing and disseminating them throughout the 
whole of civil society.  This conformity to shared norms, customs, and tastes even 
affects what objects we come to need or desire.  In other words, the general effect of 
Bildung is the emergence of shared standards on the level of individual development as 
well as on the social level.  This suggests that participation in civil society is not merely 
a matter of an individual’s self-cultivation, but does have cultural effects.  Not only are 
we producing goods that others can enjoy, we are also transforming our very customs 
in this process. 
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It is frequently assumed that Hegel believes that the members of ethical life 
must already share a set of richly cultural practices, and Hegel’s remarks about custom 
at the beginning of his chapter on Sittlichkeit can give that impression.  But this is highly 
misleading, for Hegel considers the modern state as capable of incorporating various 
levels of disagreement and diversity.  In fact Hegel distinguishes between a state and a 
nation precisely on the basis of what its members must have in common.  According to 
Hegel, a state is founded on merely “juridical relations” whereas a nation is a 
community that shares “speech, mores and customs (Sitten und Gewohnheiten) and culture 
(Bildung).”105  Mark Tunick has made much of this distinction and argues that for Hegel 
modern social ties cannot rest on a common cultural heritage, which includes history, 
tradition, language, taste, and even to a certain extent values.106  Although he is right in 
stressing that for Hegel the modern state must be able to incorporate a diversity of 
cultural backgrounds, he overlooks the fact that part of the function of civil society is 
precisely to homogenize customs and so give rise to a shared culture even where there 
may have been none before. 
Hegel claims that this convergence of individual conformity with cultural 
homogeneity brings about a “formal universality” of willing.  In calling this universality 
formal, Hegel wants to emphasize that the public features of civil society set the formal 
constraints on my economic activity, which I continue to pursue with the aim of 
satisfying my particularity.  Shared customs limit my pursuit of individual wealth, 
because I cannot achieve my private ends unless I conform to them.  But it might seem 
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as if I continue to view them as mere means that I cannot circumvent, but that I do not 
consider valuable in their own right.  Although this perhaps captures our initial attitude 
towards the universal, Hegel suggests that submitting my conduct to shared practices 
brings about a transformation in my attitude towards others.  In a striking passage he 
writes:  
It belongs to Bildung, thinking as an individual’s consciousness in the form of the 
universal, that I am grasped as a universal person, in which everyone is identical.  The human 
being counts, because he is a human being, not because he is Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, 
German, Italian, etc. (PR §209). 
 
This seems to be the most explicitly ethical effect of Bildung, for it goes beyond merely 
taking the perspective of others into consideration.  According to Hegel, participation 
in the market compels us to disregard those features that distinguish people from one 
another, especially their race, ethnicity, and religion.  In other words, practical Bildung 
generates an attitude towards every human being as a human being, not as the member 
of some narrower community.  At least in our economic interactions, each member of 
society is on equal footing with every other. 
 Because this attitude shares certain features with cosmopolitanism, Hegel is 
careful to disavow this association.  There is a sense in which the cultured individual 
becomes a citizen of the world insofar as he does not restrict his dealings to – and does 
not give preferential treatment to – those who inhabit the same community as he does.  
At the same time, this perspective that regards all others as bare members of civil 
society cannot come to compete with our commitment to our particular forms of 
community.  As Hegel puts it, “The consciousness, for which the thought counts, is of 
infinite importance – and is only then deficient, when it becomes something like 
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cosmopolitanism and fixes itself in opposition to the concrete life of the state” (PR 
§209).  The issue of cosmopolitanism is especially pressing in this context because civil 
society does not seem to respect the political borders of a nation-state.  Through trade 
it aims to establish a marketplace of global scope and so the kind of relationships it 
fosters could be regarded as threatening to patriotism and to other local bonds. 
But Hegel is so eager to distinguish cosmopolitanism from Bildung precisely 
because the two have crucial features in common.  In learning to adapt to the ways of 
life of others and to take their perspective into consideration, the educated individual 
also gives up particularities that would make him stand out.  Thus Hegel invokes this 
dual sense of universality in civil society by drawing an analogy between Bildung and 
money.  “Educated people [gebildete Menschen] look alike like coins which have been in 
circulation for a long time” (VRP, 310).  While giving up certain particularities, namely 
individual idiosyncrasies, is a necessary and positive effect of Bildung, Hegel is worried 
about the dissolution of all particular commitments.  According to Hegel, becoming 
“cultured” cannot require becoming unattached to any specific way of life. 
We can discover the significant role of particular attachments even within the 
economic activities of a single state.  Although for Hegel civil society remains a sphere 
in which each individual is free to indulge his individuality (or in Hegel’s terms, his 
particularity), he emphasizes that this institution must exhibit a differentiated internal 
structure.  As we have seen, this is a feature that Charles Taylor especially emphasizes.  
To be more precise, Hegel thinks that individuals participate in civil society not as mere 
individuals – and in that respect no different from any other individuals – but as 
members of what he calls “estates” (Stände).  Estates are in some respects akin to social 
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classes because they are determined by the kind of professions its members pursue.  
Thus Hegel divides civil society into three estates, the agricultural or “substantial” 
estate, the business estate, and the “universal” estate of civil servants.  Members of the 
first estate share a commitment to religion and to the earth, and Hegel even ascribes to 
them a specific attitude of gratitude and trust in God for the fruits of their labor.  The 
second estate is even differentiated into further professional domains – craft, 
manufacture, and trade – though its members all share a sense that what they possess is 
something they themselves have earned.  Because the third estate (not to be confused 
with the third estate)107 does not engage in economic life directly but is employed by the 
state, it is able to focus its attention on the universal interests of the community. 
Because each estate involves different professional spheres, they represent 
distinct sets of values (or, as we have previously seen, a distinct code of conduct) that 
coexist within civil society.  In fact it looks like at least in the Philosophy of Right pluralism 
in modern ethical life enters more at the level of estates than at that of ethnicity or 
nationality.  Hegel argues that such estates are more compatible with the freedom at 
issue in civil society because membership in an estate is at least in part up to an 
individual.  Conversely he criticizes the caste system in India for condemning people to 
a certain social class without leaving any room for their own preferences in the 
matter.108  Of course what estate one ultimately joins will also depend on talent and 
upbringing, and so is not completely contingent upon individual preference.  But for 
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107 As in Abbé Sieyes’s pamphlet, “What is the Third Estate?” 
 




Hegel it is important that an individual can view his membership in an estate as at least 
in part a personal achievement.   
This suggests that estates cannot be simply equated with cultural communities 
in the traditional sense, as Taylor seems to do.  While members of an estate do in a 
sense share “culture, values, and modes of life”, these are not something an individual 
merely inherits.  Moreover, they are a product of the professional ties that bind the 
members of an estate.  We have seen that in his account of civil society, Hegel 
emphasizes the transformative effect of participating in the market.  According to 
Hegel, the customs shared by participants in a society’s practices are to a large extent 
produced by their economic activity and interaction.  At the same time, estates for 
Hegel do serve the kind of role that Taylor envisions.  According to Taylor, Hegel 
thinks that differentiation provides a basis for identification and that we cannot simply 
conceive of ourselves as citizens of a common state, but must identify with our own 
partial communities and their local customs. 
Hegel certainly gives us reasons to think that this is his view.  Estates are so 
central to Hegel’s account of civil society not only because they enable something like 
communal life within a sphere of rampant individualism, but also because they demand 
a commitment to a particular way of life rather than another.  “In saying that the 
human being must be something, we mean that he belongs to a determinate estate” (PR 
§207).  This is reminiscent of Hegel’s claim in the Phenomenology that one can only 
become “someone” by adopting a specific social position and conforming one’s 
behavior to its norms.  In other words, commitments to a particular profession or 
professional community provide us with a more determinate self-conception.  If we 
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regard estates as cultural communities, this would mean that cultural membership is 
indeed integral to an agent’s identity.  But for Hegel our allegiance to our estate cannot 
preclude other bases of identification.  Since such local communities form part of a 
larger social network that generates shared customs, our identities are never exhausted 
by our membership in them. 
Hegel’s views about the formative effects of participation in civil society have 
interesting implications for cultural pluralism.  As we have seen, Hegel’s account of 
ethical life, especially his account of civil society, shows that a certain degree of 
pluralism is not only permitted, but even required.  Becoming a member of civil society 
involves entering an estate that differs from other estates in cultural respects because it 
embodies a distinct outlook, privileging certain concerns over others and thus shaping 
the values of its members.  For example, the agricultural estate expresses an attitude of 
trust, faith, and gratitude, foregrounds family and tradition, and partakes in certain 
religious practices, that the other estates do not.  According to Hegel, becoming a 
member of an estate is important precisely because its outlook differs from those of 
other estates.  Without such differentiation, our participation in civil society would fail 
to provide us with a sufficiently determinate and robust self-conception.  So becoming 
formed or gebildet does involve becoming a member of a “local” community in this 
sense. 
At the same time, we have seen that Hegel frequently identifies Bildung with the 
attainment of a universal point of view.  In other words, our commitment to our local 
community cannot sever us from the broader social practices in which we also 
participate.  This could mean that we must be willing to adjust some of our practices to 
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those of others in order to cooperate in the wider system of needs of which we are a 
part.  It could also mean that we must be willing to consider how our customs look to 
outsiders.  So Bildung for Hegel consists not only in the acquisition of a determinate and 
differentiated identity, but also in the ability to regard oneself from the outside, so to 
speak.  This is in part why Bildung shares so much with cosmopolitanism and why Hegel 
wants nevertheless to distinguish the two.  According to Hegel, this “universal” 
perspective must be compatible with particular commitments and cannot result in an 
indifference towards one’s local forms of membership.  To achieve Bildung is precisely 
to attain and sustain this union of worldliness and provinciality. 
 
V. Modern Cultural Identity 
I want to conclude by returning to a question I raised at the very outset of this chapter.  
Recall that thinkers like Anthony Appiah and Samuel Scheffler noted a tension in the 
very idea of cultural identification.  They claimed that full-fledged cultural members do 
not relate to their own practices as cultural, and in that sense do not explicitly identify 
with the culture they inhabit.  One could say that to assert one’s cultural identity is to 
take an external perspective on that culture because it involves adopting a reflective 
attitude towards it.  In my reading of the Bildung-chapter, I emphasized one sense in 
which reflection could be seen as internal to cultural participation.  There I argued that 
for Hegel participating in a culture involves producing objects that “mirror” the culture 
in which they are produced.  I also suggested that Hegel privileges modern culture 
because of the kind of self-consciousness it has attained.  In the context of modernity, 
members of a cultural community are not only reflecting about particular aspects of 
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their culture, they are also aware of the fact that their culture as a whole is cultural.  In 
other words, they discovered something that was in a sense true even of their 
predecessors, namely, that all of their customs depend on human activity for their 
origin and sustenance. 
But being conscious that your culture is a culture is not quite the same as being 
conscious of your cultural identity.  Claims to cultural identity seem to involve an 
emphasis on the particularity of one’s culture and on its being one’s own.  Although 
Hegel does not explicitly consider the nature and status of this kind of cultural self-
consciousness, I do think his view has interesting and radical implications for such 
claims.  Here I want to return to Michael Hardimon, whose discussion of the difference 
between Hegelian and communitarian conceptions of identity is especially illuminating.  
According to Hardimon, it looks as if the communitarian view accords with Hegel’s 
depiction of the Greeks, for Hegel claims that the Greeks were unable to abstract from 
and reflect on their social roles and communal membership.  But this kinship is 
misleading.  As Hardimon points out, communitarians tend to argue that (some) people 
believe that they are unable to abstract from and reflect on their roles and membership, 
and this is quite different from saying that they are in fact unable to do so.  Although 
Hardimon does not draw this conclusion, one could say that the communitarian 
account is self-defeating, for forming an explicit belief about your identity is already to 
have abstracted from and reflected on that identity. 
I think Hegel would be highly skeptical of the suggestion that there are 
contemporary communities so unaffected by modernity that they have managed to 
insulate themselves entirely from its reflective practices.  In a slightly different context, 
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Hegel describes the Enlightenment – a central influence in the emergence of modern 
culture – as “comparable to a silent expansion or diffusion, like of a perfume in the 
unresisting atmosphere.  It is a penetrating infection which does not make itself 
noticeable beforehand as something opposed to the indifferent element into which it 
insinuates itself, and therefore cannot be warded off” (PG §545).  But as Hardimon 
rightly emphasizes, communitarians in a sense exaggerate the extent to which we are 
self-conscious of our own identities.  It is Hegel’s view that we possess identities that 
we do not tend to think about, even though they figure in our deliberations and actions.   
According to Hegel, we can miss the extent to which we do identify with our forms of 
membership because we fail to see how much they bear on our lives. 
Moreover, Hegel suggests that our explicit self-conceptions can be at odds with 
and so misrepresent our own identities.  Hardimon does not remark on this Hegelian 
insight, but I do think it bears directly on the issue of cultural identity as the 
communitarians conceive it.  Although Hegel would say that those who believe that 
they are unable to abstract from their cultural identities are in a sense deluded, they are 
not merely ignorant of their own capacity for abstraction.  The identity they ascribe to 
themselves is itself a mark of delusion.  Throughout the Phenomenology Hegel explores 
various dissonances between how we conceive of ourselves and who we turn out to be 
and in this way emphasizes the fantasies we are prone to indulge.  For example, we 
have seen that in the master-slave dialectic the master becomes a victim of such 
ignorance, for the independent status he ascribes to himself is falsified by the 
dependence his actions exhibit.  It is Hegel’s firm conviction that attaining self-
knowledge is a highly difficult task and one that is vulnerable to forms of deception, for 
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who we are is not a function of who we think we are, but of who we prove to be in 
what we do. 
In conclusion, I want to propose one way in which Hegel’s broader picture of 
self-deception can become relevant to the notion of cultural identity.  Although it is 
certainly possible that someone could be right in ascribing a particular cultural 
membership to himself, Hegel gives us reasons to worry about such self-ascriptions.  
Identifications with a culture tend to be framed in exclusive terms.  This is especially 
vivid in the context of immigrant communities.  For example, if I were to claim that I 
am a Croat despite residing in the United States, I would presumably want to 
disassociate myself from the latter culture and identify solely with the former.  But for 
Hegel this would be to refuse to acknowledge that I also participate in many American 
practices, whether I want to admit this or not.  We have seen that Hegel emphasizes the 
transformative effects of Bildung not only on individuals but also on the culture itself.  
As Hegel points out, economic life gives rise to shared customs.  So when we conceive 
of ourselves as members of one particular culture and no other, our self-conception 
fails to reflect the trans-cultural practices in which we are already engaged.  In Hegel we 
find untapped resources for evaluating claims to cultural identity, for Hegel would 
neither dismiss them as incoherent nor defend them as infallible, but consider whether 









Though we have previously explored some of the ways in which reflection can be, or 
even must be, integrated into modern ethical life, one might nevertheless feel 
dissatisfied, as if we have been missing the point all along.  Someone could retort that it 
is not reflection in general that has been our concern – reflection in the sense of 
deliberation about how to apply given norms, or reflection in the sense of an overt 
affirmation of them.  What Hegel’s critics suspect is that his account of ethical life fails 
to incorporate reflection of the critical sort.  Does Hegel allow for the possibility of 
criticizing our social world, for positively objecting to it?  Moreover, does Hegel allow 
for the possibility of criticizing not just some practice or another, but principles that lie 
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at the basis of our social world as a whole?   In short, how deep can criticism run and 
what resources do we have for engaging in it? 
In this chapter I propose a response to this set of concerns that is Hegelian in 
spirit, even if it requires going beyond the letter of Hegel’s text.  I should note at the 
outset that there is a hermeneutic difficulty here.  Although Hegel focuses in much of 
his work precisely on the possibility of assessing, contesting, and changing a given 
normative framework, he never offers an explicit account of what such a critical stance 
would look like and what role it could play in the context of a distinctly modern form 
of ethical life.  This could invite the impression that Hegel deems it superfluous in an 
already rational context, where it was not so for our predecessors.  I do not think that 
our social order, as Hegel sees it, has by any means obviated the need for critical 
reflection once and for all, as no order ultimately can.  Such a social order would, 
according to Hegel’s own account, quickly ossify and deaden.109  Nevertheless, this 
means that developing a suitable conception of critical reflection will require going 
beyond the central work in question – the Elements of the Philosophy of Right – and 
drawing on other resources Hegel has left at our disposal, especially those in his earlier 
Phenomenology of Spirit.110 
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109 This follows from Hegel’s conception of life, which he thinks applies to ethical life as well.  As he states at 
the very outset, “Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is the idea of freedom as the living good (das lebendige Gute)” (PR §142).  
For a form of spirit to remain alive, it must continue to generate contradictions (or bifurcation) and 
overcome them, only to generate new ones and overcome these as well.  Since I undertake to show that 
critical reflection should be understood as a response to contradiction, it looks to be a vital moment in the 
“living” processes of all social life, including a fully rational social order such as the one Hegel here describes. 
 
110 Traditional scholarship has often denied that the Phenomenology of Spirit could be brought to bear on a 
systematic text like the Philosophy of Right, since the Phenomenology is officially only a prelude to his “system.”  
But few scholars today follow Hegel himself in drawing such a sharp line between what is within and what 
outside the system.  Moreover, there seems to be a positive reason for comparing the Phenomenology with the 
Philosophy of Right.  As we will see in greater detail, in the former Hegel assumes that every “configuration of 
consciousness” makes an implicit appeal to a criterion of Maßstab to which it holds itself.  And he seems to 
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I admit that it may not seem obvious that Hegel even needs an account of social 
criticism in modern ethical life, that this is an omission on his part.  Even those who 
hold that critical reflection must remain possible often argue that such reflection is 
already accommodated by what Hegel calls “true conscience.”  Of course, Hegel 
undeniably disparages appeals to conscience in his treatment of the moral point of 
view.111  But he takes issue only with “formal conscience” – namely, with a form of 
conscience that claims to be able to determine the good through introspection alone, 
thus asserting that its duty is nothing over and above whatever it thinks its duty is.  
True conscience in contrast does not make claims to such peerless authority, but it does 
impose a subjective requirement on what can count as the objective good.  This version 
of conscience takes the form of a right – the “right of the subjective will” – according 
to which I must be in a position to grasp the goodness of whatever I am to publicly 
recognize as good.112  So this right seems to grant a space to critical reflection, to a 
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assume the same for social practices in Philosophy of Right.  So there is a structural similarity between 
“configurations of consciousness” and “configurations of spirit,” which include modern ethical life. 
 
111 In addition to Hegel’s specific objection to conscience in the chapter on “Morality,” conscience also seems 
to be one of his central targets in the Philosophy of Right as a whole.  His preface is largely a polemic against the 
Überzeugungsethik, or ethic of conviction, dominant in his day.  So its status in ethical life is obviously a 
significant question that the work itself raises. 
 
112 He defines it in the following way: “The right of the subjective will is that whatever it is to recognize as 
valid should be perceived [Eingesehen] by it as good, and that an action – as its aim translated into external 
objectivity – should be ascribed to as right or wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal, according to its cognizance 
of the value which that action has in this objectivity” (PR §132). So according to Hegel’s definition, this right 
incorporates an additional component, namely, that I am only responsible for those actions I know I 
committed.  I should add that this is not a “right” in the traditional sense, for it is not one that the state must 
overtly sanction.  Rather, it is a perhaps unofficial requirement for the full realization of the kind of freedom 
that “morality” promises.  Hegel is not employing the liberal notion of a right, but rather considers a right to 




questioning of social norms, in which case there would be nothing lacking in Hegel’s 
official account.113 
But true conscience and its corresponding right of subjectivity strike me as clearly 
inadequate concessions to critique.  I do agree that the preservation of conscience has 
implications for the role of critical reflection, for it does indicate that we must in 
principle be permitted to ask ourselves whether a given norm is valid or not.  Hegel is 
quite clear on this point by designating it to be a “right.”   However, this is all its 
preservation can tell us.  It does not yet tell us how we can ever settle the question, 
namely how we can figure out whether a given norm is indeed valid or not.  The 
perspective of conscience is not a full-fledged perspective at all, not a point of view that 
grants us substantive insight into how to proceed, should our norms have come into 
question.114  This is what Hegel implies when he describes this right as merely “formal” 
(in the sense of merely subjective) and so as lacking a criterion for distinguishing truth 
from opinion and error. 
Moreover, it does not yet tell us whether occasions for raising this question could 
ever even arise.  In other words, it could very well turn out that we never encounter 
grounds for doubting the validity of our norms.  This means that we have not hereby 
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113 There are numerous variations of this reading, but the baldest is perhaps Allen Wood’s.  Although phrased 
rather cryptically, this is at least how I understand the following claim:  “At least in its mature form, the 
conception of ethical life is intended to include rather than exclude individual moral reflection.  Sittlichkeit, as 
Hegel means it, is a special kind of critical reflection on social life, not a prohibition against reflection” (Wood 
1990, 196). 
 
114 Hegel does mention conditions under which “what counts as the right and the good in actuality and 
custom cannot satisfy the better will” (PR §138), and these do seem to him to justify retreating into oneself in 
search of the right and the good.  But this does not mean that he thinks such a search can ever succeed.  He 
seems to imply that “in times when actuality is a hollow, spiritless, and unsettled existence” (PR §138A), we 
lose any means for distinguishing the moral genius from the sheer fanatic. !
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demonstrated the possibility of genuine criticism, for the right of subjectivity could 
plausibly be satisfied through reflective affirmation alone.  All I need to be able to do is 
to pause for a moment in my habitual adherence and abstract away from a given norm 
in order to inquire into its validity.  But this does not yet indicate that I could ever 
discover this norm to be invalid.  So making room for criticism requires more.  It 
requires showing something about the social world we inhabit, and not only about our 
available attitudes toward it – namely, that even modern ethical life can be objectively in 
need of criticism. 
Be that as it may, my reasons for wanting to develop a Hegelian conception of 
critical reflection are not exclusively hermeneutic, so as to supplement his official 
theory or mend a textual gap.  I think such a reconstruction and reconsideration is 
worth undertaking because it can offer a conception of critical reflection that takes full 
account of its virtues and drawbacks.  As I read him, Hegel stands in the tradition of 
thinkers who are weary of an unlimited exercise of critical reflection and who contest 
its unconditional value.  I call them the “critics of critical criticism.”115  Although his 
weariness may not be as deep-seated as some, he is not convinced that it is always a 
good idea to scrutinize our social world with a critical eye, namely with a view to revising 
its norms.  He suggests in various ways that such reflection has destructive 
repercussions because it incites us to doubt what we may have no reason to doubt, and 
because it tends to spread from doubt about the validity of one contested norm to 
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115 I am taking this phrase from the subtitle of Marx’ work The Holy Family (1844).  Although Marx’ target 
differs from Hegel’s, and he even has a certain strand of Hegelianism in mind, I think that Hegel is perhaps 
more of an ally than is generally acknowledged, for both are concerned with excessive abstraction, as well as 




doubt about the social order as a whole.  So a valuable form of critical reflection would 
need to be constricted in the face of its tendency to dissipate far and wide. 
The conception I propose is able to meet the challenge posed by his fellow critics 
in offering a form of critical reflection that keeps to its proper bounds and questions 
only what has proven to be questionable.  In short, the thesis I am here advancing is 
that critical reflection for Hegel does occupy a valued place in ethical life, but that its 
value is not unconditional, for it is not a good thing to practice under any and all 
circumstances.  Rather, Hegel thinks that critical reflection must be motivated not by 
the mere possibility that there could be something wrong with our norms, but by an 
actual confrontation with problems.  It is such problems, which he characterizes as 
varieties of “contradiction,” that call for and in turn justify the activity of reflecting 
critically. 
At first glance, this may strike many a thoroughly reasonable view to hold, one that 
few would be inclined to challenge.  It would after all be highly impractical, to say the 
least, to engage in perpetual social criticism.  Such a critic would be like the skeptic who 
does not know how to close the door to her study and reenter social life.  Who would 
object to caution against unhindered reflection?  And if no one would, why should a 
Hegelian response be of special interest to us? 
While I cannot yet answer this charge in full, I want to point to two conceivably 
controversial dimensions of the view I am advancing on Hegel’s behalf.   The first 
concerns the conception of ethical knowledge that lies at its basis.  If we really have no 
grounds for reflecting on our social norms until they produce problems that prove 
them to be worthy of reflection, then we are right to adhere to them even before we ask 
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ourselves whether the ways we ordinarily justify them are adequate – even if we in fact 
never ask ourselves whether they are.  This seems to suggest, albeit obliquely, that there 
can be ethical knowledge at the unreflective level, knowledge that is not first earned 
through the exercise of reflection.  It is easy to see that this would not be an 
uncontroversial claim, for it runs counter to a dominant intuition that we can only 
claim to know what we can fully justify.  Of course this is not to say that Hegel thinks 
we can claim to know what we can in no way justify.  All he holds is that we need not 
interrogate our ordinary modes of justification themselves before we are entitled to 
employ them.116 
The second concerns an implication of his view that I admit to be worrisome.  
Although I think this view has considerable merit, I will address one significant 
consideration against it.  I am especially concerned with the objection that it rests on a 
brand of optimism we have reason to resist, namely on the confidence that, should 
there be something worth criticizing, it will reveal itself to be so by generating 
contradictions that stunt our efforts to continue as before.  After all, keeping critical 
reflection constricted in this way assumes that we have no reason to question our social 
practices before any problems have come into view.  But should we trust that, 
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116 This may seem inconsistent with Hegel’s notoriously demanding epistemic standards, his thesis that we 
only truly know that which we can situate within his highly complex and complete “system” of mutually 
justifying elements.  Anything short of it does not yet count as knowledge, because somewhere down the line 
we always end up depending on a presupposition that we cannot at all justify.  Perhaps it would help to 
distinguish between two kinds of knowledge – knowledge proper and practical knowledge.  Practical 
knowledge allows us to successfully navigate our practices, and it counts as knowledge because it possesses an 
objective content.  But it falls short of knowledge proper mainly because it cannot secure itself from the 
threat of skepticism.  The system has the important function of revealing that we do really know what we 




whenever we are dealing with ethically objectionable practices, sooner or later such 
problems cannot fail to arise and give rise to the appropriate critical responses? 
My aim in this chapter is as follows.  I will begin by returning to my suggestion that 
Hegel should be read as a “critic of critical criticism”, clarifying what I mean by “critical 
criticism” and positioning my reading within the spectrum of scholarship.  I will then 
outline a conception to be found in the Phenomenology of Spirit that I think can satisfy a 
“critic of critical criticism” of Hegel’s frame of mind.  This conception is nothing other 
than what is already known as “immanent critique,” though with a different set of 
emphases, especially its dependence on experience.   Next I will illustrate immanent 
critique at work in the context of the Greek polis before assessing its relevance to the 
modern context.  This last move is also the most contentious, for it is precisely the 
continued need for immanent critique that is in question.  
 
I.  Critical Criticism 
Since “critical criticism” is not a standard phrase, let me attempt to explain what I have 
in mind by means of another, far harsher critic.  In his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
Bernard Williams raises doubts about the value of critical reflection, which he broadly 
defines as a skeptical interrogation of our ordinary ways of justifying what we do, or 
into our justificatory reasons.  Critical reflection does not necessarily lead to criticism in 
the narrower sense, for it could very well turn out that, once we have interrogated our 
reasons, we find them to be justified.  All it does is open up the possibility of reaching 
the opposite conclusion. 
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 But this on its own is not what renders critical reflection suspect in William’s eyes.  
Rather, it is its revisionary aspiration.  Williams thinks this aspiration is a drive toward 
developing a moral theory, namely toward arriving at a single normative standard by 
which to assess all actions.  He also describes this a drive toward systematicity, and he 
claims that, unless it is somehow curbed, this drive directs all critical reflection.  This 
means that, even when it does not debunk a given justificatory reason, critical reflection 
proceeds by replacing a rich reservoir of evaluative concepts with a smaller and thinner 
set.  For example, rather than characterize someone’s behavior as “rude” or “warm,” 
we are asked to justify judging it favorably or unfavorably in terms like “right” and 
“wrong.”  Williams’ point is that we had ways of justifying our judgments by means of 
traditional concepts.  The problem arises as soon as we begin to look upon these 
concepts themselves as in need of a further justification.  And narrowing our normative 
resources just is a basic feature of critical reflection, regardless of whether its 
conclusion is ultimately affirmative or not.  For Williams, this is a destructive process. 
 Is Hegel a “critic of critical criticism” in Williams’ sense?  Is he doubtful of the 
value of critical reflection, and if so, does he doubt its value on the same grounds?  
There is no consensus among his readership on this point.  While most would likely 
deny that he could be rightly classified as such a critic, there have been others who 
suspect him of being of the most conservative variety.  And it is indeed difficult to 
overlook that Hegel often speaks against the exercise of critical reflection.  His primary 
target tends to be criticism in the domain of philosophical thought, and he notoriously 
distinguishes philosophy’s proper task of comprehending the social world from that of 
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issuing corrections for it.117  In this vein he describes his own project as follows: “As a 
philosophical work it must be farthest away from having to construct a state as it ought 
to be; the instruction that it contains cannot aim to instruct the state, how it should be, 
rather more how it – the ethical universe – should be understood” (PR, 26).  It is not 
difficult to see that he has the “critical critic” of the state in mind, namely, a 
philosopher who purports to know its current faults and to be able to construct a better 
version, at least in thought. 
 But warnings against such hubris extend beyond his programmatic remarks 
regarding the proper aims of philosophy, and Hegel often criticizes critical reflection in 
broader strokes, describing it as essentially restless and ultimately empty.  For example, 
he is reported to have said that “[it] is only too easy to indulge in criticism, and it helps 
to confirm men’s estimates of their own superior knowledge and good intention” 
(VPG, 66).  Here it sounds as if he is not merely discouraging philosophy from 
becoming a critical enterprise, but considers it shortsighted and misguided in other 
contexts as well.  Though this is not yet to call it destructive, the kind of condescension 
Hegel associates with the critical attitude points in that direction.   Moreover, in the 
background is his worry that reflection tends to generate abstractions that have 
damaging repercussions because they lead to forms of confusion he diagnoses as “one-
sidedness.”  As soon as we begin to reflect, we inevitably narrow the range of standards 
we think we can rightfully employ, preferably until we arrive at a single measure.  This 
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117 This is somewhat misleading, because Hegel does condone and even advocate a form of philosophical 
critique, but one that is directed at the abstractions generated by reflection, rather than directly at the social 
world.  As he puts it in his introduction to the “Critical Journal,” the task of critique is to extract the idea of 




for Hegel has to do with the close proximity between the activity of reflection and that 
of abstraction, which is an essential moment of all reflecting.  In this respect he seems 
to anticipate Williams, who sees reflection as equally directed by what he calls a 
“systematic” drive toward a first principle that can serve as a criterion for every 
evaluative judgment.118 
 Another reason to call Hegel a “critic of critical reflection” has to do with his 
positive appraisal of unreflective attitudes associated with habitual conduct.  As we 
have already seen, he states in a key passage that  
 [in] the simple identification of individuals with actuality (Wirklichkeit), the ethical (das 
 Sittliche)  appears as their general manner of conduct (allgemeine Handlungsweise), as 
 custom (Sitte) – the habit (Gewohnheit) of the ethical appears as a second nature, which is 
 put in place of the first purely natural will and which is the soul, meaning, and actuality 
 permeating its existence (PR §151). 
 
Here it sounds like he is privileging a rather extreme form of unreflectiveness, for if 
overt criticism lies on one end of the spectrum, habit is surely to be found on the other.  
Although I take myself to have already shown that an emphasis on habit is not 
incompatible with reflection, including critical reflection, I admit that it is not exactly 
conducive to it either.  Even if being habitually immersed and adopting a critical 
distance can in principle coexist in ethical life, fixed habits may make the latter more 
difficult.  So it is not unreasonable to suspect that the more immersed in our habitual 
ways we become, the more resistant we grow to even questioning, let alone altering, 
those ways.  And even if we could move from habit to reflection with some ease, it 
would still not be possible for us to do both at once, to be both immersed and critical 
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at the same time.  So his preference for habit does seem to come at an indirect cost to 
critical reflection. 
 It is passages like these that have inspired two types of charges against Hegel’s 
account of modern ethical life.  On the one hand, it has looked to some as if Hegel 
were denying the very possibility of critical reflection, suggesting that those who inhabit 
modern ethical life are so immersed in its practices that they are simply unable to 
distance themselves sufficiently from them.  On the other hand, one might raise the 
slightly milder worry that Hegel, while not denying that it is in principle possible for 
social agents to engage in critical reflection, nevertheless discourages them from doing 
so.  Both versions are contained in Ernst Tugendhat’s infamous accusation that 
 Hegel does not allow for the possibility of a self-responsible, critical relationship to the 
 community, to the state.  Instead, we are told that the existing laws have an absolute 
 authority, that a community determines what each individual must do, that each 
 individual’s own conscience must cease to exist, and that trust must replace 
 reflection.119 
 
Although the worries about the possibility of critique and about its value may look 
distinct, I take them to be importantly linked.  For what someone like Tugendhat 
demands is not merely an explanation of how we, as participants in ethical life so 
understood, can come to engage in critical reflection at all, but of how we can come to 
do so rightfully.  So I take it that the question about the available sources of critique is 
at bottom also a question about its positive import. 
 But there is a further, third question here.  In asking about the possibility of 
critical reflection, we are not only questioning its value, but also its standpoint.  In other 
words, what we want to know is what resources we have at our disposal for engaging in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!119!Tugendhat (1986), 315. !
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critique, and how we can criticize society in a rational, rather than in an arbitrary or 
haphazard fashion.  This is a version of the problem of finding and vindicating the 
appropriate standard or Maßstab that so preoccupied Hegel throughout his work.  Most 
of his methodological discussions revolve around the necessity and difficulty of 
establishing just such a standard.  In this context, the question can be put in the 
following way: to which normative measure can we appeal when critically assessing 
given social norms?  Moreover, we ask this question as participants in the world Hegel 
is here describing, for what we want to know is what place for critical reflection 
remains within his account of ethical life.  Thus our concern is really with critical 
reflection suited to, and appropriate for, social agents who are practically entangled in 
the very practices they seek to assess and who remain so entangled even while assessing 
them. 
 I think Tugendhat’s accusation exposes a significant gap left open by the 
Philosophy of Right – the centerpiece of Hegel’s mature practical philosophy – and so 
raises a genuine challenge, one that is no longer taken sufficiently seriously.  What it 
reveals is that Hegel has told us too little about what critical reflection would entail for 
us, how it can even emerge within the practices of modern ethical life, and what tools 
we have for engaging in it.  But much of the recent scholarship has vehemently rejected 
the type of reading Tugendhat represents, arguing that Hegel merely disparages certain 
forms of critical reflection and that the very project he undertakes in the Philosophy of 
Right illustrates an alternative he favors.  What these scholars point out is that Hegel 
seems to be engaging at least in a highly reflective enterprise, even if not in a narrowly 
critical one.  The standard strategy has been to argue that Hegel is indeed holding the 
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social world he wants to understand to rational standards of assessment, in order to 
show us that we can rationally endorse our own participation in it.  Even though he 
ultimately concludes that this world is as it ought to be, there was always the possibility 
that his reflections could have yielded a different result and shown that it in fact fails to 
measure up.  According to such readings, Hegel is undoubtedly reflecting critically, 
despite the fact that his final verdict is an affirmative one.120 
 Although I grant that such efforts to show that Hegel is no enemy to critical 
reflection have been important in moving beyond the straw man that Tugendhat 
attacks, I have reservations about looking to Hegel’s own philosophical project as a 
model for how to think about critical reflection within ethical life.  While I have to 
postpone a more thorough discussion of this project to the following chapter, I want to 
point to one significant reason for resisting such a strategy in the first place.  This has 
to do with the connection between critical reflection broadly speaking and criticism in 
the narrower sense.  I do not dispute that these two need to be distinguished, for 
simply asking whether a social practice is justified does not yet entail that it is not.  
Hegel is the perfect counter-example, for he is after all both interrogating the adequacy 
of our social world and seeking to redeem it in our eyes. 
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120 I want to mention two examples of this reading.  Michael Hardimon (in Hegel’s Social Philosophy) begins by 
arguing that Hegel’s hostility towards critical reflection pertains merely to philosophy and has no implications 
for other domains of life and inquiry.  But even if “[social] criticism mat not be a philosophical activity in 
Hegel’s view…his social philosophy provides the tools that enable one to engage in philosophically informed 
criticism of the social world” (1994, p. 29). Fred Neuhouser (in Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory) suggests an 
even stronger affinity between philosophical and critical reflection.  According to Neuhouser, Hegel’s effort 
to demonstrate that the social world is rational is meant to satisfy the aforementioned “right of subjectivity,” 
which is the right of individuals to follow only those norms they can see as good.  Neuhouser’s claim is that 
this right requires a form of reflection that is best exemplified by philosophy as Hegel conducts it.  So not 
only is Hegel engaging in a critical project, he is also promoting the same kind of critical reflection for social 





 At the same time, it seems to me that to be worried about the status of critical 
reflection in ethical life is to want to know not whether those who partake in it are 
capable of abstracting from and evaluating the norms they habitually heed, but whether 
they could plausibly and legitimately criticize them.  Tugendhat’s challenge goes beyond 
the possibility of mere evaluation, a possibility which, I agree, Hegel himself 
demonstrates.  Rather, Tugendhat accuses Hegel of precluding that we ever could 
legitimately object to aspects of our social world and judge them to be in need of 
change.  I take this to indicate that, even if there is some sense in which Hegel is 
exercising critical reflection, it cannot be the relevant sense, for the philosophical 
perspective for him is unable to yield genuine criticism.  He expresses this idea in a 
famous passage: “To say a further word on the subject of issuing instructions on how the 
world ought to be, philosophy anyway always comes too late for it… When philosophy 
paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated 
[verjüngern], but only understood; the owl of Minerva begins her flight only with the 
onset of dusk” (PR, 27-28). 
 
II.  Immanent Critique 
My suggestion is that we look for a more suitable model in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
specifically in its take on “immanent critique” – an idea often ascribed to Hegel, though 
he himself never uses the phrase.  Immanent critique can be provisionally defined as a 
process of evaluating a practice in light of its normative commitment, or conversely, of 
evaluating a norm in light of its practical application.  In the Phenomenology, this process 
takes on a consistently critical form, for the whole work explores those practices and 
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norms that fall into irresolvable contradictions and in this way reveal their respective 
inadequacies.  But what makes such criticism “immanent” is that it needs nothing 
outside of the framework in question in order to expose its contradiction.  The 
framework is itself responsible for generating the kinds of contradictions between 
norm and practice that provoke its adherents to rethink both.  But the framework also 
provides its adherents with the critical standards for rethinking them, or at least for 
recognizing that they need to be rethought. 
 Drawing on this model, my proposal will be that we think of the sort of critical 
reflection available to, and appropriate for, participants in modern ethical life as 
immanent in two comparable respects.  First, such reflection must remain immanently 
motivated, by which I mean responsive to practical failures that arise out of our social 
participation.  Secondly, any critical response must make use of norms to which our 
social participation has already committed us.  Although this does not yet foreclose the 
possibility that our deepest commitments could come into question, we only have 
reason to question them when they become questionable.  And it is Hegel’s view that in 
modern ethical life they for the most part have not. 
 Before I turn to the Phenomenology of Spirit in greater detail, I want to 
circumscribe the relevant notion of “immanence” a bit more precisely and thus 
preempt possible sources of confusion.  One might initially suspect that when I speak 
of immanent critique, I have in mind what is commonly referred to as “internal 
criticism.”  Internal criticism, or the “criticism of practices by appeal to understandings, 
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norms, and values that are, at some level of generality, widely shared,”121 does at this 
very general level resemble the kind of process of reflection at issue here.  It is 
moreover a form of criticism that we frequently exercise whenever we fault an 
institution, say, for example, the academy, for failing to live up to its own ideals and 
falling prey to economic interests at the expense of education and scholarship.  But this 
is nevertheless not to be confused with immanent critique.  Though internal criticism 
objects to practices for violating the standards they espouse, this type of objection 
differs from those voiced by an immanent critic in at least two respects. 
 First, it is effective only when we presuppose that there is a merely contingent 
connection between a practice and its standard and that a failure of application has no 
implication for the validity of the standard itself.  An example might be calls for 
campaign finance reform, which do not challenge our political ideals themselves, only 
their implementation.  As we will see more closely, immanent critique is interested in 
those practical failures which indicate that there is something wrong with our very 
standards, and that these – and not merely their implementation – are in need of 
reassessment and revision.122 Of course not all practical failures will be of this kind, and 
when there is only an issue of application, internal criticism is usually sufficient.  But 
such criticism falls short in the face of those practical failures that do throw doubt on 
the standards themselves.  Secondly, internal criticism seems to presuppose that we are 
self-conscious of the “understandings, norms, and values” we share and that we are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Here I am adopting the definition from Joshua Cohen (1997), 108, even though he himself dismisses this 
notion as too underdetermined to be of use. 
 
122 I am grateful to Rahel Jaeggi for this distinction, which she explicitly thematizes in her forthcoming book, 




already ready to avow our commitment to them.  But immanent critique often invokes 
norms that, albeit in a sense widely shared, are not always overtly acknowledged.  So 
engaging in it could require that we first be made aware of commitments we may not 
have even known we had.123 
 But if immanent critique is not confined to “shared understandings, norms, and 
values” in this sense, from what is it being distinguished?  Does it have an outer limit?  
And what would even count as an “external” form of criticism?  There are different 
ways of characterizing an external standpoint, and the most vivid might be that of the 
literal outsider, such as a tourist who judges foreign ways by comparing them to those 
of her compatriots.  In this case one is still employing local standards of assessment, 
only not local to the society being assessed.  Although this is perhaps the most extreme 
example, it does echo Hegel’s own reminders to the “critical critic,” namely that she is 
being too hasty in her condemnation and should refrain from dispensing verdicts until 
she has at least made a sincere effort to understand the modes of justification already at 
work in the practices before her. 
 One could also describe the standpoint distinctive of morality as external in a 
more interesting sense, for moral norms are thought to transcend any specific set of 
social practices one happens to inhabit.  Given Hegel’s infamous emptiness charge 
against Kant’s moral law,124 I suspect that he would deem this type of criticism to be 
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123 As we will see, Antigone is an example of this.  She believes that she is only committed to the divine law, 
but what her crime reveals is that she was implicitly committed to the human law as well, even though she 
failed to acknowledge it.  I will return to this example below. 
 
124 Hegel famously accuses the moral law – understood as a version of the law of non-contradiction – of 
being too indeterminate to be able adequately to single out good from evil principles.  For further discussion, 
see for example Ameriks (2000) or Wood (1989). 
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generally unhelpful, as he did when he attempted to employ a version of the categorical 
imperative in order to test which institution is the more rational, property or non-
property.125  But even if we do not want to follow Hegel in dismissing the moral law as 
devoid of all content, we might still question its critical potential.  Even a social practice 
that passes the formal test could nevertheless turn out to be objectionable on more 
substantial grounds, such as when we criticize our attitudes towards death and 
mourning, or the anti-intellectualism that seeks to decrease funding for schools, 
eliminate humanities departments across the board, and deny any public authority to 
the natural sciences. 
 At the same time, it seems possible to construe Kant’s reflective procedure 
itself in immanent terms as a way of exposing commitments I already have in virtue of 
being an agent, even if I fail to acknowledge them when I act.  This is nothing other 
than the transcendental move from what I happen to value to the very conditions that 
enable me to value anything at all. 126  It is in a sense immanent, for it exposes implicit 
commitments.  Nonetheless, this transcendental procedure differs from immanent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 In the chapter of the Phenomenology called “Reason as law-tester,” Hegel argues that the categorical 
imperative can only expose a contradiction between a social practice on the one hand, and an individual 
action on the other.  For example, it can show that theft is wrong only by presupposing that private property 
is something worth upholding.  So Hegel tries to employ the categorical imperative to determine whether the 
institution of private property, or rather that of non-property, can be shown to be contradictory.  Both 
institutions can be made to pass and both can be made to fail, and that with equal success.  In this context I 
should note that Hegel is departing from Kant’s own understanding of the categorical imperative, for Kant 
never meant to apply it to institutions, but to maxims of action.  Hegel’s point is, however, that the 
categorical imperative can only reveal contradictions in our maxims if we take certain background institutions 
for granted, institutions that the categorical imperative cannot effectively evaluate. 
 
126 Here I have specifically Christine Korsgaard’s adaptation of Kant in mind.  In Sources of Normativity she 
begins with what she calls our “practical identities,” namely the particular ways in which we conceive of 
ourselves and which provide us with ends and obligations.  She then goes on to argue that these practical 
identities are not themselves the source of the authority they have for us, but that their authority derives from 
our identity as human beings.  It is meant to show that, if we value anything at all, we are thereby committed 




critique, for it departs rather quickly from my concrete commitments.  In other words, 
for it to work, it does not really matter what I happen to value – my particular point of 
departure – as long as I value anything at all.  To be more precise, the determinate 
standard, to which it appeals, does not depend on the content of my given 
commitments, only on the fact that I have given commitments in the first place.  
Immanent critique is not indifferent to our starting points, nor does it automatically 
privilege the abstract principle over the concrete, the formal over the substantial. 
 Nonetheless, its kinship to the transcendental procedure should lead us to 
question whether the distinction between “internal” and “external” norms is all that 
helpful for understanding immanent critique.  What sets it apart is perhaps less the 
norms to which it appeals, and more the way in which it appeals to them, namely by 
drawing the kinds of connections that show them to be part of our evaluative scheme, 
despite varying depths and distances from its core.  Thus the critical resources available 
to an immanent critic remain immanent to the society under scrutiny, even if the divide 
between what lies inside and what lies outside is neither sharp nor fixed.  This indicates 
that immanent critique is better understood as something like a method, one that might 
not always find a criterion ready to hand, but one that nevertheless searches out its 
“measure in the object of criticism itself.”127 
 In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel in fact explicitly advances such a mode of 
measuring as his preferred methodology.  Here he is, broadly speaking, evaluating 
various practices of reason-giving and their corresponding assumptions about what 
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counts as a reason in the first place.  In this way he claims to provide us with a way of 
rationally criticizing a given reason-giving practice without assuming a fixed standard of 
rationality.  All we need to do is to take the standard of what counts as a reason that is 
being invoked in the practice in question and ask whether it itself can satisfy this 
standard.  As Hegel puts it, “Consciousness provides its own criterion from within 
itself, in this way the investigation will become a comparison of consciousness with 
itself” (PG §84).  So our grounds for objecting to a practice do not require transcending 
it, but rather exposing contradictions already at work within it.  And these 
contradictions reveal themselves as inversions between how a practice envisions itself 
and what it proves – in practice – to be, even as it attempts to enact this very vision.  
Below I will elaborate one of Hegel’s examples of such a contradiction, but a 
provisional example might be the master-slave dialectic.  The master envisioned 
freedom to involve freedom from any direct engagement with the material world, but 
as it turns out, enacting this vision made him thoroughly dependent on the slave’s 
laboring activity. 
 Although Hegel describes this critical procedure as one that we as philosophers 
should adopt (at least while at the stage of the Phenomenology) he also suggests that our 
object of investigation has in fact undergone this same process.  What we are tracking is 
a procession of “configurations” (initially of consciousness, later of spirit) which are 
probably best described as normative frameworks of varying complexity, initially 
founded upon one principal norm.  Each such configuration consists of two discrete 
but related poles – a conception of what is to count as a reason (which he calls 
“knowledge-for-itself”) and actual instances of reason-giving (or “knowledge-in-itself”) 
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– and “comparing consciousness with itself” involves weighing its two poles against 
each other.  But Hegel thinks that consciousness is brought to evaluate its own 
configurations when it runs into contradictions that it cannot endure.  In other words, 
the need for critical evaluation is not imposed by the readers, or for that matter by the 
writer of the Phenomenology, but has already been acknowledged by those who represent 
the perspective under investigation.128  As we will see, it is because immanent critique 
operates at this practical level, and arises and proceeds within a given evaluative 
scheme, that it proves to be so suitable to ethical life. 
 But what makes immanent critique especially promising for our purposes is its 
revisionary upshot.  It is crucial for Hegel that such criticism, even when exercised by 
the configurations themselves, is never merely negative, a dead end road, but always 
looks forward to a new and improved future.  And this future is in a sense borne out of 
the present, for once we encounter a problem, it does not mean that we must now 
compose a new framework from scratch.  Rather, “what emerges from this process is 
the determinate negative which is thereby a positive content” (PG §59).  Hegel calls this 
transformative moment “determinate negation.”129  One could say that the movement 
of immanent critique is that of discovering which among our norms are valid and 
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128 In his influential commentary on the Phenomenology, Terry Pinkard stresses this point, arguing that Hegel’s 
theory is fulfilling an aim which “must be shown to emerge as a requirement itself, as something that those 
accounts themselves generate out of their own failures to make good on the terms they have set for 
themselves” (1996, p. 10). !
129 This notion of “determinate negation” is central to Hegel’s dialectic, a term I do not foreground in this 
context, but which is closely connected to the movement I am here describing.  According to Hegel, the 
progression from one configuration of consciousness to another cannot be conceived as a linear 
improvement, but must work through contradictions that emerge within it.  At the same time, these 
contradictions generate a new content and a new configuration that salvages elements from its predecessors.  
Thus Hegel’s answer to the question: “Why bother with the false?” (PG §38) is that even a configuration that 




which are not, and in light of these discoveries reshaping our framework without 
thereby dispensing with the valid aspects of its prior incarnation. 
 Perhaps this is a misleading way to put matters.  While the hierarchy among our 
norms may shift, foundational norms are never completely discarded, but rather 
reinterpreted in a way that is meant to stay true to their spirit.  We can see this at a 
general level throughout the Phenomenology, since the aspiration to freedom or self-
standingness is at no point abandoned.  Only what we take freedom to be changes in 
this process.  As we will see, this seems to hold true for the Philosophy of Right as well, 
though in an increasingly determinate way.  There it is not just the ideal of freedom as 
such that cannot be replaced with another.  It is also the various forms we now know 
freedom must take – the different principles that shape a free life – that modern ethical 
life must continue to accommodate.  But this is not to say that these principles cannot 
become newly understood, which for Hegel counts as a revisionary undertaking. 
 Furthermore, it is crucial that this process of revision leave neither the practice 
nor the standard unscathed.  For Hegel, when we do stumble upon a practical failure to 
meet our own measure, this is no coincidence, nor is it a contingent outcome that could 
be remedied if we simply tried a little harder.  As I noted, Hegel is interested in those 
failures that point to a necessary connection between a criterion and its enactment.  In 
other words, when we systematically fail to do justice to certain standards, it reveals not 
our own imperfection, but the imperfection of those very standards.  Thus in this 
process, “the criterion for testing changes, when that for which it was supposed to be 
the criterion fails to pass the test; and the test is not only a test of knowing, but also of 
its criterion” (PG §85). 
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 There are, however, limitations to the extent to which immanent critique can be 
thought of as a test in any strict sense, for it is not a procedure that can be applied in 
abstraction from what Hegel calls “experience.”  I want to underscore this notion 
because I think it plays an indispensable role for Hegel, one that is too easily 
overlooked.  He in fact calls the very movement of evaluation and revision a kind of 
experience, by which he has two things in mind.  First, he thinks that running into 
contradictions is not merely something we do when we choose to contemplate our 
norms, but is rather something we are forced to confront experientially in our efforts to 
apply them.  It is our experience of living in accordance with inadequate norms that 
provokes us to adopt a reflective attitude towards them. 
 Second, this experience is importantly a historical one, and the movement of 
critical revisions one we have already experientially undergone, although initially in a 
relatively obscure way.  I think this sense of experience suggests most clearly that 
Hegel’s talk of a “test” must be misleading.  He does not think we can formulate a set 
of formal criteria that can be applied independently of the real historical 
transformations of our past, because the inadequacies of a given framework are rarely 
visible at the outset.  Such a test is only really effective when applied retrospectively to 
those configurations that have already accomplished the hard work of evaluating and 
revising their own criteria.  Thus this test benefits from the long historical experience at 
its disposal, without which it would be highly limited, if not virtually useless.  At the 
same time, immanent critique remains forward-looking, directed at problems of a 
particularly pernicious sort as they arise and invested in their overcoming, even if it has 
no way of testing proposed solutions in advance.   
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 It bears emphasizing that we are not concerned with just any old experience, 
but that what the relevant experience must be an experience of is contradiction.  In the 
end I think it is this related notion of “practical contradiction” that is the distinguishing 
mark.  Immanent critique is unlike all other forms of criticism, no matter whence they 
glean their standards of assessment, precisely because it remains anchored in practical 
contradictions and takes its cue from them.  These contradictions provide it with both 
– an object to be criticized as well as a standard with which to do it.  They moreover 
indicate the need for more substantial reassessment than the one internal criticism can 
offer.  When I discover a real contradiction between norm and practice, I am 
confronted with the necessary relation between them and I learn that I cannot amend 
the one without the other.   
 Since the basic structure of a practical contradiction is best illustrated in the 
earliest sections of the Phenomenology, let us take a quick look at the first configuration, 
“Sense-Certainty.”  Sense-certainty is for Hegel the most minimal conception of 
knowledge, for it claims that knowledge is nothing more than the immediate 
apprehension of what is, and that what is is itself something immediate – i.e. not 
mediated by relation to anything other than itself, including both the knower as well as 
other objects.  So “immediacy” is its basic criterion, the measure it hopes to meet, its 
“knowledge-for-itself.”  In order to assess this criterion, we need to examine its 
practical application, what would count as an instance of knowing by its own lights.  Its 
actual instances of knowing are limited to the expressions “This”, “Here”, and “Now”, 
since any other expression would invoke concepts and so would violate both the 
immediacy of our apprehension as well as the immediacy of the object to be 
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apprehended.  The one demand that Hegel does impose from outside, so to speak, is 
that we be able to articulate what it is that we know, and he takes for granted that we 
cannot be said to know what we cannot in principle say.  It is at this point, when sense-
certainty tries to put its knowledge into words, that it is compelled to contradict itself. 
 Without spending too much time on the detailed stages of its efforts, it will 
suffice to say that the expressions of knowledge available to sense-certainty – namely 
“This”, “Here”, and “Now” – prove to be highly general, indeterminate, and without 
content, in the absence of concepts.  For example, there is no way for me to pick out a 
particular object, say, a framed painting, merely by means of the expression “This,” 
since “This” could equally well refer to the whole wall on which it hangs, or to the rural 
cottage it depicts.  And employing more fine-grained ways of pointing, namely by 
differentiating the spatial “Here” from the temporal “Now,” leaves us no better off.  So 
sense-certainty arrives at the very result it hoped to avoid.  It hoped to yield a form of 
knowledge that has sacrificed nothing of, has not omitted anything from its object.  It 
hoped to represent the object exactly as it is, in all its particular richness.  But “this 
certainty in fact gives itself away as the most abstract and poorest truth” (PG §91), for 
what it is capable of representing is only an empty “This.” 
 Nonetheless, this failure has taught us something.  We learn that, if we want to 
know particular objects, we have to conceive of them as possessing a more complex 
structure than Sense-Certain attributed to them.  At the next stage this is interpreted to 
mean that we need to think of an object as that which underlies the sum total of its 
sensible qualities, qualities it might share with other objects.  So in the transition from 
“Sense-Certainty” to “Perception,” we continue to be interested in a world of objects 
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standing over and above me.  But we have come to recognize that an object cannot be 
thought of as a bare particular we passively apprehend, that we can know an object as 
the particular object it is only by relating it to other objects, and so only by employing 
concepts. 
 I hope that this gives us some idea of what it means to “compare consciousness 
to itself”, to compare an ideal criterion with its actual application.  What becomes 
especially clear in sense-certainty, however, is not just the discrepancy between the two 
poles, but the inevitability of failure.  Its proponents purported to have the richest 
knowledge, but they were called out as having the poorest – knowledge without any 
content whatsoever.  The contrast between the ideal and the actual, or between norm 
and practice, could not be starker.  But they failed through no fault of their own.  It is 
not as if they were hypocritical in their avowals or sloppy in their applications.  We now 
see that this criterion, with its entire corresponding conception of what it means to 
know, cannot be applied.  It will produce its contrary every time, presenting us with the 
paradigmatic exemplar of a practical contradiction. 
 Now we hopefully also have a better idea of the kinds of revisions such a 
contradiction sets into motion.  In the transition from “Sense-Certainty” to 
“Perception,” much remains in place.  I still want to know something self-standing, and 
I take this to be a world that is independent of me and populated with particulars.  So I 
have not faltered in my epistemic aspirations, though my criterion has in a sense 
changed.  Although I remain committed to objectivity, I realize that it should not be 
conflated with “immediacy,” for it cannot reasonably require insulating an object from 
all relations altogether.  I move forward with a more concrete criterion that I expect 
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will yield more determinate knowledge.  Although this one too will generate a set of 
discrepancies of its own, it is nonetheless a step in the right direction. 
 Despite the clarity of these early sections, it is likewise important to note their 
limitations.  These configurations are already highly theoretical.  Even though Hegel 
characterizes sense-certainty as the standpoint of “natural consciousness,” he cannot 
mean that people ordinarily conceive of knowing in this way, that this is a starting point 
his readership shares.  I think the main reason Hegel begins with this configuration is 
not because it is most common or pervasive or mundane, nor because it is the earliest 
in history, but precisely because it is the most minimal, primitive, and crude.130  So its 
clarity is also its limitation, and it is not until the chapters in “Spirit” that Hegel turns to 
worldviews rich enough that they could have been espoused by actual societies.  Thus it 
is also first in “Spirit” that we begin to see what it means to call immanent critique a 
lived experience, rather than a merely theoretical exercise we can choose to undertake. 
 
III.  Beautiful Ethical Life  
I announced at the outset that my concern in this chapter is with critical reflection in 
modern ethical life and I alluded to some of the peculiar difficulties this context poses 
for Hegel.  In short, modern ethical life is supposed to constitute a rational social order, 
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130 For an explanation of why Hegel needs to begin in this way, namely, why the initial account of knowledge 
needs to also be the most minimal, given his epistemological aims, I recommend Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s 
“The Phenomenology of Spirit as a ‘transcendentalistic’ argument for a monistic ontology”.  According to 
Horstmann’s reconstruction of the critical procedure, Hegel hopes to demonstrate the “primacy of the 
maximally complex over the elementary simples” by revealing that a more complex conception of both the 
subject and the object is already implicit even in the most simple.  This would make the procedure 
transcendental in some sense, because it exposes the preconditions of even the simplest conceptions.  But it 





whereas the configurations of “Spirit” that comprise the Phenomenology do not.  So given 
that Hegel develops the model of immanent critique in order to explain the social 
changes that preceded us, it is not obvious that this model can be transposed to those 
changes that may lie ahead of us.  But before we can address these potential 
disanalogies, we need to get a better sense of how immanent critique does work when it 
arises in actual societies, even in those that proved to be less rational than our own. 
 The next step will thus involve a detour via the Greeks, as Hegel describes and 
diagnoses them, in order to examine the emergence of critical reflection in their midst.  
To be sure, the Greek polis differs significantly from its modern successor, though this 
does not make it irrelevant for us.  In fact one reason to look to the Greeks is in order 
to highlight the difference between an inadequately and an adequately rational social 
order.  As we will see, this will amount to the difference between a society that is at 
bottom inhospitable to critical reflection and ill-equipped to cope with its effects, and a 
society (such as our own) in which critical reflection plays a constitutive role. 
 Thus in the following I will focus on the first configuration of spirit, which Hegel 
calls “Beautiful Ethical Life.”  Although I suggested that configurations of spirit do not 
lend themselves to the same simple analysis, it is possible to extract some general 
criteria that Hegel takes to be definitive of beautiful ethical life.  In a familiar vein, one 
could say that its participants identify “immediately” with their social order, though 
“immediacy” is understood somewhat differently here.  It is no longer a matter of 
knowing a world of independent objects, but of “knowing” an objective social world, 
for it is this social world that I now take to be truly self-standing.  But given that I 
likewise take part in this social world, my knowledge of it also supposed to yield self-
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knowledge.   In others words, I look to the world in order to find out how to behave, 
and my duties are prescribed to me by the role I occupy within it.  So each individual 
has no trouble figuring out what to do in any given situation and she inhabits her role 
so seamlessly that she always performs her duty decisively, without any hesitation.  The 
aim of action is to sustain the internal harmony of this order by fulfilling one’s 
particular role, and action is guided by a knowledge that is immediate because it does 
not need to be acquired through any kind of reflection, including deliberation.131 
 This criterion for ethical knowledge has to be understood against the background 
of “social substance”132 that forms the context of its application.  This substance is 
divided into two distinct spheres that are both equally essential to beautiful ethical life 
and so need to be able to coexist harmoniously without infringing on each other’s 
terrain, if this order is to be maintained.  Hegel identifies the two spheres as the family 
and the state, and he claims that each is governed by a different set of laws, the family 
by the divine law and the state by the human law.  The human law, which Hegel also 
calls the “prevailing custom,” is publicly known and acknowledged.  “Its truth is the 
validity that is open and in broad daylight” (PG §448).  What this means is that 
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131 As we have seen in Chapter 1, not all of these criteria for ethical knowledge are themselves problematic 
and Hegel in fact reintroduces many of them in the Philosophy of Right, implying that decisiveness and lack of 
hesitation should be regarded as essential features of modern virtue as well.  
 
132 I do not have sufficient space to elaborate this notion here, but I do want to point out that the presence of 
“substance” is a new element that sets configurations of spirit apart from those of mere consciousness.  
According to Hegel, substance is the social order that individual agents and knowers inhabit.  Substance can 
on the one hand be distinguished from its individual members because it both precedes and outlives them, 
but on the other hand it is a work produced and sustained by their actions.  In this context Hegel defines 
substance in the following terms: “the universal, self-identical, and abiding essence is the unmoved and solid 
ground and starting-point of action of all and their purpose and goal… This substance is in the same way the 





everyone knows not only the content of the law – which actions it commands – but 
also its origin, which is a human one.  In short, the human law is one whose source of 
validation is not obscure because it is posited by human beings.  The divine law, on the 
other hand, is also known immediately, but its origin is in a sense unknown, since it is 
authored by the gods.  What this means is that, while its adherents know what it 
commands of them, they do not know why.  This law is moreover timeless, unwritten, 
and infallible, and so remains off limits to human evaluation and revision.  
 Hegel stresses that neither law has a privileged status because each depends on the 
other.  Moreover, the authority of each is derived from the underlying social substance, 
which in turn requires the jurisdiction of both for its own survival.  But the fact that 
there are two competing sets of laws is not supposed to compromise the criterion of 
immediacy, for it cannot generate conflicts of duties within one individual, since no 
individual is ever subject to both laws.  Everyone is assigned exclusively either to the 
family or to the state.  One important aspect of beautiful ethical life is that social roles 
depend on the natural distinction between men and women.  “Nature, not the accident 
of circumstances or of choice, assigns one sex to one, and the other sex to the other 
law” (PG §465).  While women belong to the family and have the task of protecting 
divine law, men are participants in the state and so comply first and foremost with the 
dictates of human law.  This is why there is never any question as to which social roles 
one is assigned, since assignment is based exclusively on biological facts about the 
individual.  And since one’s sex determines whether one is a member of the state or of 
the family, no individual can belong to both spheres and so experience a conflict 
between the duties each prescribes. 
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 Below I will follow Hegel’s own narrative in order to trace the structure of his 
argument.  So let me begin with Hegel’s account of the family, to which he devotes 
considerable attention.  Hegel calls the family a “natural community,” by which he 
means more than merely that its members are connected by blood.  He claims that the 
family must possess its own unique ethical function and that this function cannot lie 
exclusively either in childrearing or in the acquisition of wealth, since both of these 
activities point beyond the family toward public life.  He concludes that what 
distinguishes the family from the state is its commemoration of the dead.  Burial is for 
Hegel an ethical act because its aim is to preserve the social standing of a deceased 
family member in spite of her natural death.  As Hegel puts it, “the blood-relationship 
thus supplements the abstract natural movement by adding the movement of 
consciousness, interrupting the work of nature, and rescuing the blood-relation from 
destruction” (PG §452).  This gives us another sense in which the family stands in close 
relation to nature.  Although its task is primarily to “interrupt the work of nature”, this 
in turn gives ethical significance to something natural about us – our mortality. 
 But there is a sense in which the state’s unique ethical function, which Hegel 
identifies as war, can also be described as an effort to “interrupt the work of nature.”  
First, war prevents individuals from lapsing into their natural state of self-seeking 
drives, appetites, and desires by pushing them to orient their activities towards public 
ends.  Second, Hegel argues that there is a particular value in putting one’s own life at 
risk.133  The warrior is forced to assert his own independence from life and so prove !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 As Hegel states in an earlier section of the Phenomenology, “It is only through staking one’s life that freedom 
is preserved… The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person; but he has not 
attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness” (PG §187).  This moment of 
risk serves to draw a dividing line between freedom and life and demonstrating that the ends of freedom are 
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that he is not merely a living creature and natural organism.  Those who survive the 
battle are awarded the honor of becoming citizens with a publicly acknowledged 
standing.  Unfortunately women cannot achieve this recognition in public life, since 
their “destiny lies in the home.”  So it must be possible for them to become recognized 
as participants in ethical life within the constraints of the familial structure. 
 Although this premise is never explicitly stated, Hegel seems to hold that such 
recognition is essential to any form of ethical agency, including those available to 
women within this world, for without it one remains a merely natural creature without 
any duties at all.  In order for women to be able to regard themselves as subject to the 
divine law, their self-conception must be confirmed through recognition by another.  
But most familial relations prove to be inadequate in this regard.  That between 
husband and wife is too wedded to feeling, desire, and procreation, and so to nature.  
And that between parent and child is a relation among vast unequals.  So the only 
remaining candidate is the relationship between brother and sister, because such a 
bond, albeit natural in a sense, remains free from the intrusion of sexual desire.  As 
Hegel puts it, brother and sister “are the same blood which has, however, in them 
come to its rest and equilibrium… they are free individualities toward each other” (PG 
§457).  And yet a sister’s role is still significantly different from that of her brother.  
Brothers leave home, go to war, and participate in political life, while sisters become the 
principal guardians of the divine law. 
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my true priority, even if in the end I can only be free so long as I am alive.  But Hegel also offers another 
argument, namely, that it is the confrontation with death that reveals to us our essential indeterminacy and 
capacity for abstraction.  This is what the slave learns as he trembles before the “absolute lord.”  In this 
context it is worth noting that, despite this formative experience of confronting death, the slave ultimately 
demonstrates that he priorities life over freedom, and not the other way around. 
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 It is at this point probably clear that Hegel is setting the stage for his reading of 
Sophocles’ Antigone, which comprises the kernel of his argument in this chapter, since 
this tragedy explicitly thematizes this filial relationship.  But Hegel also turns to it 
because it focuses on a conflict between two individuals who embody the two central 
spheres of beautiful ethical life.  Antigone is a woman who disobeys Creon’s edict that 
her brother Polyneices remain unburied because he died in an effort to overthrow the 
throne.  At night she attempts to bury Polyneices, though fully aware that this deed is 
punishable by death.  From the perspective of the state, which Creon as king 
represents, Polyneices was a rebel who acted out of self-interest and so must be denied 
this “last honor,” which in turn makes Antigone’s act likewise one of rebellion.  But 
from the perspective of the family, the state is only permitted to punish the living.  The 
dead properly belong to the family and so must be returned to it.  In leaving the corpse 
in broad daylight, Creon has violated the divine law, which commands that the 
deceased be buried by his relatives.134 
 Prior to this collision between the family and the state – personified in Antigone 
and Creon – this social order encountered no problems that it could not settle by 
appeal to justice, a function of the human law intended to restore social equilibrium.  
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134 There is some textual evidence in support of Hegel’s reading.  For example, Sophocle’s version stresses 
this conflict between two sets of laws and the ensuing disagreement about their rightful jurisdiction.  As the 
chorus leader reassures Creon, “Law and custom, as I see it, are totally at your disposal to apply both to the 
dead and to us survivors” (250:1–3).  But when Creon asks Antigone why she dared to break this law, she 
gives a reply that Hegel loves to quote: “Yes, because I did not believe that Zeus was the one who had 
proclaimed it; neither did Justice, or the gods of the dead whom Justice lives among.  The laws they have 
made for men are well marked out.  I didn’t suppose your decree had strength enough, or you, who are 
human, to violate the lawful traditions the gods have not written merely, but made infallible.  These laws are 
not for now or for yesterday, they are alive forever; and no one knows when they were shown to us first” 
(550:1–12).  Hegel alludes to Antigone’s speech in the Philosophy of Right when he describes the laws in the 




This is why Hegel calls it “beautiful” ethical life.  He writes, “This ethical realm is in 
this way in its enduring existence a world that is immaculate, not sullied by any 
antagonism” (PG §463).  But the conflict we see in Antigone cannot be settled in this 
way because both sides have committed a crime and so neither is in a position to 
arbitrate justice.  Moreover, Hegel thinks that these crimes could not have been avoided 
and so have little to do with Antigone and Creon as individuals, or with the specific 
circumstances in which they found themselves.  What their actions reveal is that, within 
this form of ethical life, every ostensibly dutiful action carries the prospect of guilt, for 
it could very well turn out to be a crime, no matter how dutiful it may seem.  As Hegel 
puts it, “Innocent is therefore only non-action, like the being of a stone, not even that 
of a child” (PR §468). 
 This is a strong claim, but it is not as crazy as it may sound.  Hegel argues that, as 
long as one refrains from acting, it is possible to feel certain of what duty demands and 
to remain committed to one law at the exclusion of the other.  But as soon as one acts 
out of this “simple certainty of immediate truth” (PG §468), one enters a social space 
that is far more complex than one’s own attitude reflects.  Since each agent 
acknowledges only one law, she is merely lucky if she avoids transgressing the 
provisions of the other.  What Antigone reveals is that it is only a matter of time before 
our well-intentioned deeds make us guilty of a crime.  So every particular action is at 
least vulnerable to the threat of violation. 
 The conflict that emerges between the two sides of beautiful ethical life is 
irresolvable and so initiates its downfall.  We already witness a certain level of 
destruction within the play itself, since the whole family perishes as a consequence of 
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Creon and Antigone’s misdeeds.  But Hegel thinks this particular conflict is merely a 
harbinger foreshadowing the death of the entire Greek configuration because it exposes 
ineradicable inadequacies within it.  At the beginning of this chapter Hegel announces 
that Beautiful Ethical Life will come to exhibit two kinds of internal contradictions, for 
it is divided not only into two sets of laws, but also into two types of self-
consciousness, each one aligned with only one law.  “Thus [self-consciousness] 
experiences [erfährt] in its deed both the contradiction of those powers, into which 
substance divides itself, and their mutual destruction, as well as the contradiction 
between its knowledge of the ethical nature of its action and that which is ethical in and 
for itself, and so finds its own downfall” (PG §445).  Although he calls both 
contradictions, only one of them is ultimately responsible for this downfall.  The first 
contradiction that emerges between the two powers or sources of authority does not 
yet disclose that there is anything inherently wrong with this evaluative framework.  
Perhaps it is misleading even to call this a contradiction.  So the relevant contradiction 
is rather one between a certain conception of ethical knowledge and the only possible 
actualization of this knowledge, which turns out to be an essentially criminal action. 
 Let us take a closer look at Hegel’s diagnosis.  What, according to Hegel, makes this 
attitude deficient and incapable of enduring conflicts like that between Antigone and 
Creon?  At the end of the chapter he writes, “This downfall of ethical substance and its 
passage into another configuration is thus determined by the fact that the ethical 
consciousness is oriented toward the law in a way that is essentially immediate” (PG 
§476).  What Hegel has in mind is that single-mindedness prevents such an agent from 
performing the act of abstraction, namely, from stepping back from one law and 
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evaluating his or her action from the perspective of the other.  Antigone was 
exclusively a sister and thus unable even to entertain Creon’s point of view, and Creon 
was in turn unequipped to take Antigone’s standpoint into consideration.  This 
incapacity accounts for their subsequent failure to see that the other’s action accords 
with norms that are equally essential to the social order they share.  While this ability to 
abstract may not have been sufficient for resolving this particular conflict, Hegel 
suggests that it is revealed to be a necessary condition for sustaining a common culture 
in the face of ethical conflicts that will inevitably erupt in a society that exhibits even a 
minimal degree of pluralism, as beautiful ethical life clearly does. 
 While it is right to conclude that the exclusivity of commitment is at fault, Hegel 
thinks there is an even deeper contradiction at the core of this self-understanding that 
such conflicts bring to the surface.  Antigone may think of her identity as exhausted by 
her familial roles, but Hegel argues that she is unknowingly committed to the human 
law as well.  Though her action is a violation of the human law, it likewise reveals that 
she is not only a sister, but also a member of a broader society that includes the human 
law as a legitimate and essential source of authority.  Hegel’s point is not simply that the 
other law is equally legitimate and essential, but that neither law is self-sufficient and 
that each needs the other for its authority.  The divine law needs the state for its public 
actualization, just as “the publicly manifest spirit has the root of its power in the 
underworld” (PG §474).135  Because the two laws are ultimately co-dependent, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 This is an obscure moment in Hegel’s argument, but I think we can make some sense of it.  It is perhaps 
easier to see why the gods would require the state in order to actualize their aims, since they do not otherwise 
have a public presence.  Hegel calls them a “bloodless shade.”  So when Creon violated their law, they needed 
the assistance of other states surrounding Athens in order to avenge the wrong committed against them.  
Beckoned by the gods, these other states “rise up in hostility and destroy the community which has 
dishonored and shattered its own power, the sacred claims of the family” (PG §474).  This in turn gives us 
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Antigone cannot be committed to the one without thereby committing to the other, 
which in turn compromises the simplicity of her self-conception.  In Hegel’s words, “In 
the deed [the two powers] are as a self, but a diverse self, which contradicts the unity of 
the self and constitutes its unrighteousness and necessary downfall” (PG §472).  So 
Antigone is in a sense in contradiction with herself, even if not with her explicit self-
conception, rather than being simply in contradiction with her deed as it is interpreted 
by the world she inhabits.  And since “neither power has any advantage over the other 
that would make it a more essential moment of the substance” (PG §472), the same can 
be said of Creon as well. 
 What we learn from Hegel’s discussion of Antigone is what it means for a society to 
undergo immanent critique.  The society in question invoked a standard of 
“immediacy” in knowledge – namely, an immediate grasp of objectively binding norms 
– which it had to meet if it was to count as ethical by its own lights.  But in its effort to 
adhere to its standard, it discovers that upholding it produces unethical actions, actions 
which are inevitable crimes committed against the social order as a whole.  Even 
though such a society requires that the attitude of agents be undivided, its social 
structure is divided into what look like relatively autonomous spheres, even though they 
turn out to be significantly interdependent.  According to Hegel, problems erupt when 
agents try to act out their uniform convictions within this complex structure.  Although 
it may initially appear as if it were possible to avoid interfering in each other’s domains 
of governance, Hegel suggests that they will eventually encounter a situation in which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
some insight into the dependence of the state on the divine law.  Since the divine law in a sense more 
universal, a law that holds for other communities as well, any particular state needs to respect it in order to 




both laws have a stake and discover that they lack the resources they need to assess the 
two competing claims.  When such a situation arises, it becomes clear the actions that 
express an “immediate” attitude are in principle divisive because they oppose the 
integrity of the whole.  Moreover, it becomes clear that this attitude could never have 
been truly “immediate” in the first place, for it always already incorporates an 
unacknowledged commitment to the opposing law. 
 Since we moderns do not share this insistence on “immediacy,” it is not 
immediately clear how the experience of beautiful ethical life is supposed to bear on 
our own.  Here it is worth recalling that this difference is in part what makes the 
Greeks so relevant.  Above I characterized it as a difference between a society that is 
inhospitable to critical reflection and one to which such reflection is constitutive.  We 
can now see that the fatal flaw of beautiful ethical life was nothing other than its 
incapacity to integrate critical reflection.  It held fast to “immediacy” to such an extent 
that critical reflection could only appear as an interruption and intrusion, even when it 
was beckoned by contradictions that were fully its own.  Here immanent critique had to 
adopt a radical form, for it could not resolve the central contradiction without thereby 
undercutting this society’s basic self-conception, without overthrowing the value it 
prized the most.  Hegel thinks that this is not so for us. 
 
IV. Modern Contradictions 
Although we moderns are accustomed to reflecting critically, it is not clear that the 
forms of criticism available to us count as immanent critique of the sort we have 
previously explored.  To be sure, immanent critique is at work throughout the 
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Phenomenology, including later configurations of spirit, but it is notably absent from the 
Philosophy of Right.  And to many this looks like no omission.  They would grant that 
Hegel is no apologist for the status quo, and that he does leave room for criticizing 
existing institutions when they betray their ideals.  But given that modern ethical life for 
Hegel is rational in its normative foundations, all that remains to be done is to engage 
in what I earlier described as “internal criticism” and demand that our practices accord 
more closely with our norms.136  This does not mean that we cannot also evaluate these 
norms themselves, as an extra-curricular activity of sorts.  All we would discover, 
however, is that they are in order and that we know what freedom would require even 
when we do not manage to live free lives.  So the exercise of reflection, albeit not 
forbidden in modern ethical life, could at most yield approval of it, one to which Hegel 
himself arrives. 
 Now, I think that it is easy to overstate Hegel’s theoretical ambitions, for in 
deeming modern ethical life rational, he never implies that we could rule out 
contradictions once and for all and guarantee that they will not surface at a later point 
in our own historical development.  This means that any justification he can give of 
modern ethical life is and remains provisional.  His full argument for this, to which I 
will return in the next and last chapter, relies on his conception of philosophical 
method and its continued dependence on “experience” in the same way as we have 
seen in the Phenomenology.  But Hegel also offers a different basis for his confidence in 
the resilience of modern ethical life, for he thinks that whatever problems have 
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136 This is seemingly Hardimon’s proposal for a “philosophically informed” criticism of the social world. 




emerged and continue to emerge do not necessitate a revolutionary transformation of 
its basic framework.  In other words, he deems it sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
revisions without issuing in whole-scale paradigm shifts.  And part of what makes it so 
flexible is its high estimation of critical reflection.  If it proved to be inimical to critical 
reflection and unequipped to cope with the challenges it presents, that is when it would 
fail thoroughly by its own lights.  One could say that modern ethical is less fragile or 
brittle than its Ancient counterpart, not necessarily because its social practices are 
guaranteed to stand the test of time, but because it has dispensed with the standard of 
immediacy.  This means that there is a sense in which a radical form of critique is no 
longer possible for us, simply because it is no longer necessary for us. 
 In spite of his confidence, however, Hegel does not seem to consider modern 
ethical life to be immune to problems altogether, problems that may even compromise 
its rationality to a lesser or greater degree.  On one level it is true that the chapter on 
“Ethical Life” in the Philosophy of Right presents a vision of a successful social order, but 
even in this vision it is not all that successful.  This is most vivid in his section on “Civil 
Society,” in which Hegel admits that among a string of more or less worrisome 
repercussions, the rise of poverty is a direct consequence of the modern market – and 
not merely a contingent one either.  According to Hegel, poverty is produced by the 
“inner dialectic of civil society.” As he puts it, “It comes therein to the forefront that 
despite the excess of wealth civil society is not rich enough, i.e. it does not possess enough of 
its own resources to check the excess of poverty and the creation of a rabble” (PR 




 I admit that this might initially appear to be a far-fetched diagnosis of a rather 
ubiquitous phenomenon.  Since poverty is certainly not limited to the modern world, it 
is perhaps difficult to accept that civil society should be to blame for it.  But Hegel’s 
more compelling point is that under these modern conditions poverty assumes a new 
form, appearing as the “rabble.”  The rabble for Hegel comprises a class of those who, 
by losing their employment, recede entirely from social participation.  Such a class is a 
uniquely modern phenomenon because of the status that civil society adopts.  With the 
introduction of an autonomous market, the economic function of the family (as well as 
that of the state) diminishes, and so there is no longer a safety net for those who fall 
upon difficult times.137  This is at least one explanation we can give for the necessity of 
poverty in civil society, though I suspect that Hegel wants to say something even 
stronger.  In tracing it back to civil society’s “inner dialectic”, it sounds as if he wants to 
say that poverty itself rises as a consequence of the market, and not simply that the 
market makes poverty more difficult to bear. 
 Even if we accept this diagnosis in its stronger form, it is not obvious what 
conclusion we are to draw from it.  Hegel himself remains remarkably reticent.  Since 
he mentions the problem of poverty only towards the end, he avoids confronting the 
challenge it presents and determining the extent to which it might threaten his previous 
account.  He moreover never goes so far as to call it a contradiction, which would 
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137 See for example PR §238: “Initially, the family is the substantial whole whose task it is to provide for this 
particular aspect of the individual, both by giving him the means and skills he requires in order to earn his 
living from the universal resources, and by supplying his livelihood and maintenance in the event of his 
incapacity to look after himself.  But civil society tears the individual away from family ties, alienated the 
members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as self-sufficient persons… Thus the 




imply that poverty compromises the rationality of civil society as a whole.  Despite his 
caution on this point, I think his acknowledgment that poverty is a structural feature of 
civil society indicates a certain foresight on Hegel’s part, a foresight that implicitly 
concedes the prospect of institutional change.138  At the same time, I think Hegel had 
good grounds for calling it a contradiction, rather than regarding poverty as being 
merely an unsavory side effect at the periphery of civil society, because it exposes an 
inconsistency at its basis. 
 It seems to me that the phenomenon of poverty does reveal that civil society 
cannot live up to its own standards.  According to its self-understanding, unhindered 
individualism is worth indulging because it inadvertently benefits everyone.  Such a 
tenet is crucial to this institution because it is mirrored in the attitudes of its 
participants.  So long as they believe it, they can continue to regard their own 
participation in civil society as justified, and so as free.  Hegel calls the principle in need 
of justification the “principle of particularity” to pursue one’s individual interests, 
wants, and desires, and he claims that this principle must become a right with its own 
sanctioned social space.  At the same time, it can only become a right if it is 
“constricted by the power of universality” (PR §185), namely, if it is proves capable of 
being accorded to every other participant as well.  Otherwise self-interest would turn 
self-destructive. 
 This right of particularity depends on the right of universality in at least two 
respects.  First, particularity requires universality as its means, for even the pursuit of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 Marx thinks through the implications of Hegel’s account of civil society more generally, but it is striking 
that he does not explicitly take up Hegel’s discussion of the “rabble.”  For a helpful discussion of the 




my particular ends can only succeed if I take those of others into consideration and 
coordinate my endeavors around theirs.  Second, particularity also requires universality 
as its final end, namely by contributing to the satisfaction of the particular ends of 
others.  In this way actions that are selfishly motivated create something of objective 
value, what Hegel calls the “universal permanent capital,” “which contains for each the 
opportunity to take part in it by the exercise of his education and skill in order to be 
guaranteed his livelihood – while what he thus earns by means of his work maintains 
and increases the general capital” (PR §199).  This universal permanent capital is the 
common good that in turn redeems our selfishly motivated actions in our own eyes. 
 This is at least how civil society is, according to its own self-understanding, 
supposed to operate – a self-understanding articulated in the tradition of political 
economy and captured most memorably in Adam Smith’s metaphor of the “invisible 
hand.”  In Hegel’s rendition, the story is one in which “each man in earning, producing, 
and enjoying on his own account is eo ipso producing and earning for the enjoyment of 
everyone else” (PR §199).  But heeding this principle proves to have an unanticipated 
consequence.  Although such a system may improve the material conditions for a 
certain class of individuals, it at the same time relegates many others to conditions of 
utter destitution.  So civil society is in fact not capable of providing benefits for all.  
The issue is not just that it cannot guarantee the livelihood, let alone improve the 
standard of living of every individual.  What is far worse is that it ends up harming the 
social order at large, because the rabble it creates becomes unfit to participate in any of 
!
171 
its other institutions, especially the state.139  In short, civil society produces a 
constituency that has no stake in the survival of this order and may even come to wish 
for its demise.140 
 Much like those we find in the Phenomenology of Spirit, this type of contradiction 
is not a logical or formal one, but takes a distinctly practical form.  There I 
characterized the relevant contradiction as an ineradicable discrepancy between norm 
(knowledge-for-itself) and practice (knowledge-in-itself), but here we seem to be 
dealing with a slightly more complex set of conflicting elements.  One could say that 
the contradiction is in a sense between two norms – the principle of particularity and 
that of universality – rather than simply between a norm and its practice.  What makes 
such a contradiction nonetheless practical is that we discover through experience that 
we are unable to do full justice to both norms without violating either one or the other, 
and in this way introducing objective problems for ourselves.  Another way to put it is 
to say that upholding both to the fullest extent proves to be unsustainable. 
 I am aware that it has become increasingly popular to associate failures in forms 
of life with the notion of “unsustainability,”141 and I admit that there might be some 
dangers in identifying them too closely.  One reason to reject such language is that it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!139!According to Hegel, “When a large mass falls below the standard of a certain subsistence level…and when 
there is thus a loss of a sense of right, of righteousness, and of the honor of maintaining oneself through 
one’s own activity and work, this brings about the creation of a rabble” (PR §244). !
140 This is especially clear in the Addition to §244, in which Hegel defines the rabble in terms of its socially 
destructive frame of mind: “Poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by 
the disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, 
etc.” 
 
141 In his most recent book, Hegel’s Naturalism, Terry Pinkard speaks of alienation in terms of 




sounds too ecological, as if the issue were primarily an exhaustion of material resources, 
which is not always the case.  Hegel does say that civil society is not “rich enough” to 
check the excess of poverty, but I take this to be a metaphorical allusion to the dearth 
of its normative resources, its inability to overcome this contradiction without 
sacrificing either the right of particularity or that of universality for the other.  Another 
reason might be the indeterminacy of this notion of unsustainability.  The worry is that 
it lacks a criterion of application and so cannot adequately distinguish between what 
merely seems unsustainable and what is truly so.  For example, some men might not 
feel at home in feminist familial arrangements, might even claim that they find them 
inhospitable, without thereby indicating that such arrangements are in any way unfree.  
Or vice versa, some women may feel perfectly at home in the midst of a patriarchal 
family structure.  But all this seems to show is that we need a more determinate notion 
of unsustainability, one that does not hinge on subjective feeling alone.  Once it is 
objectively circumscribed, I think this notion can tell us something about the nature of 
contradictions, namely that these are bound to find a practical expression.  Moreover, 
this way of speaking remains true to Hegel’s spirit, for Hegel is explicitly concerned 
with the livability of forms of social life, with their longevity and capacity for 
regeneration.142 
 Most importantly, this move can shed significant light on the space left open to 
critical reflection.  It implies, first of all, that it is often not easy to see that two 
principles are incompatible until we try to live by them.  Although we may 
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142Recall the passage from the “Preface” of the Philosophy of Right in which Hegel speaks of shapes of life 
having “grown old” and immune to (philosophical) “rejuvenation.” 
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retrospectively think that their incompatibility should have been obvious from the start, 
we now know this only because we tried it out and discovered that it cannot work.  To 
return to our example, it is the phenomenon of poverty that brings to light the 
irresolvable tension between the principle of particularity and that of universality, at 
least within their capitalist interpretation.  If we merely contemplate the theoretical 
foundations of the market economy in abstraction from real economic practices, we 
may never come to suspect that there is anything wrong with its mode of self-
justification and that there is no “invisible hand” ensuring the common good.  This 
goes some way toward explaining why the political economists writing before Hegel’s 
time, and so before the actual emergence of a rabble, lacked his foresight.  And it also 
goes some way toward explaining why it is the further unfolding of capitalism and 
industrialization that enabled Marx to see Hegel’s short-sightedness in turn. 
 A further implication is not only that we discover such contradictions, should 
we choose to contemplate our norms, but that we cannot avoid discovering them.  This 
is a crucial aspect of what it means to call a normative commitment unsustainable, and 
one that is rarely emphasized.  To put this slightly differently, if certain practices of 
ours are unethical through and through, rather than contingently flawed or defective, 
this will manifest itself in undeniable ways by generating the kinds of problems that 
systematically thwart our efforts to inhabit them.  We can think of these problems as 
“crises” of varying depth and scope.  And in moments of crisis, it is not reflection that 
first brings contradictions to light.  Rather, it is contradictions that initiate reflection, 
for it is in the face of them that we find ourselves pressed to reevaluate the conflicting 
norms.  Critical reflection, in short, is a response to the unsustainability of a 
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contradictory way of life, and thus beckoned by our very inability to live it out.  This is 
also clear in the crisis that emergence of the rabble at least threatens to provoke, for 
what emerges is a class of “criminals” who do not even recognize the very laws 
according to which they are to be punished.  And in a sense they are right to reject their 
authority, since these laws protect only their formal rights, but fail to guarantee 
anything like genuine freedom. 
 It might be instructive to look at some examples that Hegel did not himself 
consider, such as the critique of racial segregation in the early days of the civil rights 
movement.  At that time segregation was publicly justified in terms of the notorious 
doctrine of “separate but equal,”143 which roughly implies that having two sets of 
institutions separated along racial lines does not violate the equal status of each 
American citizen because both sets can in principle be equally good.  While it does not 
assume that they are equally good, nor does it offer a positive reason in favor of 
segregation, this doctrine is meant to vindicate certain social practices by showing them 
to cohere with our deeper commitment to equality.  It was after decades of actual 
segregation that this vindication came to look conceptually incoherent.  The Supreme 
Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education points this out in striking terms, for it 
states that “in the field of public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no 
place.  Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”  We can make better 
sense of this realization, I think, if we look to the role that the experience of 
segregation came to play.  It is precisely this experience of consistently and vastly 
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unequal facilities that demonstrated the incoherence of the doctrine, proving that 
separate is in fact inherently unequal. 
 The official argument seems to be a consequentialist one, namely, that racial 
segregation harms Black children because they are being educated in a context in which 
they are made to feel inferior on the basis of their race.  This has detrimental effects on 
their academic performance, thus preventing them from achieving equal results as their 
white peers, even if both sets of educational institutions were to have the equal material 
resources.  The problem with this argument is that, stated in purely consequentialist 
terms, it seems to be an empirical thesis, one that counter-evidence could in principle 
challenge.  But I think that closer examination reveals that the plausibility of this 
argument rests on a deeper claim about the nature of segregation, namely, that 
segregation along racial lines is always motivated by an implicit racist assumption about 
the superiority of one race over another.  This means that segregation could never 
achieve equality because it presupposes inequality. 
 An even clearer example is perhaps that of slavery, since we do not think that 
its legitimacy as a practice depends on consequentialist considerations in the first place.  
Even if it turns out that slavery proves beneficial to, say, the material wellbeing of 
slaves, we would still deem it unethical.  And this is not only our current perspective on 
the practices, for even those who practiced it seemed to want to justify what they did in 
principled terms, for they denied that slaves were members of the same “moral 
community” as masters.  At the same time, it was precisely this very same evaluative 
framework that was being invoked by abolitionists to criticize this institution.  This 
moral community was being demarcated in religious and political terms that looked to 
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be at odds with the very distinction between slaves and nonslaves.  Christianity, for 
one, espoused universalist values about the irreducible and equal moral status of each 
human being in the eyes of God.  But even political values, such as those expressed in 
the Declaration of Independence, provide us with a different set of immanent 
resources on which to draw in criticizing the practice of slavery.144 
 As I already mentioned, it looks as if Hegel held slavery to involve a rather 
explicit practical contradiction, because it took for granted a conception of freedom on 
the part of the master that it could not in principle deliver.  But even if we look at 
slavery in a richer historical context such as the American one, it looks as if its practices 
fell into equally unavoidable forms of contradictoriness.  This incoherence is perhaps 
best expressed by Frederick Douglass, who pointed out that there is no need to argue 
that slaves are human beings, since those who own them already implicitly admit their 
humanity. 
 Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man?  That point is conceded already.  
 Nobody doubts it.  The slaveholders themselves acknowledge it in the enactment of 
 laws for their government.  They acknowledge it when they punish disobedience on 
 the part of the slave.  There are seventy-two crimes in the State of Virginia, which, if 
 committed by a black man, (no matter how ignorant he be), subject him to the 
 punishment of death; while only two of the same crimes will subject a white man to the 
 like punishment.  What is this but the acknowledgment that the slave is a moral, 
 intellectual, and responsible being?  The manhood of the slave is conceded.  It is 
 admitted in the fact that Southern statue books are covered with enactments 
 forbidding, under severe fines and penalties, the teaching of the slave to read or to 
 write.  When you can point to any such laws, with reference to the beasts of the field, 
 then I may consent to argue the manhood of the slave.145 
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144 For an interesting discussion of the role of such internal criticisms in the context of American slavery, see 
Cohen, “The Arc of the Moral Universe”.  Cohen’s concern here is with “moral explanations,” namely, with 
explaining the demise of a certain practice by invoking its immorality or injustice.  But ultimately Cohen 
denies that internal criticism can go far enough in identifying what is wrong with a practice like slavery. 
 




And if no one denies the humanity of a slave, then no one can consistently deny a slave 
an equal moral status.146 
 What these examples of practical contradictions indicate is the self-sufficiency 
of immanent critique, that modern ethical life already contains everything we need to 
discover its shortcomings.  But even if we concede this point, overcoming such 
shortcomings can seem like a separate task altogether.  So one could accept that 
immanent critique so understood suffices for exposing what needs to be revised, while 
still doubting whether it likewise suffices for guiding subsequent revisions and ensuring 
that they are conducted in a rational manner, rather than arbitrary and haphazard one.  
This is sometimes cited as a reason why ordinary reflective practices need to be 
supplemented by a critical theory that steers them in the right way.147   Either way, I think 
it is important that we not draw too sharp a wedge between the diagnostic and the 
reformative aspects of critique and try to keep in mind that for Hegel encountering 
problems is never a discovery only of what not to do, of how not to live.  The very 
notion of “determinate negation,” which refers to the transformative moment in 
immanent critique, is meant to connote the positive content criticism itself introduces.  
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146 I should note that, unlike Hegel’s diagnosis, which is meant to challenge the conception of freedom 
underlying slavery, Douglass’ diagnosis looks more like a form of internal criticism rather than immanent 
critique in the strict sense.  For Douglass does not intend to challenge the relevant account of humanity, only 
to show that it needs to be applied in a more consistent manner. !
147 This seems to be one of the issues at stake in the debate between Axel Honneth and Michael Walzer 
regarding the relationship between theory and critique.  While Michael Walzer insists that all critique requires 
are virtues like “courage, compassion, and a good eye,” Axel Honneth contends that these are not enough.  
See for example Walzer (2009).  Although I lean more in the direction of Walzer’s position, I want to remain 
agnostic on the question of whether theoretical resources may be needed to adequately analyze and perhaps 
even resolve the kinds of contradictions that first provoke critical reflection.  All I want to argue here is that 
critical reflection should not be modeled on the activity of normative theorizing – whether of the kind Hegel 




In other words, our failures already point beyond themselves and indicate how to revise 
our principles in a way that incorporates these critical lessons.  Even though such 
revisions may beset by problems of their own, Hegel is nevertheless committed to 
regarding them as improvements, and to regarding the very movement of immanent 
critique as an “educative” process in which we learn more and more about what to do 
and how to live.148 
 Of course, it is one thing to illustrate the progressive dimension of this 
revisionary process in the context of the Phenomenology, which reconstructs revisions that 
have already been made and are now behind us.  Obviously the Phenomenology benefits 
from its retrospective standpoint.  In cases like that of the capitalist market, however, 
figuring out how to resolve the relevant contradiction is more difficult and can involve 
false starts.  Hegel himself did not exactly rise to the challenge, for the solutions he 
entertains (and for the most part abandons) are meant to leave civil society and its 
mode of self-justification intact.149  This is clearly unsatisfactory even by his own lights, 
for once we learn that the single-minded pursuit of self-interest conflicts not only with 
its own espoused justification, but with the survival of the whole social order, it 
becomes clear that the very principles at work in civil society are in need of serious 
reconsideration. 
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148 Hegel’s term for this learning process that unfolds in the Phenomenology is Bildung. 
 
149 These proposals include charity, taxation, and public works, all of which Hegel ultimately rejects as 
suitable solutions to the problem.   But to be fair, Hegel does follow up his discussion of poverty with some 
amendments intended to introduce regulations into the free market.  For example, he seems to introduce 
corporations, which are something like unions, in part as a measure against poverty.  But as promising as this 
proposal may otherwise be, I do not see how it is supposed to provide comfort to the rabble, whose 




 But however serious the needed reconsideration might be, Hegel remains 
convinced that it will not require that we give up on individual freedom of the sort the 
market sanctions.  Hegel, unlike Marx, is unwilling to dispense with the principle of 
particularity altogether, no matter how precarious and hazardous it proves to be.  In 
addition to his more systematic reasons for this, he thinks that the cost of doing so 
would be too high.  At the same time, I do not think that he can rule out – at least on 
any principled grounds – radical changes in our understanding of freedom, including 
freedom of the individual kind.  He simply does not believe that we have so far 
encountered good grounds for doing so.  Poverty is, after all, only a bi-product of 
particularity, and not a whole-scale inversion of its basic aspiration.  To be more 
precise, it is not as if every self-interested act results in poverty and so ends up with the 
exact opposite of what it hoped to achieve.  In this respect, this modern contradiction 
does differ from that of sense-certainty, and even of beautiful ethical life.  And Hegel 
seems to trust that all modern contradictions will follow suit.  They may be far from 
innocuous and might cause problems, perhaps even crises that destabilize our 
institutions, but they are unlikely to demonstrate that the various principles these 
institutions are meant to realize can only ever shape unfree lives. 
 More recently there has emerged another model of reflective criticism that 
curiously resembles immanent critique, though to call it a “model” is a bit exaggerated.  
What I have in mind is John McDowell’s recurring metaphor of Neurath’s ship.  
McDowell invokes it in order to stress that we are very well able to criticize our ethical 
standards from a standpoint inside those same standards.  In his words, “the key point 
is that for such reflective criticism, the appropriate image is Neurath’s, in which a sailor 
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overhauls his ship while it is afloat”150.  But as “immanent” as this form of criticism 
may appear, I worry that it is ultimately much narrower than the one we have been 
elaborating.  Though of course it is only a metaphor, it threatens to make normative 
change seem like an essentially piecemeal endeavor – plank by plank, so to speak – and 
in this way obscure the extent to which a society’s most fundamental principle, and 
consequently its entire “scheme of values,” could come to be called into question and 
prove to be in need of an overhaul. 
 In fact we witness many such overhauls in the Phenomenology.  As Hegel puts it in 
its “Preface,” “the life of spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself 
untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it.  It 
wins its truth only when, in absolute dismemberment, it finds itself” (PG §32).  If spirit 
is not to shrink from death, it cannot become too attached to the planks beneath its 
feet, but must be prepared to tear the ship apart and tumble into the sea.  This is what 
happened to many of our predecessors, most vividly to the participants of beautiful 
ethical life.  The lesson they impart is that there are certain contexts in which ethical 
failures run too deep to make piecemeal revision fruitful.  In such contexts, social 
criticism must be of a radical sort, even when it voices its grievances from an embedded 
perspective.151  The strength of immanent critique is that it can accommodate this 
lesson because it can admit variations in degree and range from preservationist to 
revolutionary, which are for Hegel anyway extreme ends on a shared spectrum.  What 
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constitutes their continuity, however, is that we always continue to be committed to 
freedom, even when we alter our understanding of it in fundamental ways. 
 At the same time, I think this comparison to Neurath is not wholly misguided.  
One could say that we moderns in particular have much in common with the sailors on 
his ship, never overhauling our social world at one fell swoop, but repairing it one 
plank at a time.  As long as we remain oriented toward practical contradictions, our 
activity still counts as an exercise of immanent critique, even if it does not call for 
radical revisions.  In fact Neurath’s ship is in a certain respect an especially apt 
metaphor for critical reflection in the modern social order, and not just because the 
problems we face are not so severe that they cannot be solved through gradual reform.  
What it highlights is the peculiar structure of this order, which is no longer reliant upon 
one foundational norm, but incorporates and negotiates a variety of conceptions of 
freedom whose relationship to each other remains an open question.  But if we had to 
pick one value that we moderns prize above all else, it would probably be nothing other 
than critical reflection itself. 
  
V.  Criticism 
There are various objections one could raise against the picture I have sketched on 
Hegel’s behalf.  For example, one could question whether it is really true that the kinds 
of problems that surface in modern ethical life, including poverty, do not call for a 
more radical reevaluation of our most basic values, say, of the value we accord to 
individual freedom.  Some may want to deny this, if for no other reason than the sheer 
fact that our social world is already quite different from the one Hegel deemed so stable 
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in the Philosophy of Right.  One could also question whether we have good reasons to 
believe that the revisions available to an immanent critic will be sufficiently rational, 
rather than a blind groping in the dark.  For example, when faced with two conflicting 
principles, like that of particularity and that of universality, can Hegel tell us how to 
adjudicate between them, how to decide which one to restrict or alter, and in what way?   
 While I grant that these are all legitimate concerns, I want to focus instead on a 
third source of worry.  Throughout this chapter I have stressed that we need not 
actively hunt for objects of criticism – that we should in fact refrain from doing so – 
for should there be something wrong with our social practices, this will reveal itself to 
us in the form of practical contradictions.  In other words, I have claimed that critical 
reflection needs to be immanently motivated, called for by the emergence of actual, and 
not merely possible, problems.  And as I already indicated, I take this to be a significant 
aspect of what it means to call the relevant form of critique “immanent.”  It is not only 
that standards of assessment are taken from the object to be assessed, but also that the 
adoption of a critical attitude is provoked by objective problems that arise in the midst 
of a social order. 
 Now, it seems like we can accept this restriction on critique only if we also 
accept a distinctly Hegelian brand of optimism, a conviction that the unethical is 
uninhabitable or unlivable – in short, unsustainable.  And Hegel does seem to hold 
something like the view that an unethical practice will sooner or later reveal itself as 
such to its participants because it will produce problems that will make its perpetuation, 
if not practically impossible, at least increasingly difficult.  Of course Hegel is fully 
aware that merely recognizing something as unethical is still a long way away from 
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social change.  But even if there are mechanisms of evasion and denial that prevent us 
from heeding our better judgments, a Hegelian optimist nevertheless trusts that the 
unethical cannot go completely undetected by those who are attempting to live it out. 
 While I take this to be a crucial, original, as well as attractive aspect of Hegel’s 
view, and one that I think is in the end worth defending, I would like at least to 
mention one context to which such optimism may not be so easily extended.   In his 
novel Elizabeth Costello (2003), J. M. Coetzee describes an old woman and renowned 
writer who is haunted by our treatment of animals and believes herself to be utterly 
alone in her qualms.  When invited to give a lecture at the university where her son 
happens to teach, she decides to speak on this topic.  Given how divisive the issue of 
animals tends to be, this makes for a very trying visit, full of confrontations with the 
university faculty as well as with her daughter-in-law – a currently unemployed 
philosopher of mind – who has little patience for vegetarians.  On the way back to the 
airport, her son finally asks her why she has “become so intense about the animal 
business.”  To this question, she gives the following reply: 
  It’s that I no longer know where I am.  I seem to move around perfectly easily 
 among  people, to have perfectly normal relations with them.  Is it possible, I ask 
 myself, that all of them are participants in a crime of stupefying proportions?  Am I 
 fantasizing it all?  I must be mad!  Yet every day I see the evidence.  The very 
 people I suspect produce the evidence, exhibit it, offer it to me.  Corpses.  Fragments 
 of corpses that they have bought for money. 
  It is as if I were to visit friends, and to make some polite remark about the 
 lamp in  their living room, and they were to say, “Yes, it’s nice, isn’t it?  Polish-Jewish 
 skin it’s made of, we find that’s best, the skins of young Polish-Jewish virgins.”  And 
 then I go to the bathroom and the soap wrapper says, “Treblinka – 100% human 
 stearate.”  Am I dreaming, I say to myself?  What kind of house is this?   
  Yet I’m not dreaming.  I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the children’s, 
 and I see only kindness, human kindness.  Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a 
 mountain out of a molehill.  This is life.  Everyone else comes to terms with it, why 
 can’t you?  Why can’t you?152 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




 There is much to say about this passage, and much to object to.  Thus it is 
important to keep in mind that Coeztee is not treating Elizabeth’s Costello’s outlook as 
authoritative, and she is certainly not let off the hook for drawing the above 
comparison.  But my interest in this passage has less to do with her specific evaluation 
of eating meat and its ethical repercussions.  Rather, I would like to consider it as a kind 
of thought experiment that explores the plausibility of such a scenario, one in which we 
partake in a “crime of stupefying proportions” without any inkling of doing so.  What 
Elizabeth Costello describes is watching people perpetuate such a crime while never 
detecting a hint of reservation in their demeanor.  All she sees in their faces is human 
kindness.   And the practice in question seems to operate smoothly without generating 
difficulties for us and in this way inviting reservations in the first place.  In short, there 
seem to be no problems, let alone crises, in sight that could compromise its 
sustainability and throw it into a critical light.  Regardless of whether we ultimately 
regard Elizabeth Costello as some kind moral genius or (as she herself suspects) as a bit 
mad, her account of her own sense of alienation raises the broader question of whether 
it is possible to conform seamlessly to an unethical practice without ever coming across 
grounds for suspicion. 
 Though I want to leave this broader question unsettled, I do think it is no 
coincidence that it arises with respect to our treatment of animals.  Since they are not 
fellow members in social life, it may look easier to mistreat them without giving rise to 





optimism is completely unwarranted, even in this context.   Here I would like to cite a 
slightly different example, from Jonathan Safran Foer’s book Eating Animals.  There he 
describes his experience of accompanying an activist to a factory farm at night to save a 
handful of injured animals.  Although there is no one anywhere in sight, they find the 
doors to the factory to be locked.  Foer writes, “In the three years I will spend 
immersed in animal agriculture, nothing will unsettle me more than the locked doors.  
Nothing will better capture the whole sad business of factory farming.  And nothing 
will more strongly convince me to write this book.”153  The fact that the meat industry 
is intent on keeping so many of its practices concealed can be seen as an implicit 
acknowledgment that these would be threatened by exposure, because were we fully 
aware of what is being done to animals behind locked doors, we would find it 
increasingly difficult to continue eating them.  But we seem no more eager to find out 
than the industry is eager to reveal.  I nevertheless cannot help but think that any set of 
practices so contingent on opacity can at best lead a precarious life. 
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The Hegel I have presented so far maintains that we are able to determine what to do 
in specific situations as well as which basic principles are worth upholding, all without 
his help.  We can do this by reflecting in the very ways we ordinarily do.  As the 
foregoing three chapters have argued, Hegel’s picture of ethical life confirms that we 
have everything we would need in order to engage in reflection at various levels, 
including reflection of the critical variety.  More specifically, we already have access to 
the standards necessary for evaluating and correcting our social practices as well as their 
underlying norms.  Ethical life so conceived is thoroughly self-sufficient, replete with all 
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the resources its members require to overcome its own shortcomings.  But such a 
picture would consequently obviate any additional need for philosophy itself. 
 It is undeniable that Hegel conceives of philosophy as not merely one reflective 
enterprise among others, but as reflection par excellence.  Philosophy is so paradigmatic 
because it is the highest form of self-reflection.  As Hegel puts it, it is “reflective 
thinking, which has thoughts as such as its content and brings them to consciousness” 
(E1 §2).  What this means is perhaps more perspicuous in the context of his Logic, 
which is engaged in thinking about thinking itself.  But this description holds no less 
true of the philosophy of right, though what it would mean in the latter context awaits 
clarification.  As an instance of self-reflection nonetheless, it is one that from the 
standpoint of ethical living looks superfluous at best, for it seems to have nothing to 
contribute to our knowledge of the good, which we possess as adequately habituated 
and sufficiently active social participants.  This leads to the surprising conclusion that 
Hegel the philosopher has turned out to be something of a quietist. 
Although I will argue that Hegel does not in the end consider philosophy to be 
superfluous to ethical living, I admit that this assessment of philosophy is at first glance 
confirmed by his cautionary remarks against its critical or revisionary pretensions.  As I 
have previously pointed out, in the Philosophy of Right Hegel warns that philosophers 
should not seek to instruct the world about how it ought to be and even ridicules those 
who believe themselves capable of providing such instruction.  He claims that its 
proper aim is to enhance our understanding of how the social world is by grasping its 
inner rationality.  Even if it is not immediately clear what this would mean, Hegel 
clearly means to circumscribe the philosopher’s task in such a way as to exclude the 
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issuing of practical precepts.  Philosophers have no business telling us which principles 
we ought to live by, let alone which laws we ought to institute. 
At the same time, Hegel does admit that philosophy has in the modern world 
become a public practice, and this is indeed part of his argument against its prescriptive 
ambitions.  Thus he notes that it is “even less surprising if the government has finally 
drawn attention to such philosophizing, since by us philosophy is not, like by the 
Greeks, exercised as a private art, but rather it has a public existence that touches its 
audience” (PR, 21).  This suggests that Hegel thinks the state is rightfully concerned 
whenever philosophy begins to harbor the aspiration to prescribe new and improved 
laws.  Then it is not only overstepping its own boundaries, but also stepping onto the 
state’s turf.  But even though Hegel’s acknowledgment of the publicity of philosophical 
reflection on one level confirms his supposed quietism, it also raises a serious difficulty 
for his position.  If philosophy is indeed a public practice, it is in need of a 
correspondingly practical justification.  By this I do not mean that philosophy needs to 
demonstrate its utility for the attainment of some extrinsic end, that it must prove to be 
strictly speaking useful.  Rather, what I mean is that a philosophy that claims to be 
about right must make a contribution to right, even if its contribution is merely to offer 
a better understanding of it.  Another way to put this would be to say that a philosophy 
of right must be of some ethical value, and since it is a reflective endeavor, this value 
probably involves yielding some kind of insight into the good. 
Hans Friedrich Fulda has raised a version of this question in his paper “The 
Rights of Philosophy”: “For what are the rights and obligations of philosophy, as a 
social and political ‘institution,’ with respect to making its presence felt within the realm 
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of actuality?”154  Fulda notes that this question has rarely been raised because it is 
assumed that philosophy has exclusively theoretical ends and so need not have a 
practical upshot.  He disputes this by pointing out that the rights and obligations that 
distinguish philosophical reflection must be conceived in ethical terms.  But even though 
Fulda concedes that this cannot amount to asking how philosophy can serve the ends 
of the state (since both philosophy and ethical life must be autonomous ends that are 
pursued for their own sake), he ultimately ties this ethical task of philosophical 
reflection too closely to ethical upbringing, making it an integral part an individual’s 
Bildungsprozess.  This strikes me as implausible, because it grants philosophy a task that is 
perhaps too integral, from the practical point of view.  Indeed I think Hegel wants to 
sever philosophy from Bildung proper and introduce it into the picture only once this 
process is, from the practical point of view, finished.  Moreover Fulda ultimately ties 
philosophy too closely to social criticism, claiming that it cultivates a will that is 
oriented toward reforming the actual world.  Although more needs to be said about the 
proper relation between philosophy and social criticism, we have already seen that it 
cannot be as straightforward as this seems to suggest – that philosophers themselves 
make the best social critics. 
Though this does not immediately answer our question, in programmatic 
statements like the following Hegel intimates that philosophy’s proper task is to tell us 
what we already know, “to make the implicit explicit,”155 so to speak: 
The business of philosophy consists only in bringing explicitly to consciousness that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 Fulda (2004), 21. 
 





which people held to be valid about thought from time immemorial.  Thus philosophy 
establishes nothing new; what we have here brought forth through our reflection is 
 already everyone’s immediate presupposition (E1 §22A). 
 
Although this seems like a humble enough program, and one that steers clear of 
prescriptive ambitions, it isn’t clear why it is worth undertaking, especially for the 
author of a text like the Philosophy of Right.  What kind of project is this?  Why even 
bother to make explicit by means of reflection what everyone already takes for granted 
without it?  In short, wherein lies the ethical value of philosophical reflection of this 
kind? 
This question becomes all the more pressing when we consider that 
philosophical reflection looks to be not merely superfluous to living well, but 
potentially harmful to this enterprise.  I suggested that Hegel shares Williams’ worry 
that reflection in general is governed by a drive toward theory that tends to impoverish 
our ethical knowledge – a drive which culminates in philosophical theorizing.  For 
Hegel this is the very drive that gives rise to abstractions that distort the complex 
character of ethical life.  In fact, this is one of Hegel’s main targets in his early essay on 
Natural Law, and in that context he cites what he calls “scientific empiricism” as an 
example.  In its effort to ground ethical life, this method abstracts one of its empirically 
given aspects and confuses what is in fact only a part with the whole,156 making it 
“prescriptive as the essence of the relation” (NL, 422).  But this drive ultimately 
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156 He writes, “But the totality of the organic is precisely what cannot be thereby attained, and the remainder 
of the relation, excluded from the determinate aspect that was selected, falls under the dominion of this 
aspect which is elevated to be the essence and purpose of the relation” (NL, 422).  As an example he cites the 
effort to explain punishment by appealing to only one the many social uses this practice has, such as moral 
reform or deterrence, as its justificatory ground, and thus making only one of its aspects “essential” at the 




transgresses empirical constraints altogether, refusing to acknowledge its continued 
indebtedness to experience.  According to Hegel, it is experience that provides us with 
the specific content of ethical life, and this content is in turn “being corrupted and 
perverted by philosophizing” (NL, 430).  Thus he paints the following picture: 
This restrictedness of concepts, the fixing of specific characteristics, the elevating of 
one selected aspect of appearance to universality and granting dominion over the 
others, has in recent years styled itself not just ‘theory,’ but ‘philosophy,’ and when it 
rose to emptier abstractions and seized on purer negations such as freedom, pure will, 
humanity, etc., styled itself ‘metaphysics’ (NL, 429).157 
 
By the time Hegel writes the Philosophy of Right, he is no longer preoccupied with the 
pitfalls of the empirical method per se.  Rather, his worry is that philosophical 
reflection now swings free of any regard for our practices as they are – something 
empiricism at least remained committed to – thus generating a conception of freedom 
so abstract and consequently distorted that none of our practices can meet its standard. 
So how is the Philosophy of Right able to avoid these destructive effects and to put 
reflection to ethical use?  Hegel’s ambitions in this respect are quite high.  The 
Philosophy of Right is meant not only to avoid these effects, but even to reverse them.  To 
put this slightly differently, Hegel understands his own project as one of reflection’s 
self-overcoming, reflection putting itself to rest.  He moreover suggests that this self-
overcoming can only occur when philosophy – in this case a practical philosophy 
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157 Hegel adds that empiricism “rightly demands that such a philosophy should take its bearings from 
experience.  It rightly sticks to its obstinate opposition to such an artificial framework of principles” (NL, 
430).  In other words, empiricism is already engaged in a certain form of abstraction, but it is preferable to 
philosophical theories that recognize no constraint imposed by experience.  At the same time, both are 
ultimately manifestations of the same basic drive.  So Hegel concludes that, “when empiricism seems to go to 
war with theory, it usually turns out that the one like the other is a vision already contaminated and 




concerned with the subject matter of right – becomes a science or Wissenschaft.158  As he 
rhetorically asks, “How in this crowding of truths is that which is neither old nor new, 
but rather that which is enduring, supposed to rise above these formless considerations 
that keep going back and forth – how is it supposed to distinguish and preserve itself 
except through science” (PR, 13)? 
In this chapter I will focus on what Hegel means in calling for a “scientific” 
approach to ethics and why he thinks what he is offering is not just another ethical 
theory, which is a disparaging term in his book.  Although there will be more to say 
about this, one significant difference for Hegel is that a science of right is not in the 
business of providing us with ethical knowledge of the first order.  And it cannot be, if 
Hegel thinks this knowledge is already our own.  As Hegel stresses, science is not 
concerned with discovering and propagating “new truths.”  Rather, its primary function 
is to lend our ethical knowledge a particular form.  This function is neither superfluous 
nor idle, for it is this formal task of philosophical reflection that is meant to deliver us 
from the dangers associated with theorizing.   
So considering its scientific aims will in turn allow us to explore another way in 
which philosophy can contribute to ethical life, even when it fails to deliver practical 
guidance.  The key to understanding this alternative approach lies in philosophy’s 
modest role of “making explicit” what we already know.  Although this is bound to 
sound rather cryptic at this point, I want to propose that we can best make sense of this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 Although I intend to follow the standard translation of Wissenschaft as “science,” I want to caution against 
assuming that this term is synonymous to the one in English.  Wissenschaft in German is a much broader 
concept that encompasses all forms of theoretical knowledge, including the human and social “sciences”.  
And in Hegel’s vocabulary in particular, Wissenschaft has a distinctive meaning that is idiosyncratic to his 




role if we think of philosophical reflection on the model of “recollection,” a model 
Hegel outlines and illustrates in the Phenomenology of Spirit.  This is not an 
uncontroversial proposal, for the method in the Phenomenology is more frequently 
contrasted with that of Hegel’s systematic texts like the Philosophy of Right.  I will argue 
that there is a greater affinity between them than has been acknowledged. 
I do want to make one preliminary remark about thinking of Hegel’s method 
along the lines of recollection.  In this respect Hegel’s conception of philosophy bears 
striking resemblance to that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who characterized its end as that 
of “collecting reminders.”159  Both Hegel and Wittgenstein stress that collecting 
reminders is a very difficult undertaking, even if we are in the end only trying to remind 
ourselves of something we already know.  But for Hegel this difficulty has to do with 
more than the depths of our forgetfulness, for what we seek to recall is not simply lying 
around fully formed and ready to be unearthed.  Recollection is so demanding because 
it cannot retrieve this knowledge without transforming it, giving it a form it did not 
previously possess, even though this form turns out to be the only one that is truly 
appropriate to its content.  This is why, according to Hegel, “the thought of right is not 
whatever everybody has first hand, rather rightful thinking [das richtige Denken] is the 
knowing and recognizing of the thing [das Kennen und Erkennen der Sache], and our 
cognition should therefore be scientific [wissenschaftlich]” (PR, 17n).  So the knowledge 
attainable by a science of right is not a mere repetition of truths everyone is sick of 
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159 “The work of the philosopher is a collection of reminders for a particular purpose” [“Die Arbeit des 
Philosophen ist ein Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu einem bestimmten Zweck”] (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations §127).  Another striking similarity between Wittgenstein and Hegel is that they both 




hearing, nor is it simply a repetition of truths everyone once knew and has since 
forgotten.  It is Hegel’s claim that to make the implicit explicit is to give the rational 
content of ethical life the rational form it merits.  My main objective in what follows is 
to shed some light on what this means and why it might be worth undertaking. 
I will begin by considering whether a science of right is a normative endeavor, 
or whether its aims are exclusively descriptive.  In other words, is Hegel interested in 
saying something about the goodness of our practices, or merely in identifying what 
they are?  Our answer to this question will hinge on how we understand Hegel’s use of 
the term “rational,” whether Hegel takes it to involve merely intelligibility, or whether 
his interest is really in justification.  I will argue that Hegel’s project is normative in a 
sense, because it does seek to offer a justification of its object, though his object is an 
already idealized self-understanding.  What this means is that the relevant difference 
between an ethical theory and a science of right hinges less on their aims, and perhaps 
also less on their content, and more on the method each employs.  The next step is to 
explain this method by considering its relationship to Hegel’s conception of 
systematicity.  My guiding question will be to what extend the Philosophy of Right forms a 
systematic body of knowledge, and to what extent it depends on Hegel’s broader 
systematic ambitions laid out in the Encyclopedia.  Finally, I will consider the general 
structure of Hegel’s procedure on analogy with his method in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
assessing how far his project of recollection can help us understand the kinds of 





I. Evaluation and Description 
In order to get a preliminary sense of what a science of right might be, we should first 
distinguish it from its various competitors, especially from what Hegel regards as a 
theoretical approach to right.  At first glance we might suspect that, while an ethical 
theory is normative and seeks to offer some kind of evaluation of its object of study, a 
science of right does not.  In particular, ethical theories presumably tell us which 
principles to employ in deliberation and action, while it may look like a science of right 
is meant to provide us with a description or perhaps an explanation of how we as a 
matter of fact act and deliberate, without asking whether we are right to do so. 
Hegel’s proclamations that a science in the relevant sense seeks nothing over 
and above a grasp of the social world as it is have led some to conclude that Hegel’s 
practical philosophy is in fact not practical at all.  Kierkegaard, for example, famously 
criticized Hegel for telling us only how life should be understood, not how it ought to 
be lived, while others have argued that Hegel is offering what is better described as a 
“sociology of ethics.”160  Although adopting a descriptive or explanatory attitude 
towards our social practices could have some alienating or disruptive effects on our 
participation in them,161 it does not seem to be as problematic as the standpoint of a 
normative theory, which has direct implications for our continued commitment to 
them.  For example, any theory that tells us what genuine freedom consists in has the 
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160 Walsh (1969), 11, 55. !
161 Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality is an example of a broadly explanatory theory with critical consequences.  
Nietzsche claims that he is merely reconstructing the origins of our moral conceptions, but in doing so he is 
simultaneously undermining the kind of justificatory basis we assumed they had – for example by showing 




power to alienate us from those parts of our world that turn out to be in tension with 
the requirements of freedom.  So this might be one way to avoid the negative 
repercussions of reflection, namely, by refusing to engage in the evaluative sort.  Even 
though such a theory of ethical life may still have negative repercussions for our 
practical knowledge, at least it does not purport to teach us which among our principles 
we ought to heed. 
In short, a science of right so understood could still be characterized as a 
theory, but more akin to the kind natural science provides, where there is no question 
of whether the laws of nature are justified.  In fact Hegel invites this comparison when 
he advises that philosophy investigate the natural and ethical worlds in similar ways.162  
He recommends that we begin by regarding the ethical world as rational in the same 
sense as we do the natural world.  When we study nature, we assume that it is already 
governed by a set of laws that lend it a certain internally coherent structure, and we 
admit that our task is to discover what this structure is.  Those who study the domain 
of right are to adopt a similar starting point and seek to identify and explain the laws 
that already structure the social world under investigation. 
But even though this convergence in starting points exploits a favorable 
contrast between giving a description of how things stand and offering prescriptions 
for their improvement, this does not yet rule out that his project may in the end be an 
evaluative one.  In fact, Hegel explicitly acknowledges the limits of his comparison 
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162 “As far as nature is concerned, it is admitted that philosophy is to know [erkennen] it as it is… The ethical 
world in contrast, the state, or reason as it actualizes itself in the element of self-consciousness, it is not to 
enjoy the good fortune of being reason, which has in fact in this element acquired power and authority, and 




between the attitudes of the natural and practical philosopher.  When trying to 
understand the laws of nature, it is only our understanding that is subject to normative 
constraints, and not the object of our understanding.  In other words, while we can 
either get these laws right or wrong, the laws themselves cannot be right or wrong.  As 
Hegel puts it, “The measure of these laws is outside of us, and our knowing adds 
nothing to them, does not advance them: only our knowledge of them can advance 
itself” (PR, 16n). 
But “the knowledge of right is in one respect the same, in another not” (PR, 
16n).  We learn ethical laws in the same way we learn the laws of nature, namely, as 
already there, established, and operative, whether we investigate them or not.  But this 
divide between our knowing and its object is, when dealing with the domain of spirit, 
not sustainable.  Hegel points out that in this process of investigation we likewise 
discover that these laws are not „absolute,“ which in this context means that they are 
not fully independent of our attitudes toward them.  Rather, they are laws (Rechtsgesetze) 
that have been „posited“ (Gesetztes) by us in the first place.163  Once we make this 
discovery, we come to think that we possess the measure that these laws must meet, 
rather than taking the laws as setting the measure that our understanding of them must 
meet.  For Hegel this is where the problems begin.  This discovery introduces not only 
the possibility of a conflict between these given principles and the dictates issued by 
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163 “But the difference is that with the laws of right [Rechtsgesetzen] the spirit of reflection [Betrachtung] arises 
and already the diversity of laws draws attention to the fact that they are not absolute.  The laws of right are 
posted [Gesetztes], coming from human beings” (PR, 16). !
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our „inner voice,“ but it also allows us to grow arrogant and misled into taking our 
inner voice as the sole ethical judge. 
What matters for us at this point is not Hegel’s diagnosis of where things go 
astray, but his assessment of the discovery that lies at the root of this conflict.  What 
Hegel suggests is that there is a relevant difference between natural and spiritual laws, a 
difference that needs to be accounted for our attitudes towards them.  Whereas it 
would be inappropriate to evaluate the laws of nature, such an evaluation is an essential 
component in even understanding the ethical world.  To be more precise, Hegel is 
arguing that we cannot remain indifferent to the laws we are trying to comprehend.  
Even though we find them to be in place before we turn our attention to them, it is 
nevertheless we who ultimately put them there, for their origin is a human one.164  This 
for Hegel means that understanding them must also involve an interrogation of them, a 
demand that they justify themselves to us.  What Hegel rejects are the standards usually 
employed in such an interrogation, and not the demand for justification as such.  In 
short, his hostility toward prescriptions or mere “oughts” does not as such preclude 
that Hegel himself harbors normative aspirations.  He even goes so far as to suggest 
that it is not possible to gain an understanding of our social norms without 
simultaneously asking whether we are right to uphold them. 
In the Preface he gives us at least three other clues to suggest that he is 
engaging in an assessment of some sort.  The first clue is the analogy he draws between 
his own Philosophy of Right and Plato’s Republic.  Even though the Republic may seem like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
164 I take this to be one conclusion from the chapter on Greek Sittlichkeit.  As I already suggested in the 
second chapter, although the Greek world was divided into two independent sets of laws, the human law and 




a prescriptive project par excellence, Hegel denies that it is concerned with delineating a 
mere ideal, a society that is not drawn from the self-understanding of the one Plato 
himself inhabited.  Hegel writes, “In the course of the following treatise I have noted 
that the Platonic Republic itself, which counts as the slogan of an empty ideal, has 
essentially captured nothing but the nature of Greek ethical life” (PR, 24).  This is 
undeniably an unorthodox reading of the Republic, or at least a reading with an unusual 
emphasis.  Hegel is here suggesting that Plato’s utopian vision of an ideally just city is 
culled directly from the city he as a matter of fact inhabited, albeit in inverted form.  To 
be more precise, Hegel thinks that Plato acknowledged the emergence of certain 
destructive forces in his society, specifically the principle of “free infinite personality” 
[freie unendliche Persönlichkeit] (presumably embodied in Socrates), and he acknowledged 
this precisely by delineating the structure of a society that would exclude this very 
principle.  Of course Hegel wants to avoid falling prey to such reactionary inversions.  
But he likens his work to Plato’s nonetheless.  Hegel’s point is that his as well as Plato’s 
subject matter is a normative one, namely the idealized self-understanding that is shared 
by their respective compatriots.  So neither of them is offering a straightforward 
description of the customary practices that surround them, but what they are describing 
are the standards to which those practices hold themselves, whether they ultimately cast 
them in a negative or a positive light. 
He gives us the second clue shortly thereafter, in the form of his infamous 
Doppelsatz: “That which is rational, is actual; and that which is actual, is rational.  On 
this conviction every unprejudiced consciousness as well as philosophy takes its stand, 
and from it philosophy proceeds in its investigation of the spiritual universe just as of 
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the natural one” (PR, p. 24).  However we may understand this identity of the actual 
and the rational, it very much seems as if Hegel is making a strongly evaluative claim, 
for in calling the actual “rational,” he seems to be saying that it is good, justified, and 
worthy of our endorsement.  So the question left to answer is what Hegel takes to be 
the object of endorsement, namely, whether Hegel wants to affirm the status quo as 
such, whatever it may be, or only that portion of it that is as it truly ought to be. 
In a compelling paper about the Doppelsatz, Robert Stern lays out the two 
standard alternatives – the conservative and the progressive readings of this claim. 
According to the conservative reading, which few people nowadays defend, Hegel is 
saying that whichever practices and institutions happen to exist are rational and thus 
justified and good.  On this picture, philosophy lacks any basis for adopting a critical 
attitude towards the social world and pronouncing it as insufficiently rational, and thus 
good and just.  But its task is nevertheless a normative one, namely that of legitimating 
the status quo, whatever that status quo happens to be.  According to the progressive 
reading, the Doppelsatz also involves a legitimization of some sort, but it disputes that its 
object is whatever practices and institutions happen to exist.  Rather, this reading points 
out that “the actual” is a technical term for Hegel, one that is to be distinguished from 
what merely is and yet fails to live up to what it ought to be.  In other words, Hegel is 
not claiming that everything that exists, is good, but only that part of existence that 
corresponds to its essence. 
Although Stern gives us a perspicuous reconstruction of these two interpretive 
possibilities, he himself wants to steer clear of either pole.  According to Stern, the 
question we need to ask is what Hegel even means in calling something “rational” and 
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whether such a pronouncement involves an affirmation on his part.  He disputes that 
we should understand “rational” as a strongly normative concept that implies 
justifiability.  Rather, Stern argues in favor of what he calls a normatively neutral 
reading of the Doppelsatz that takes “rational” to be a methodological concept.  All that 
Hegel means in calling the actual “rational” is that it is intelligible to reason and so 
suitable to be investigated by its means.  It does not mean that the actual is therefore in 
any way good from an ethical point of view.  This neutral reading has the advantage of 
being able to make sense of the Doppelsatz’s place in the Philosophy of Right.  Stern is right 
that it would be very surprising indeed if Hegel inserted such a strong thesis in the 
opening pages of his work, which he usually reserves for methodological remarks, 
rather than for substantive claims.165  Hegel moreover explicitly identifies the Doppelsatz 
as the starting point of philosophical inquiry, not as its conclusion.  So how can such an 
investigation, even one that is engaged in an effort of legitimization, proceed from the 
assumption that its object meets ethical standards? 
Despite these considerations in favor of Stern’s neutral reading, I question 
whether it is helpful in shedding light on Hegel’s ultimate aims in this work.  It is true 
that Hegel employs the term “rational” in a spectrum of ways, at times implying 
nothing beyond rational intelligibility, and other times suggesting something more 
robust, closer to “reasonable” and perhaps even to “good.”  And Stern may be right 
that the Doppelsatz should be read in the more minimal sense as expressing no more 
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165 As Stern puts it, “[Hegel] therefore does not use the introductory sections of his writings to attempt any 
real exposition of the book as a whole, or any defense of its conclusions; instead, he mainly uses them to deal 
with meta-level issues, concerning the nature of the work as a work of philosophy, and therefore with the 




than “a faith in reason.”  But this does not yet imply that the work as a whole should 
not be read as making a normative claim.  There are other reasons to think that there is 
more at stake for Hegel than merely demonstrating the rational intelligibility of the 
social world, its suitability for philosophical comprehension.  In short, even if the 
Doppelsatz on its own does not express a normative assessment of the actual, we might 
nevertheless think that Hegel’s overall argument in the Philosophy of Right does. 
The main evidence in support of this is also the third clue suggesting that Hegel 
is engaging in an evaluative endeavor.  Toward the end of the Preface Hegel identifies 
“reconciliation” as the real payoff of philosophical comprehension.  Let me quote the 
relevant passage in full: 
What lies between reason as self-conscious spirit and reason as the present world, what 
separates the former reason from the latter and prevents it from finding satisfaction in 
it, are the shackles of some abstraction, which has not been freed to the concept.  To 
recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and to thereby rejoice in it, this 
rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality, which philosophy affords to those in 
whom there has once arisen an inner voice bidding them to comprehend (PR, 26-27). 
 
Many have read this passage as an admission of Hegel’s strongly normative aims.  If 
philosophical comprehension is meant to afford reconciliation with the social world, 
then such comprehension cannot be separated from a rational assessment of this world.  
It looks like we can only reconcile ourselves to what we can regard as good.  And since 
a rift has been drawn between us and this world and we are currently in doubt about its 
goodness, reconciliation is contingent on Hegel’s ability to justify its ways to us.166 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 Robert Stern considers such an objection to his methodological gloss on the term “rational,” but he argues 
that there is another way of construing the above passage that is compatible with his neutral reading.  
According to Stern, rational comprehension, even in the absence of justification, embodies a kind of anti-
utopianism, which is all that Hegel needs.  In other words, understanding that the world is rational in this 
more minimal sense – i.e. rationally intelligible – is enough to prompt us to become reconciled to the world, 
even if it leaves open the question of whether or not we can endorse it.  Stern moreover adds that his neutral 
reading is better able to make sense of Hegel’s project of reconciliation, since Hegel suggests that it is the 
philosopher – misled by theoretical abstractions – who is in need of reconciliation, and not the man on the 
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I do agree that reconciliation can only be achieved through justification, if its 
source is certain kind of doubt.  But I am not convinced that Hegel thinks we are in 
doubt about the goodness of the social world, or at least not directly.  There seems to 
be another way of construing the project of reconciliation that neither Stern nor his 
interlocutors consider.  This construal holds that the object of reconciliation is not the 
social world exactly, so neither this world as it happens to be, nor those parts of it that 
are as they ought to be.  What requires our reconciliation is the ideal to which we hold 
ourselves, more specifically, the principles to which we are committed.  To return to 
the analogy with the Republic, it is our idealized self-understanding that is in need of a 
rational vindication.  I admit that it may sound rather un-Hegelian to separate the two 
by drawing a sharp wedge between our idealized self-understanding and the world we 
as a matter of fact inhabit.  Presumably our principles do inform our individual conduct 
as well as our social practices.  And as we have previously seen, Hegel moreover holds 
that there is often a necessary connection between them – that a commitment to a 
certain set of principles can issue only in this conduct and these practices, and no other.  
Despite this connection, I do think that the true target of Hegel’s account is 
nonetheless an ideal.  But what makes this ideal “actual” is precisely the fact that it does 
inform our conduct and practices.  So there is a sense in which Hegel is referring to the 
world, though a world not as it is, nor as it ought to be, but as its inhabitants think it 
ought to be.  Once we see that the object of reconciliation is our own norms, so to 
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street.  The latter, as Hegel himself admits, finds his knowing and his willing already satisfied by the world he 




speak, it becomes easier to understand how Hegel’s project can itself be regarded as a 
normative one. 
This of course makes Hegel’s project sound like one that is much more in line 
with traditional theorizing, and it is true that its aims are similar in this respect.  A 
theory and a science of right are both concerned with evaluating the norms to which 
we subscribe and asking whether we should continue doing so.  There are, however, a 
few central differences between them.  The first has to do with the strategy that each 
employs in conducting such an evaluation.  What distinguishes Hegel’s project is less its 
conclusions, and more its method.  It is on methodological grounds that he insists on 
the difference between a scientific and a theoretical approach to right.  Another way he 
puts this is to say that a science of ethics stands out in virtue of its form, rather than its 
content.  So we need to take a closer look at how he describes this form and how it can 
contribute to the task of justification.  This will become our next focus.   
But before we turn our attention to the form Hegel thinks is distinctive of a 
scientific approach, it is worth noting that a science of right would have to differ in its 
content as well.  Hegel thinks that, because normative theorists privilege content at the 
expense of form, they are preoccupied with making substantive discoveries about 
which principles we ought to heed.  Hegel pokes fun at those philosophers who 
imagine that they have discovered such “new and unheard-of truths”, and that the 
world has been eagerly awaiting these discoveries.  A science of right, in contrast, tells 




This description, however, needs to be significantly qualified.  When I said that 
Hegel is interested in evaluating how the world thinks it ought to be, I should have 
added that it does not always know what it thinks it ought to be.  So Hegel confronts 
the prospect that we may fail to recognize our own idealized self-understanding, more 
specifically, that we may not be self-conscious of the principles to which we are 
committed.  We have seen versions of such delusion in previous chapters, in the 
context of cultural reflection as well as in that of immanent critique.  But in this context 
Hegel is not merely confronting it as a possibility, but as a genuine problem.  His 
project begins with the basic assumption that we are in fact deluded about our own 
ideals and that these need to be not just evaluated, but also exposed.  As we will see, 
these are for him inseparable tasks that his method must simultaneously accomplish.  
What this shows is that there is a sense in which his project must be also descriptive, 
for we must be able adequately to describe our norms before we can evaluative them. 
So when Hegel claims that his science will do no more than tell us what we 
already know, he does not mean that such a science makes it its mission merely to 
reaffirm our pre-philosophical assumptions.  First of all, Hegel thinks that it is its 
distinctive method that leads it to those truths; it does not take them for granted.  
Moreover, as we will see, Hegel thinks that arriving at truths we already know is a 
genuine accomplishment, though he is convinced that once we discover them, we will 
find them to be indisputable.  This indicates another crucial difference between a 
theory, and a science, of right.  Whereas theories are doomed to deliver doctrines that 
remain contentious, science does justice to our pre-philosophical intuitions.  Although 
Hegel thinks this is a significant advantage of the scientific approach, the mere fact that 
!
206 
a science of right accords with these intuitions is not as such enough to justify its 
conclusions.  Just because we do not contest them does not yet indicate that they are 
genuinely beyond dispute.  Rather, it is his method that is meant to protect his doctrine 
from arbitrariness.  And it is precisely the lack of such a rigorous method, or its 
“formlessness,” that he thinks prevents ethical theorizing from delivering truths that we 
are right to doubt no further. 
In order to avoid such formlessness, Hegel sets himself the task of finding the 
form that is called for by the content, or to put it slightly differently, of developing a 
method that is suitable to the subject matter under consideration, so the topic of right.  
He is quite clear that it is this form or method that is meant to accomplish not only his 
descriptive aim of somehow capturing and preserving our ordinary ethical knowledge, 
but also his normative aim of showing it to be genuine knowledge.  In a crucial passage 
he writes, 
In any case the truth about right, ethical life, and the state is as old as it is openly 
presented and familiar in the publuc morality and religion.  What more does this truth 
need, insofar as thinking spirit is not satisfied to possess it in this familiar way, if not 
also to comprehend it and to win for this in itself rational content also a rational form, 
so that this content appears justified to free thinking, which does not stop with the 
given, whether through the outer positive authority of the state or the agreement 
among people, or through the authority of inner feeling and the heart and the 
immediately concurring witness of spirit that supports it, but rather proceeds from 
itself and thereby demands to know itself as united in its innermost with the truth (PR, 
13/14). 
 
Although he thinks philosophers exaggerate the extent to which we disagree about 
ethical matters, this passage suggests that the sheer fact of agreement is for Hegel not 
enough.  At the same time, the problem is clearly not that we lack ethical knowledge, 
but that we don’t recognize what we have as a form of knowledge in the first place.  In 
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Hegel’s words, we are already in possession of a rational content, but without the 
requisite rational form.  And this is precisely what his method is supposed to supply. 
 
II. System of Right 
Our next task is to investigate how Hegel characterizes this method capable of 
delivering indisputable truths that fully capture what we in some still elusive sense 
already know to be ethically valid.  Within the Philosophy of Right he says rather little 
about it.  For example, he begins his Introduction by telling us what this method is not.  
It is not a purely formal method that begins with definitions of certain concepts and 
then tries to somehow derive substantive conclusions from those definitions alone.  
Nor is a subjectivist method that proceeds on the basis of our intuitions, which Hegel 
in this context associates with the “ethics of conviction” [Überzeugungsethik].  The 
former makes the error of presupposing the definitions themselves without being able 
to show why they are the correct ones, and it falsely assumes that it can derive practical 
norms and discover the nature of right by means of conceptual analysis alone.  But the 
latter method, Hegel suggests, is even worse.  It is thoroughly un-philosophical, because 
it makes the “arbitrariness of knowing” into its principle, which means that it treats our 
given intuitions as the highest arbiter of right without providing us with any way of 
interrogating their reliability. 
When it comes to giving a positive account of his method, Hegel simply says: 
“Wherein consists the scientific approach of philosophy can here be presupposed from 
the philosophical Logic” (PR §2).  There is a big question about how seriously we want 
to take this claim.  First of all, some interpreters have worried that drawing too close a 
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connection between the Science of Logic and the Philosophy of Right will make Hegel’s 
practical philosophy far too dependent on his highly contested ontological 
commitments outlined in the former text.  In short, it would suggest that his doctrine 
of right presupposes his account of the basic structure of reality without which it could 
not be accepted.167  Secondly, some have questioned how far Hegel’s analogy between 
his logical and practical method can go, given that the transitions in the Logic seem to 
involve a kind of conceptual necessity of which the transitions in the Rechtsphilosophie 
frequently fall short.168  But these are not the questions most relevant to our concerns.  
Rather, I want to focus on another point of overlap between a science of logic and a 
science of right, namely their shared preoccupation with the contours of a 
philosophical “science.”  The Science of Logic in particular seems to be concerned with 
the task of developing a philosophical method that is non-arbitrary, and it is this 
concern that makes it an especially fruitful companion to the Philosophy of Right. 
In the Encyclopedia Logic, for example, Hegel lays out several requirements that a 
philosophical method must meet if it is to avoid arbitrariness.  One requirement is that 
the form it imposes be appropriate to – or, as he puts it, “identical” with – the content 
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167 This seems to be the basic premise of Kevin Thompson’s paper “Reason and Objective Spirit: Method 
and Ontology in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.”  There he argues that for Hegel any form of justification, 
including justification of a practical principle or norm, is a “matter of demonstrating a thing’s proper place 
within the totality of what is.  It is, in a word, to establish something’s ontological status, to locate its place 
within the whole of reality itself” (2001b, 116). 
 
168 Fred Neuhouser calls the transitions in the Philosophy of Right “quasi-logical” “because [they] involve 
more than purely conceptual analysis” (2000, 31n).  This statement has caused a bit of a stir in the literature.  
For example, Will Dudley contests that “If the Philosophy of Right were only quasi-logical, however, then it 
could not determine the structure of truly rational institutions, but instead could offer at most an account of 
quasi-rational institutions, or those institutions that might make sense under certain empirical conditions or 
certain pragmatic considerations” (2004, 12).  Although I cannot go into great detail at this point, I think 
Dudley’s response rests on a very problematic (because very stark) distinction between the empirical and the 




under consideration.  He claims that he is trying to work out such a method “which, as 
[he hopes], will be recognized as the only truthful method, namely one that is identical 
with the content” (E1, 11).  On the one hand, Hegel is here concerned with developing 
a method that is not an external imposition on its object, but that somehow arises from 
within the object under scrutiny.  On the other hand, Hegel is also concerned with 
developing a method that is not merely one among other contenders, but that is the only 
one appropriate to the subject matter at hand.  This is what he means in calling for the 
identity of form of content, and demonstrating this identity would be one way of 
proving that the method employed was not an arbitrary one.  Although this 
requirement will turn out to be crucial in understanding the function of a science of 
right, it is not clear that looking to the Logic will be of much help, given that the subject 
matter of right seems to differ significantly from that of logic.   
But I want to focus on another requirement that Hegel thinks both methods 
must share.  He points out that in any investigation, but especially in the normative 
sort, we must presuppose a standard of evaluation in light of which we seek to assess 
and justify our object.  The question that naturally arises then is how we can be sure 
that this standard is the right one, namely that it is itself in turn justified, and not a 
merely arbitrary presupposition.  In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel identifies this as the 
problem of the beginning and he characterizes his aim as that of developing a 
presupposition-less science: “But the difficulty of making a beginning arises 
simultaneously with the fact that a beginning as something immediate makes its 
presupposition, or is moreover itself such a presupposition” (E1 §1).  It is beyond 
doubt that the task of avoiding an arbitrary starting point and a groundless principle is 
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Hegel’s main methodological preoccupation, whether in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the 
Science of Logic, or the Philosophy of Right. 
This task of developing a presupposition-less science leads us to Hegel’s 
notorious obsession with and commitment to systematicity.  To put it in highly general 
terms, Hegel argues that any standard of assessment can be justified only from what he 
calls the “standpoint of the whole.”  What this means for Hegel is that any given 
principle gains its validity through its place within a system.  The notion of systematicity 
is absolutely central to Hegel’s understanding of the philosophical method, and Hegel 
in fact follows Kant in defining a science as a systematic body of knowledge.  As he 
states in the “Introduction” to the Encyclopedia: 
A philosophizing without system cannot be scientific at all; such philosophizing 
expresses for itself more of a subjective disposition, its content is accordingly 
contingent.  A content has its justification only as a moment of the whole, outside of 
which it is only an ungrounded presupposition or subjective certainty (E1 §14A). 
 
Hegel characterizes a systematic body of knowledge as one in which each particular 
piece of knowledge stands in necessary relation to every other.  Those relations do not 
have to be strictly speaking deductive.  Nevertheless, it must hold true that each part 
makes an indispensible contribution to the whole.  Were it missing, it would 
compromise the integrity of the entire structure. 
 Although Hegel largely inherits this notion of systematicity from Kant as well as 
Fichte, he rejects a significant tenet of theirs.  Both Kant and Fichte believe that a body 
of knowledge becomes systematic only when each piece of it can be deduced from a 
single universal principle that serves as its foundation.  For Kant this was the ideal that 
governed inquiry, namely to strive to discover ever more basic laws of nature that 
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subsume all others.  And Fichte as well as was concerned with formulating a principle 
that could serve as a self-sufficient basis upon which his entire philosophical system 
could be built.  But Hegel abandons this requirement and denies that there is a single 
principle that can anchor a system in this way – a presupposition-less starting point that 
itself needs no further justification.  At the same time, the relationships between the 
various principles that comprise a system must exhibit necessary connections, even if 
there is no one principle from which the rest can be derived.  So when Hegel says that 
justifying any given standard requires relating it to the whole, he is not saying that it 
must be derivable from some supreme standard.  Rather, all it requires is demonstrating 
that it occupies a necessary place within a broader network of interdependent 
principles.169 
So even though Hegel raises the difficulty of finding the right starting point, we 
should avoid thinking that he is looking for some kind of foundation that needs no 
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169 Thus I am denying what Kevin Thompson identifies as one of Hegel’s “strictures of systematicity.”  While 
I agree that for Hegel “the parts must stand in inferential relations to each other [and] must be individually 
necessary and mutually implicatory,” I disagree that Hegel thinks giving an account of something requires 
tracing it back to a ground “by joining its various elements under the governance of an indubitable and 
noninferential axiom, an absolute first principle (ein erster Grundsatz)” (2001b, 114).  In his response 
“Beyond the Ontological Foundation for the Philosophy of Right,” Simon Lumsden already critiqued certain 
problematic theses in Thompson’s paper, for example his claim that systematicity needs to be supported by 
ontology and that a systematic progression of reasoning is for Hegel an analytic one.  But he does not 
challenge Thompson’s claim that systematicity requires a first principle in the first place. 
 At this point I would like to add a comment about the relationship between systematicity and 
ontology, even though this is not my main concern.  According to Thompson, this first principle is supposed 
to capture Hegel’s commitment to the fundamental interdependence between method and ontology, for 
“methodology could be nothing less than the conceptual articulation of the process in and through which 
things come to be what they intrinsically are” (2001, 115).  Lumsden argues that this is not the kind of 
justification that Hegel is after, for the relevant principle needs to be situated in a “logical structure,” rather 
than demonstrated as the principle at work in nature.  But even if we accept Lumsden’s critique, there 
remains a sense in which systematicity does rest on certain ontological assumptions, even in the context of 
the Philosophy of Right, for it only makes sense to build a systematic body of knowledge of an object that is 
already in a sense systematically structured.  In other words, our knowledge of ethical life can be systematic 
only because ethical life is itself a systematic whole.  But this does not involve proving that its principles can 




further grounding.  We must make sure that wherever we begin can be integrated into a 
system, that it does constitute an indispensable part of the whole.  But no part can in 
the end take absolute priority.  So once we understand how a system works and what 
kind of justification it provides, we realize that it does not in a sense matter where we 
start.  What makes his investigation a scientific one in the relevant sense are the 
systematic connections it establishes, and these can be established regardless of which 
principle we take as our first.  In the Philosophy of Right he writes, “Philosophy forms a 
circle: it has something that is first, immediate, since it must after all start, something 
that is not proven, that is not a result.  But that with which philosophy starts is 
immediately relative, for it must at another point appear as a result” (PR §2A).  Hegel 
frequently invokes this circular image of the philosophical procedure to indicate that, 
although we must start somewhere, that beginning is only provisional.  Once the 
procedure has been carried out, the principle we initially invoked will be properly 
situated within a systematic context in which it will be on equal footing with every 
other principle.  And it is only in that context that we can see why our starting point 
was legitimate in the first place.  This is not visible to us prior to completing the 
procedure.170 
But there are certain constraints on what can serve as an adequate starting 
point.  For Hegel, we cannot simply invoke any principle whatsoever, since it is 
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170 This conception of systematicity may be closer to Fichte’s than I make it sound.  Fichte at various places 
suggests that, even though we must pick a principle as our starting point, we can only prove that this was the 
right starting point when we have successfully derived all other truths on its basis.  So he admits that the 
starting point is never self-evidently legitimate, but can only be fully justified in retrospect, once we have the 
whole system in view.  So even though Fichte retains this commitment to finding a grounding or basis, he 




possible that this principle will lead us astray.  The criterion we begin with must be an 
expression of the true concept, by which he means that it must be some formulation of 
a genuine standard.  Although the formulation may initially be an inadequate one, we 
cannot begin by invoking a standard that is thoroughly inadequate.  So the question 
then arises how we can be sure that our starting point is adequate in this more minimal 
sense and will turn out to have a place in the systematic context to be drawn from it.  
In the Philosophy of Right, the standard in question is what Hegel calls the “free will.”  
Although our understanding of what constitutes a free will may be initially 
impoverished, Hegel deems it nevertheless a fruitful point of departure.  From it we are 
able to arrive at a more complex system of normative commitments in virtue of which 
our attachment to freedom of the will turns out to be justified.  So the question can 
then be put in the following way:  how do we know that the standard of the free will 
has a legitimate place in such a system of right and that beginning with this standard 
will give us access to it? 
Hegel himself offers an answer to this question, but it is one that demands that 
we accept his philosophical project as a whole.  As he puts it, the presupposition of the 
Philosophy of Right is not only that it makes sense to speak of a free will, or that the will is 
(or can become) free.  It makes the more robust assumption that, if we understand 
what a will truly is, we will see that it is in its very nature to be free, that a “will without 
freedom is an empty word, just as freedom is only actual as will, as subject” (PR §4A).  
As Hegel admits, this is a strong assumption to make at the very outset of the Philosophy 
of Right, one whose truth is anything but self-evident.  Yet Hegel rejects various 
standard strategies for justifying this presupposition.  He denies that we can derive 
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freedom by exercising conceptual analysis on the notion of the will, or by looking to 
our psychological attitudes like regret and guilt, or by simply asserting it as a “fact” of 
consciousness, all of which he seems to associate with Kant in one way or another.  
Rather, Hegel claims, “that the will is free, and what will and freedom are – this 
deduction can only take place… in connection with the whole” (PR §4).   
But what he means by the “whole” here is not the Philosophy of Right in its 
entirety.  He is rather referring to his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences as the 
articulation of the whole system, of which the investigation of right forms only one 
part.  He states this quite explicitly in his lectures: “All philosophical science are parts 
of a large whole.  Philosophy has as its object the universal, the absolute.  Right is one 
side of the manifestation of this absolute, of the divine idea” (VPR, 39).  In the official 
text he explains that we need to examine what precedes the introduction of right into 
his system – such as his discussion of intelligence and practical spirit in his “Philosophy 
of Subjective Spirit” – in order to find the justification for beginning with the notion of 
a free will.  As he puts it, 
The science of right is a part of philosophy… As part it has a particular starting point, 
which is the result and the truth of that which precedes it and that which comprises its 
so-called proof.  The concept of right falls thus with respect to its becoming outside of 
the science of right, its deduction is here presupposed, and it is to be taken on as given 
(PR §2). 
 
Thus it may seem highly un-Hegelian to want to treat the Philosophy of Right as 
comprising an autonomous science that swings free from his broader systematic 
ambitions.  Hegel, after all, believed that there can only be one system, for the 
possibility of multiple system compromises the very idea of systematicity.  If more than 
one system were possible, then we would have the problem of deciding between them 
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in a non-arbitrary way.  So the only way to ensure non-arbitrariness is to develop a 
system without competitors.  At the same time, divorcing Hegel’s science of right from 
other components of his broader system, which is the subject matter of his Encyclopedia, 
does not imply that there can be multiple sciences of right, just as there are multiple ethical 
theories.  In other words, we can still maintain with Hegel that there can only be one 
science of right – because its method is the only one that is fully suitable to the subject 
matter – without also accepting his claim that a science of right is as such incomplete.  
But Hegel clearly indicates that what serves as its point of departure is in fact the result 
of a prior investigation he has undertaken in the preceding chapters of the Encyclopedia.  
How else can we possibly justify taking the notion of freedom as our standard? 
While I admit that there may be limits to the extent to which the Philosophy of 
Right can provide a full vindication of all of its presuppositions, we do not necessarily 
need a prior demonstration of the concept of a free will in order to be entitled to its 
employment.  There is an alternative strategy available to Hegel, even if it requires 
tempering some of his aims and undertaking a more modest project.  While such a 
strategy may not be immune to more radical forms of skepticism – which clearly did 
worry Hegel – it nevertheless makes Hegel’s conception of a science of right a more 
attractive, and probably more plausible, one.  This strategy would take a minimal 
connection between right and freedom for granted, namely that for a principle to be 
right means that we are free in our adherence to it.  This is perhaps not a thesis that 
Hegel can fully defend within the science of right, but it is not clear that it necessarily 
needs an independent derivation, for Hegel thinks that the value of freedom is at the 
very core of modernity and so constitutes an explicit commitment that already informs 
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our reflective point of departure.  We as members of modern ethical life are willing to 
accept only those principles that can be proven to contribute to self-determination in 
some way,171 and this is a demand we make on any normative account of right.  So to 
begin with the bare notion of the free will is, according to Hegel, not to invoke a merely 
contestable prejudice or baseless agreement.  It is to take seriously the most 
fundamental feature of modernity.  But to say that we moderns are committed to 
freedom, and to take this commitment seriously, is not yet to have said anything about 
the nature of freedom.  And so for Hegel the more interesting challenge involves 
determining how we are to conceive of freedom and what kind of conception we are 
entitled to presuppose. 
 
III. Abstract Right 
It is important for Hegel that the conception of freedom with which we begin be 
inadequate, since the alternative strategy he favors is closely bound up with his 
understanding of “dialectic” – a method Hegel already employs in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, but one he also associates with the Science of Logic.  At the end of his Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel states in unequivocal terms that this is likewise the 
approach he is about to apply in the practical context.  Although he wants to 
distinguish his understanding of the dialectic from Plato’s, who (according to Hegel) 
employed it in an exclusively negative manner, the Hegelian dialectic can also be 
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171 Hegel leaves open what this connection might be, because for him it can be manifested in a variety of 
ways.  For example, an institution might contribute to our self-determination because participation in it is a 




described as proceeding negatively.  This is why Hegel frequently characterizes the 
dialectic with an exercise of skepticism that seeks to criticize a given position by 
revealing its instability.  The reason Hegel ultimately rejects this analogy is primarily 
because he thinks the dialectic destabilizes certain positions in order to improve on 
them and so get us closer to truth (eine Annäherung zur Wahrheit, PR §31).  So its aims are 
positive, even it proceeds via a negative route. 
It is worth emphasizing that Hegel admits that his project is in many respects a 
critical one.  In other words, although Hegel is interested in ultimately justifying a 
certain view, this view is not his starting point.  Rather, he begins with a view he finds 
to be deficient and he seeks to arrive at the correct one in part by exposing these 
deficiencies.  So Hegel significantly begins not with a conception of the free will that he 
wants to defend, but precisely with one he wants to criticize.  This should be a 
somewhat surprising discovery, given that Hegel frequently rejects the critical 
pretensions he finds among his contemporaries.  At the same time, Hegel is not 
directing his criticism at the principles actualized in the social world.  What he is 
criticizing are in a certain sense these very pretentions.  In other words, Hegel’s target is 
the abstractions generated by so-called “philosophical” reflection governed by what he 
calls the understanding (Verstand). 
This may come as a surprise, considering that he thinks a science of right must 
be concerned with the concept (Begriff) of right, which he contrasts with the 
abstractions generated by the understanding.172  Because a concept in Hegel’s technical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 “Philosophy has to do with ideas and so not with what tends to be called mere concepts, even pointing out 
their one-sidedness and untruth, such that it is the concept alone (and not that which one often hears called 
that, but which is only an abstract determination of the understanding) that has actuality, and has it in such a 
way that it gives this actuality to itself” (PR §1). 
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sense must already incorporate a necessary content, and must already exhibit a kind of 
actuality or realization in the world,173 it may look like we cannot begin a scientific 
investigation of right until we have fixed such a concept.  But this is highly misleading.  
Even though Hegel wants to identify the concept as his proper concern, we can only 
arrive at it at the end of his investigation, whereas we must start with the very 
abstractions he so vehemently rejects.   So it is no coincidence that Hegel’s starting 
point is what he calls “abstract right.” 
Abstract right for Hegel is the most minimal conception of the free will, 
according to which freedom means the ability to pursue one’s ends in an unhindered 
fashion, whatever these ends happen to be.  Fred Neuhouser calls this “personal 
freedom” and stresses that what matters is that I have chosen which ends to pursue, 
irrespective of my reasons for doing so.  Although I am settled with a reservoir of 
needs and desires, I can decide which among them I will take up.  As Hegel puts it, 
initially I only make reference to myself as an “inherently individual will of a subject” [in 
sich einzelner Wille eines Subjekts] (PR §34).  But in order to attain these ends of mine, I 
require an external world of things that I can turn into an embodiment of my will, i.e. 
my property.  This notion of property introduces a host of other requirements that 
complicate the picture of freedom at issue in abstract right.  First I discover that I need 
to make reference not only to things, but also to other wills, if I am to attain these ends 
of mine.  Simply put, in order for something to count as my property, it must be 
recognized as such by others.  If it weren’t so recognized, then this thing would not be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
173 This is implied by Hegel’s insistence that philosophy is concerned only with the Idea (Idee), which is 
supposed to be the unity of the concept (Begriff) and actuality (Wirklichkeit), whose relationship he compares 
to that of the soul and the body (PR §1A). 
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properly mine – or my claim to it would have no real bite.  So property presupposes 
contractual relations in which both party recognize each other’s things as belonging to 
each. 
This suggests that “abstract right” quickly surpasses this minimal conception of 
what constitutes a free will, for it incorporates considerations about what kind of social 
world such a will would have to inhabit in order to be free in this sense.  According to 
Hegel, actualizing the free will so conceived requires a system of rights that protect the 
domain of private property within which each individual will can enact his chosen ends 
without infringing on those of others.  So even an internal account of “abstract right” 
inevitably unravels a more complicated structure of freedom by delineating its social 
conditions.   
But we soon discover a further limitation indicating that abstract right cannot 
account for freedom through its own resources, even when these resources are 
developed into a system of rights.  At the end of his chapter Hegel argues that contract 
presupposes “wrong,” and so that a conception of contractual relations must be able to 
accommodate the possibility breaching their terms.  In the case of such a breach, we 
would need to appeal to a will that can adjudicate between the claims made by the 
conflicting parties because it itself is not embedded in contractual relations.174  Another 
way to put this would be to say that we must be able to make sense of an impartial 
perspective and that we cannot make sense of it on the model that contract provides.  
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174 One of Hegel’s targets in this chapter is social contract theory.  Hegel argues that we cannot have a 
contract with the state because then there would be no higher authority to enforce the contract and a contract 
without such an authority would be empty.  Hegel thinks this higher authority must therefore stand outside 




Hegel associates this perspective with justice.  Thus he concludes that personal freedom 
cannot be actualized without morality or “Moralität”.  
This rough sketch gives some indication as to how it is that we move from one 
conception of freedom to another, but mainly it is intended to indicate why we begin 
where we do.  The conception of freedom underpinning abstract right is not equivalent 
to the one Hegel ultimately endorses, though both it as well as its moral successor are 
meant to be preserved in his fuller acccount.  This conception is inadequate not 
because it is misguided, but because it captures only one principle of the free will and 
not yet the whole of right.  So in calling it “abstract,” Hegel suggests that it is the most 
basic picture, one that will first have to be filled in and given a concrete content, a 
process that will likewise radically challenge the basic tenets of abstract right, notably its 
self-sufficiency.   Hegel also describes such a starting point in various philosophical 
contexts as “immediate.”  In the context of abstract right, this for one refers to the 
content of the relevant conception, which takes freedom to be a matter of picking 
within a given set of needs and desires that constrains the range of ends available to us.  
So what makes abstract right “immediate” is the fact that the needs and desires at its 
disposal are given by nature, rather than produced or even simply modified by its own 
free activity.   
There is, however, a further sense in which Hegel thinks of abstract right as 
immediate, for he also thinks that it reflects our ordinary intuitions about freedom, 
though in a highly distinctive sense.  For Hegel abstraction is not merely a problem 
internal to philosophy, but one that pervades all of modern culture.  This is why it 
makes sense for him to speak of a “culture of reflection”.  Although abstraction finds 
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its purest expression in the domain of philosophical thought, Hegel sees its damaging 
effects as far more widespread than we might initially suppose.  Whether it is 
philosophy that has infected the surrounding culture, or whether philosophy is nothing 
but a symptom of what is at bottom a cultural problem, is for Hegel somewhat beside 
the point.175  What matters is that our own starting point, not only as philosophers, but 
also as members of modern ethical life, is already shaped by abstraction to the highest 
degree, articulated in abstract right. 
This blurring of the boundary between what lies within and what falls beyond 
philosophy has significant implications for Hegel’s philosophical method.  First of all, if 
the abstract starting point from which Hegel proceeds is not an exclusively 
philosophical one, then his critical enterprise cannot be directed exclusively at 
philosophy’s pretentions.  Rather, it means that what Hegel is here undertaking is at the 
same time a form of immanent critique in the strong sense, akin to the sort we explored 
in the previous chapter.  Hegel must likewise be criticizing the forms of abstractions 
that dominate our ordinary ways of thinking, and not only those within philosophical 
accounts of right.  I will return to this implication below, but for now I want to raise 
another question about Hegel’s broader critical target.  If the standpoint of abstract 
right is in fact our ordinary standpoint, then it looks like no one yet knows the true 
nature of freedom, neither we, nor the theorists among us.  But how is this consistent 
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175 Hegel does, however, indicate that he does not think philosophy responsible for the kinds of problems 
brought forth by reflection.  When he cites various dualisms such as that between freedom and necessity, or 
between law and the heart, he remarks that “these are contrasts [Gegensätze], which are not simply invented 
through a trick of reflection [Witz der Reflexion] or through the school lessons of philosophy [Schulansicht der 
Philosophie], but instead the spiritual culture [geistige Bildung], the modern understanding, produces this contrast 
in the human being, which makes an amphibian out of him” (VA, 80-81).  I am grateful to Terry Pinkard for 




with Hegel’s repeated insistence that it is philosophy that has to be brought to 
recognize the very thing we already know and have always known, namely the content 
of right?  How can we both know what constitutes right and at the same time confuse 
it with a mere abstraction? 
 I propose that we considering resolving this tension by saying that we once 
knew what constitutes right and have in some sense forgotten it.  Admittedly this may 
at first not appear to be a promising solution, for Hegel does after all claim quite 
explicitly that we do know (and have always known) the content of right.  But before 
we simply dismiss this proposal, we should consider that in the Phenomenology (even if 
not explicitly in the Philosophy of Right) Hegel does draw an analogy between the task of 
philosophy and a process he characterizes as “recollection” [Erinnerung].  And there 
seem to be reasons to think that it might be a fruitful analogy in the Philosophy of Right as 
well.  For example, it would allow us to make sense of the unusual structure of the 
work, which starts not by taking our intuitions for granted, but in a sense arrives at 
them only at the end, once we have entered the domain of Sittlichkeit that Hegel thinks 
best captures our concrete practical knowledge, the kind of knowledge we display in 
our habitual conduct.  Given this inverse structure, it is at least not outlandish to 
suspect that Hegel thinks we, too – and not only the philosopher under the spell of 
abstraction – need to be reminded of the true nature of right and that it is his task to 
remind us of it.  So such an analogy would enable us to explain both his procedure as 
well as the distinctive and indispensable role Hegel envisions for the speculative 
philosopher.  In “making the implicit explicit,” Hegel is not merely stating the obvious, 
he is rather helping us recall knowledge that reflection has effectively obscured.  So 
!
223 
even though explicating the implicit need not always require recalling the forgotten, it is 
the latter that shows why the former activity might be worth undertaking.   
But even this proposal does not yet resolve the apparent contradiction, for it 
still looks like Hegel is saying that we both know and don’t know what constitutes 
right.  If it is true that we once knew it and now no longer do, it would no longer make 
sense to say that we “already” possess this knowledge at the outset of his procedure.  
One way out of this contradiction is to distinguish between the form and the content of 
this knowledge.  If we pursue this line, we find that the process of abstraction leads to a 
certain forgetfulness of the form of our knowledge, namely that it is knowledge in the 
first place.  What abstraction obscures is not in the first place what we already know, but 
that we already know it.  In other words, the rich and varied content of our knowledge 
is not completely lost, for we are able to competently navigate our social world in a 
habitual manner and so prove that we are adequately acquainted with the principles at 
work in ethical life.  
The problem arises with reflection, namely, when our ways of justifying our 
actual principles come to seem insufficiently systematic to us.  We come to believe that 
we must be able to derive the rich and varied content from a single principle that 
delineates the criterion of right.  “Abstract right” is our starting point in the sense that 
it is both the most dominant, and at the same time the most abstract version of such a 
criterion.  It looks like every aspect of actuality must be justifiable according to the 
standard set by “abstract right” if it is to count as right, and thus as an expression of the 
free will.  What this means is that, though we are not ignorant of right per se, we have 
grown doubtful about whether our norms do genuinely constitute right.  We can be said 
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to lack a certain kind of self-knowledge, namely knowledge that we do already know.  
So Hegel’s task of recollection must also be a normative one, for to help us retrieve our 
ethical knowledge just is to show that is genuine knowledge in the first place. 
Hegel articulates this complex task rather clearly in the following passage: 
After all, the truth about right, ethical life, and the state is as old as it is known and 
expressed in the public laws, the public morality and religion.  What does this truth 
further need, to the extent that thinking spirit is not satisfied to possess it in this ready 
fashion, except also to comprehend it and to achieve for this already in-itself rational 
content also a rational form, so that it appears justified before free thinking, which 
does not stop with the given, whether through the external positive authority of the 
state or through the agreement among human beings, or through the authority of inner 
feeling and heart and through the witness of the spirit that immediately concurs, but 
rather which proceeds from itself and thus demands to know itself as most intimately 
united with the truth? (PR, 13/14) 
 
As this passage explains, Hegel thinks that even though our public and publicly known 
morality is not in need of philosophical revision, it is in need of philosophical 
justification of a certain sort.  And it is such a justification to free thinking that meets 
the demand for a form of self-knowledge, namely knowledge that we do in fact know 
the truth about right, though we have forgotten this very fact.  In what follows, I want 
to explore the extent to which an analogy with recollection can illuminate this 
justificatory procedure.  But whatever it is that recollection turns out to be, it cannot be 
merely a matter of retrieving what was already there.  Recollection for Hegel always also 
gives a new shape to its object, one it did not possess before.  This means that this self-
knowledge, which Hegel also characterizes as rational form, is the unique contribution to 






IV. Absolute Knowing 
Hegel entertains an analogy between philosophical comprehension and recollection or 
Erinnerung in the final chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit entitled “Absolute Knowing.”  
As the title alone betrays, this is one of the least understood and most controversial 
chapters of the entire Phenomenology.  Although few agree about what this knowledge 
consists in, the fact that he calls it “absolute” has to many ears made him sound even 
more pretentious than any of his contemporaries could ever be.  While they may 
pretend to instruct the world about how it ought to be, Hegel’s pretense seems far 
worse.  He claims to have knowledge that is absolute, which sounds like divine 
knowledge, or knowledge of the divine.   
My interest here is not to give a full explanation of what Hegel means in calling 
it “absolute,” although I cannot avoid giving some gloss on this term.  What I want to 
focus on is rather how his account of absolute knowing can shed light on what he takes 
philosophical comprehension to be.  And given that he identifies absolute knowing as 
the transition from the various configurations of spirit to the domain of science, we 
have good reasons to suspect that this chapter can provide some insight into Hegel’s 
broader conception of philosophy and its relation to our actual principles.  But it may 
seem strange to look to the Phenomenology of Spirit for a statement of Hegel’s meta-
philosophical commitments, given that Hegel differentiates the aims of this work from 
those of science proper.  The Phenomenology is widely taken to be a kind of introduction 
or prolegomena to the system, which begins with the Science of Logic.  Nevertheless, I 
hope to show that there is some methodological continuity between the Phenomenology 
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and at least one part of the system, namely the Philosophy of Right, and that this 
continuity is best captured by the term “recollection.” 
 As perplexing as this chapter may be, Hegel explicitly states that absolute 
knowing refers to a certain form of self-knowledge – spirit knowing itself as spirit (der 
sich als Geist wissende Geist).  He also states that this self-knowledge was the aim all along, 
an aim that was guiding the various transitions we have been tracking so far.  This is 
something he already announces in the Preface, where he claims that spirit’s self-
knowledge would complete the formative process under scrutiny, and that this process 
is nothing other than the becoming of science [das Werden der Wissenschaft] (PG §27 & 
28).  This has significant implications for the role of philosophy according to this 
account.  It means that Hegel does consider a scientific or philosophical grasp of our 
own Bildung as likewise marking its completion.  In other words, it is only a 
philosophical science that can bring our formative education to an end.  This certainly 
sounds like a significant task indeed! 
 So the question we need to ask is what is still missing from the formative 
education we have presumably undergone such that it requires this further step, one 
that only a science can provide.  In order to address this question, I want to take up a 
characterization of absolute knowing that has received relatively little attention.  
Although it is difficult to avoid this characterization altogether, given its significant 
place within this chapter, few have ventured to delineate its function in any detail.  At 
the end of this chapter, Hegel describes absolute knowing as something we achieve 
through the process of “recollection.”  He writes, “The goal, absolute knowing, or 
spirit that knows itself as spirit, has as its path the recollection of spirits as they are in 
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themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm” (PG §808).  Again, 
this is something he already announces in the Preface, where he identified recollection 
as the process whereby being-in-itself turns into being-for-itself, i.e. whereby we 
become self-conscious of something that was already true of us (PG §29).  Although 
there is a sense in which this could characterize the entire development that the 
Phenomenology tracks, when Hegel speaks of recollection, he does not have the whole 
Bildungs-process in mind.  Rather, Hegel suggests that there is a different kind of 
process that can begin only once Bildung proper is complete and that at the same time 
completes it. 
 One way Hegel puts this is to say that the Bildung we have been tracking so far 
has been a process of externalization, of spirit taking an outward form and expressing 
or manifesting itself in the world.  This aspect is already captured in the title of the 
work.  Hegel explains that he chose to call this a phenomenology because its subject matter 
is the appearance of knowing, namely the concrete practices that various conceptions 
of knowledge have adopted in their efforts to actualize themselves.  These appearances 
are initially inadequate, but at the end of this process we do arrive at a point at which 
the persistent disparity between such conceptions of their externalizations vanishes, and 
we are able to adequately grasp, and so adequately express, what knowing consists in.  
This is the point that Hegel characterizes as absolute knowing. 
But for Hegel it is not enough that we have now as a matter of fact overcome 
the contradictions that plagued previous configurations and that we are thus able to 
adequately externalize our self-conception within giving rise to ineradicable disparities.  
Rather, he suggests that the completion of this process is now in need of another 
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movement, one of running through its entirety again in order to “internalize” it.  The 
problem is that, even once we have undergone the practical Bildungsprozess that the 
Phenomenology describes, its content is still not completely our own, for it has not yet 
shown itself to be rational, and thus justified.  What it lacks is a fitting form.  So we 
have to first repeat this whole development in thought in order to take full possession 
of it, to make it completely our own.  This retrospective repetition is what Hegel calls 
Erinnerung.  In his words: “In the immediacy of this new existence spirit has to start 
afresh to raise itself to maturity again, as if for it all that preceded it were lost and it had 
learned nothing from the experience [Erfahrung] of the earlier spirits” (PG §808). 
 “But memory or inwardizing [Er-Innerung] has preserved it” (PG §808).  In 
other words, what makes this retrospective repetition possible in the first place is the 
fact that we have in a sense retained the content of this development process.  
Although Hegel does not cite Plato in this context, he seems to have his doctrine of 
recollection in mind.  This doctrine states roughly that we never acquire new 
knowledge, but that all learning is really a matter of remembering what we once knew 
and have since forgotten.  In the Meno Socrates invokes this doctrine in order to explain 
what looks like a paradox.  How can you inquire into something you do not already 
know?  Either you know it, in which case you have no further need for inquiry, or you 
do not know it, in which case you cannot get any inquiry off the ground.  Socrates 
attempts to solve this paradox by proposing that the soul is immortal and so has 
previously seen all those things that it appears to be encountering for the first time.  He 
famously demonstrates this by teaching the slave geometry through questions that elicit 
and awaken what looks to be knowledge the slave must already possess. 
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 Hegel of course does not inherit the metaphysical account that seems to be at 
the bottom of Plato’s doctrine, and he does not employ the notion of recollection to 
argue in favor of the immortality of the soul.  Nevertheless, he is interested in Plato’s 
suggestion that we already possess the very knowledge we appear to be learning for the 
very first time.  The significant difference, it seems to me, is that for Hegel this process 
of recollection is more than one of unburying what was there already.  Rather, this 
process contributes a new form to this knowledge, a form that is meant to fortify it in a 
certain way.  He articulates this double-aspect of recollection in a telling passage: 
Though on the one hand the first appearance of a new world is at first a whole veiled 
in its simplicity or the universal ground, so on the other hand is the richness of the 
previous existence still present in memory (Erinnerung) for consciousness.  It misses in 
the newly appearing configuration the expansion and differentiation of content; but 
even more does it miss the development (Ausbildung) of form, whereby the differences 
are determined with certainty and are ordered in their stable relations (PG §13). 
 
As this suggests, recollection for Hegel is a process that depends on memory, on the 
preservation of the content that Bildung has gradually acquired in its unfolding.  To be 
more specific, each new generation approaches the world as if it were newly given, 
rather than the product of the work exerted by prior generations.  So even though the 
newcomers in a sense inherit and so retain the achievements of their predecessors, they 
do not as yet recognize the extent of their indebtedness.  So what exactly is it that they 
are missing?  On the one hand, Hegel describes it as an impoverishment of content, 
namely the forgetting of its “expansion and differentiation.”  But on the other hand, he 
emphasizes that what is really needed is the Ausbildung der Form, “whereby the 
differences are determined with certainty and are ordered in their stable relations”. 
!
230 
 One way to explain what this might mean is by way of Plato’s Meno.  This 
dialogue begins with Meno asking about the source of virtue, whether it is acquired by 
teaching or practice, or by nature, and Socrates responds that we first must be able to 
figure out what virtue is before we are in a position to determine its source.  After 
Socrates questions Meno’s various attempts to give an account of virtue, he notes that 
Meno seems thoroughly confused and that this may have something to do with his 
questioning.  He explains, “I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am 
utterly perplexed myself.  And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in 
the same case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched me”.176  This 
suggests an alternative explanation of why we forget and are in need of recollection.  
We forget perhaps not at the moment of birth (or rebirth, in this case, since according 
to Socrates we pass through multiple lives), but at the moment at which Socrates enters 
the pictures and asks us to reflect on what we knew perfectly well prior to this 
encounter.177 
 As we will see, there is something similar going on in the Philosophy of Right, 
where we lose sight of the content of right once we succumb to the lure of abstraction 
best embodied by what Hegel calls Reflexionsphilosophie, but is certainly not limited to it.  
What I want to draw attention to at this point is the task that Hegel assigns to 
recollection, given this source of forgetfulness.  Its primary aim, as the above passage 
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177 This is of course not Plato’s own diagnosis of the source of our forgetfulness.  What Socrates reveals is 
rather that what we thought we know prior to this encounter we did not in fact know at all.  So Socrates is 
doing us a service by exposing our ordinary ignorance, which tends to make us dogmatic and prevents us 




suggests, is not first and foremost to recall the content that has been stripped of its 
expansiveness and differentiation, although that too.  It is to develop a form among our 
various pieces of knowledge, namely a form that orders this knowledge in a certain way.  
This is perhaps why the term “recollection” is even better suited than its German 
equivalent, Erinnerung.  While Erinnerung does have connotations of internalization and 
appropriation, it lacks the aspect of collecting, and more specifically ordering, that seems 
to be contained in Hegel’s notion. 
 This function is vividly illustrated in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where the 
content at issue is the historical process that spirit has undergone.  As Hegel explains in 
the final chapter, the process of externalization has been a “slow movement and 
succession of spirits, a gallery of pictures,” which precedes absolute knowing and of 
which we now must make retrospective sense.  Although this gallery at our disposal 
follows a certain historical movement and succession, Hegel thinks that philosophy 
must reorganize these various “spirits” in order to give them a rational form.  This 
involves laying them out in such a way that we can see the transitions from one spirit to 
another as a rationally necessary one, namely a superior solution to the problems that 
emerged internally to the previous configuration.  Thus it is no surprise that the order 
we see in the Phenomenology of Spirit is not strictly speaking a historical one, and that 
Hegel is perfectly comfortable skipping certain historical spirits altogether, and more 
often presenting them in a succession that departs from the one in which they initially 
unfolded.  In this way Hegel is able to lend coherence to our historical development.  
What we find in this work is not a strict chronology, which might include all kinds of 
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haphazard shifts, false starts, and regresses, but a story that shows our history to be a 
learning process that ultimately justifies where we currently are. 
 So the aim of the retrospective procedure is not to generate new content, but to 
establish rational and systematic connections within the manifold content at hand.  But 
as the above passage likewise suggests, its aim is not exactly to impose new 
connections, but to give certainty and stability to those connections that this content in 
some sense implicitly contains.  So Hegel does not take himself to be telling an entirely 
new story of our history, but to show the kind of rational development that is in a 
certain respect already its own.  So the pressing task is first and foremost one of 
strengthening these connections by making them explicit. 
 This aspect of recollection bears in many respect on Meno’s own problem, 
which was not only that he lost sight of virtue as soon as he was “touched by Socrates,” 
but that he was susceptible to the kind of instability that Socrates’ questions inevitably 
inspired.  Although Plato himself does not suggest that recollection has a fortifying 
function,178 this turns out to be a significant aspect of Hegelian recollection.  According 
to Hegel, to recollect what we already in a sense know – because it lies buried in our 
memory – is to retrieve not only a richer content than is currently before our eyes, but 
also to order this content into a system capable of warding off the destabilizing 
influences of skepticism.  As I mentioned above, Hegel held that only a complete 
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knowledge we possessed when we actually encountered the forms directly.  Whatever we may be able to 
recollect within our embodied lives will fall short of this perfect knowledge we can only ever approximate.  I 




system could ward off this influence altogether.  Nevertheless, even partial systems are 
able to stabilize our knowledge by collecting its various parts into an ordered whole.  
 But before we turn to the Philosophy of Right, it is worth remarking that it is no 
coincidence that the model of recollection emerges explicitly in Hegel’s account of 
absolute knowing.  Earlier I suggested that absolute knowing is not really knowledge of 
some object, but rather a kind of self-knowledge.  This means that this chapter is in the 
end focused less on the historical content that has unfolded in this work, although 
Hegel does give a brief recap of this unfolding.  Rather, absolute knowing can be 
described as knowledge of what it is to know.179!!To put this in very broad terms, what 
we come to know is not what the correct and indubitable criterion of knowledge must 
be, the one that we can guarantee will not fall prey to the same contradictions we 
witnessed before, but that the very criterion of knowledge is fully internal to the activity 
of knowing.  In other words, what we realize is that our epistemic practices are self-
sufficient and need not appeal to anything outside themselves in their justificatory 
procedures.  This was true of knowing all along, but it is only at the stage of “absolute 
knowing” that it becomes adequately transparent to us knowers.  It is for this reason 
that absolute knowing constitutes a form of self-knowledge and in calling it “absolute,” 
Hegel has this very self-sufficiency in mind.  
 All of this is relatively uncontested, especially among those who read Hegel as a 
non-foundationalist.180  Nevertheless, there remains a host of questions about the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
179 Hegel states this in the Preface when he claims that “the goal is the insight of spirit into that, which 
knowing is” (PG §29). 
 
180 See for example David Stern (1990).  In this paper Stern argues against the traditional foundationalist 
reading of “absolute knowing,” according to which the identity of subject and substance means a collapsing 
of substance into subject, which the subject serving as the foundation of substance.  Stern proposes a non-
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implications of this self-sufficiency for Hegel’s epistemology and metaphysics.  Since 
Hegel characterizes such self-knowledge as the discovery of the identity or unity 
between subject and substance, it is not immediately clear whether this is meant to 
collapse the very distinction altogether, and even if so, which side takes precedence – 
subject or substance.  Moreover, there is the worry that this picture makes cognition 
unresponsive to experience, a “frictionless spinning in the void”,181 swinging free from 
any constraints imposed by the world.  If this is true, how then can we ever revise our 
claims to knowledge?  Hegel of course has a lot to say about the revisability of our 
claims, and he does not think such revisability needs to appeal to resources that lie 
beyond our practices themselves, even if it does involve experience in his distinctive 
sense.  But my interest is not to address this worry in such broad terms, or to defend 
Hegel’s thesis about knowledge in general.  Rather I want to turn to the relevance of 
this kind of self-knowledge for Hegel’s account of ethical knowledge in particular.  So 
now I want to return to this distinctly practical context and consider the extent to 
which this model of philosophical reflection represented by recollection can help us 
determine the aims and means of Hegel’s project in the Philosophy of Right. 
 
V. Recollecting Right 
In what follows I want to explore two ways in which Hegel’s procedure in the Philosophy 
of Right mirrors that in the Phenomenology.  First of all, both are supposed to be 
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foundationalist reading according to which Hegel is merely positing the inderdependence of objectivity and 
subjectivity, and not a collapsing of the former into the latter. 
 




justificatory in some sense, for by imposing a certain systematic structure on the 
relevant content, they show this content to be rational.  This seems to be true even 
though the two texts differ in terms of content.  Secondly, what they ultimately seek to 
justify is not first and foremost a given set of normative standards, but our practices of 
determining normative standards in the first place.  It is important for Hegel that these 
practices remain open-ended.  As we will see, this does indicate an important difference 
between his project and that of traditional theorizing.  Even though Hegel is also 
engaged in a form of rational evaluation, he acknowledges the limit of any such 
evaluative procedure, including his own, which turns out to have something to do with 
its indebtedness to (historical) experience. 
At first sight it may seem rather odd to compare Hegel’s method in the two 
texts, and especially to invoke the notion of “recollection,” given that the Phenomenology 
deals explicitly with a historical content, whereas the Philosophy of Right lacks a focus on 
history.  In the chapter on “Absolute Knowing,” Hegel makes clear that what is being 
recollected in this work is the historical unfolding and development of our epistemic 
criteria.  Of course this does not mean, as I have already pointed out, that Hegel is 
providing nothing but a historical narrative, especially since retelling our own history is 
supposed to serve the normative end of justifying the criteria we do currently uphold.  
Nevertheless, much of the content of this work is undeniably culled from history.182  
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182 It is by now very popular to argue that the Phenomenology of Spirit only appears to be concerned with history, 
but is in fact more akin to a transcendental argument that investigates the kind of presuppositions at the basis 
of our normative commitments.  See for example Pippin (1989) and Forster (1998).  Although it is true that 
the first few chapters of the Phenomenology seem to have relatively little connection to real historical epochs 
and worldviews, I do not agree that this means that the Phenomenology does not concern itself with a historical, 




The Philosophy of Right, in contrast, does not seem to be offering a historical narrative in 
the first place.  This is only partly true, since Hegel does associate the various 
conceptions of right (abstract right, morality, and ethical life) loosely with various 
historical epochs.  But since history is not in the foreground, in what sense can his 
method in the Philosophy of Right be regarded as a form of recollection? 
Even though offering a historical narrative looks more obviously like an 
instance of recollection – because what you are recollecting is something you have in a 
sense already undergone and retained in at least a “collective memory” – I want to 
suggest that for Hegel, recollection is first and foremost the very movement from the 
abstract to concrete.  This movement characterizes the structure of the Philosophy of 
Right, which begins with “Abstract Right,” but it also characterizes the structure of the 
Phenomenology, which after all also proceeds from what Hegel identifies as the most 
minimal and impoverished account of knowing: “Sense-Certainty.”  In other words, 
what we are recollecting is not already before our eyes in all its richness.  Rather, the 
rich content must first be retrieved.  But as I pointed out, in retrieving this multifarious 
content, we are simultaneously drawing out the systematic connections between the 
various parts, thus imbuing it with rational form.  Both for Hegel happen 
simultaneously, for it is not as if we have the content fully laid out before us and now 
need to do no more than systematize it.  Nevertheless, there is a sense in which we are 
already acquainted with this rich content, for we exhibit it and appeal to it all the time 
whenever we participate in our practices in less reflective ways.   
Given this basic outline of recollection, it is not difficult to see that something 
quite similar is taking place in the Philosophy of Right.  There Hegel starts by taking up a 
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normative commitment that we do explicitly espouse and proceeds to show us that this 
commitment is only one part in a broader network of principles.  So our starting point 
is abstract because it is a mere part of a whole, and what needs to be retrieved is the 
very whole within which it is properly situated.  In the context of the Philosophy of Right 
Hegel’s critiques of abstract right and of morality are meant to show these conceptions 
of freedom are partial, rather than complete misguided.  What this means is that their 
legitimacy is contingent on their connection to other forms of freedom, which they 
themselves do not explicitly acknowledge.  In this way Hegel uses them as springboards 
to these latter forms as well, in this way reminding us of the broader system of right we 
inhabit and navigate.  This illustrates one way in which the movement from the abstract 
to the concrete is also a movement of recollection, even when its content consists of 
forms of freedom that coexist in modernity, rather than forms that have been espoused 
and abandoned in our historical development. 
What still needs to be explained is how Hegel intends to get there, namely, what 
specific shape this movement of recollection is supposed to take and how it is 
supposed to serve Hegel’s justificatory ends.  Even if both are engaged in modes of 
recollection, how close is his procedure in the Philosophy of Right to that in the 
Phenomenology?  I want to address this question by considering a proposal advanced by 
Mark Tunick, who draws an overt analogy between the two.   He offers what I find to 
be a very helpful characterization of their common aim, arguing that “as we progress, 
each new theory approaches asymptotically the actual world, encompassing more and 
more of its complexity and detail, accounting for more of our actual commitments”.183  
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But problems for his interpretation arise when he attempts to characterize this 
procedure itself.   According to Tunick, the two methods resemble each other insofar 
as both are “phenomenological,” by which he means that they proceed via experiences 
of subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction with various accounts.  According to Tunick, 
it is such experience that moves us from the abstract to the concrete and thus allows 
for the transitions that get us from “Abstract Right” to “Ethical Life.”  The most 
complete account, on this reading, is the one “that does not leave us in contradiction 
with ourselves; for we already live objective spirit, we are it, we know it implicitly…we 
will experience the incompleteness of any account that is not concrete enough, for in 
the reality portrayed in such an abstract account we will not be fully at home”.184  Thus 
he calls the method in the Philosophy of Right no less a “dialectic of experience.” 
I agree that experience plays some role in this context, a role that remains to be 
specified.  But I also think that there are limits to the extent to which the structure of 
the Philosophy of Right can rightfully be called a “dialectic of experience.”  It is worth 
pointing out that there are different senses of experience relevant here that Tunick does 
not adequately distinguish.  One is experiences of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, which 
seem to be subjective and which are, according to Tunick, supposed to provoke the 
transitions from one conception of right to another.  But the Philosophy of Right cannot 
be a “dialectic of experience” in this sense, for Hegel would never make the transitions 
themselves contingent on something like subjective feeling.  In other words, it cannot 
be true that Hegel is appealing to the assent of the reader or his ability to identify with 
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the account as a criterion of its truth.  Hegel even admits that his readers will resist this 
identification because the account he is giving conflicts with “public opinion” and so 
will strike many as counter-intuitive, despite the fact that it does justice to our intuitions 
at some deeper level.  But even if the transitions from one account of freedom to 
another are generally accompanied by experiences of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, 
the success of the method cannot hinge on such experience, for that would make it 
more arbitrary than those of his critical targets.  And we know that Hegel’s primary 
concern was to develop a method that would be beyond dispute.185 
Tunick also invokes another sense of experience when he speaks of the actual 
commitments that provide the background against which we evaluate the various 
accounts.  In this context he is speaking of the experience we have as those who inhabit 
Sittlichkeit and are implicitly familiar with its broader structure.  This does presumably 
give us a certain reservoir of empirical knowledge that is relevant to Hegel’s method.  
For example, if Hegel is assessing whether a certain principle can be actualized, he 
clearly takes for granted some background experience that allows us to entertain in 
thought what such actualization would entail.  As we will see, Hegel is primarily 
concerned with the requirements of actualization.  This means that, if I didn’t know 
anything at all about, say, the nature of property, I would probably not be able to begin 
evaluating abstract right.  I also need to know something about human beings, about 
their desires and aspirations, in order to consider the applicability of a given principle to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185 I should add that I have doubts about whether this is the best way to characterize the transitions in the 
Phenomenology itself.  Even though Hegel thinks we did experience certain configurations of consciousness to 
be unsatisfactory, we can rationally reconstruct the movement from one to another as rationally necessary, 
and not merely subjectively more compelling.  So even though the Phenomenology does track a kind of 




their behavior.  But these are still far more minimal ways of understanding background 
experience than the one Tunick invokes.  Even if Hegel’s method assumes that we have 
some empirical knowledge about the relevant social institutions and their members, we 
must be careful to avoid concluding that such experience provides the criterion of its 
success. 
First of all, it cannot be true that Hegel is starting with experience in this sense, 
for this would be like presupposing the legitimacy of our ordinary intuitions – 
something Hegel thinks we are not entitled to do.  The problem is not just that Hegel 
wants to persuade even those who do not already inhabit ethical life of its validity.  It is 
that Hegel thinks even those who inhabit ethical life do not have its normative 
structure fully in view.  According to Tunick, abstract right provides an inadequate 
account of social reality because it excludes ethical commitments, and since we have 
such commitments, we will experience this account as inadequate.  But this would 
mean that Hegel’s method could succeed only if we know that we have ethical 
commitments and admit that these are inadequately represented by more abstract 
accounts.  As Tunick puts it, all we need in order to see this inadequacy is 
“introspection and the invocation of ungrounded views we already hold and which 
serve as touchstones for moral deliberation”.186  But if these “ungrounded views” are 
not transparent to us, we cannot simply access them through introspection. 
There is a third sense of experience that is relevant here, even though Tunick 
makes no overt reference to it.  When he says that we “experience” abstract right as 
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unsatisfactory, he clearly does not mean that we tried it out in practice and it didn’t 
work.  So the practical experience of attempting to live out these accounts cannot be a 
requirement for Hegel, the way it seems to be in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where we are 
tracking the practical experience of various historical societies and rationally 
reconstructing those real successes and failures.  But in the Philosophy of Right, the 
experience at stake is not that of living out an account, but that of following out a train 
of thought.  This means that the movement is primarily a conceptual one, because it 
involves thinking through a certain account.   
It is, however, not a purely conceptual one, for what we are thinking through 
are the requirements for living out such an account.  In other words, we are to consider 
what it would take to actualize this conception of freedom, and as it turns out, 
actualizing even the most minimal conception takes for granted resources that far 
exceed it.  Our ability to make those transitions does, in this respect, presuppose some 
knowledge gleaned from experience.  But what ultimately make the transitions 
necessary are the kinds of contradictions that emerge at the conceptual level.  These 
differ from the practical contradictions we previously discussed, those that compel a 
community to revise its practical norms, primarily because they need to manifest 
themselves in practice.  But structurally they do resemble those contradictions as well, 
for any community that should try to live according to nothing but the principles 
internal to abstract right, for example, would inevitably encounter the very same 
problems that make a form of life unsustainable.  Nevertheless Hegel does not think we 
need to wait until this happens, and thankfully even we moderns have never been so 
limited, no matter how abstract our self-conceptions tend to become. 
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So one aspect to be considered are the requirements for actualization, namely, 
what it would take to live out a certain conception of freedom.  But this for Hegel is 
also to consider the requirements for determinacy, namely, whether a certain conception 
of freedom provides us with sufficiently determinate norms that make it actual-izable.  
We have seen this to some extent in the context of abstract right, where abstract right 
lacked the principles needed for a just adjudication of contract.  But we see this even 
more clearly in the transition from morality to ethical life.  Hegel considers 
“conscience” the highest articulation of the account of freedom represented by the 
standpoint of morality, according to which right, or in this case duty, is determined by 
the formal principle of the subjective will.  In other words, conscience takes itself to be 
the sole authority in the determination of duty, and according to this account, I ought 
to do only that which is issued by my own heart.  But because conscience takes nothing 
but its own willing as authoritative, it cannot in principle attain the kind of objectivity 
contained in the very concept of right, which it clearly does seek.  If my sole criterion 
of duty is that I will it so, then I lack any way of distinguishing right from wrong – or 
genuine duty from mere opinion – in the first place. Thus Hegel famously accuses 
conscience both within the Philosophy of Right as well as in the Phenomenology of becoming 
evil because of its inability to keep good and evil conceptually apart.  As he puts it, 
“Conscience as formal subjectivity is simply to be on the verge of reverting into evil” 
(PR §139). 
When Hegel lays out his criticisms of the moral standpoint, he repeatedly refers 
to it as far too abstract to be capable of generating determinacy.  As he puts it, 
For the good as the substantial universal of freedom, but as still abstract, 
determinations in general as well as the principle for determining them (though a 
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principle identical with the good itself) are still required, just as for conscience, as only 
the abstract principle of determining, the objectivity and universality of its 
determinations is required.  Both, each having elevated itself to an independent whole, 
become the indeterminate which ought to be determined (PR §141). 
 
What Hegel means is that the kinds of principles to which this account of right 
confines itself are unable to delineate right from wrong.  But we can see that in this 
charge Hegel is not merely faulting conscience with excessive abstraction, for it is true 
that the standpoint of conscience is avowedly a purely formal one.  The problem it 
encounters is that it cannot even generate a coherent notion of right in the first place.  
Indeterminacy for Hegel does not yield a merely thin content, but no content at all.  In 
other words, Hegel thinks that if we take seriously what it would mean to apply the 
criterion of conscience, we discover that its application contradicts its expressed aims.  
So in this way Hegel is assessing the extent to which conscience can be actualized 
precisely by assessing its conceptual resources for such an actualization. 
But while the above example illustrates the critical side of Hegel’s method, it 
does not yet explain how we are supposed to think our way out of the given conception 
and into another.  Even if we concede that Hegel criticizes the account of conscience 
on rational grounds, what makes the transition to ethical life a rational one?  Although 
Hegel is pointing to a certain contradiction internal to a given account that renders it 
indeterminate, or inapplicable, this does not mean that one side must give way to the 
other.  In the contradiction between conscience and the good, what we discover is that 
both are essential and there is no rational way to choose between them.  So for Hegel 
the only way to overcome the contradiction is to treat each side as a mere moment that 
is, independently of the other, one-sided.  Now we can begin to see how this paves the 
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way for “Ethical Life.”  As the unity of conscience and the good, “ethical life is a 
subjective disposition [Gesinnung], but of what is in itself right” (PR §141).  In other 
words, Hegel regards ethical life as a structure of concrete principles that can genuinely 
draw distinctions between right and wrong, but that likewise grants a corresponding 
insight into the legitimacy of these principles. 
 Of course this general description of ethical life is at this point still a mere 
sketch.  Hegel still needs to outline the structure of ethical life in order to show that it is 
sufficiently complex to avoid a similar charge of indeterminacy. 187  It is nevertheless a 
crucial step in Hegel’s method, for it marks the transition from the primarily critical 
side of the procedure to the positive project of the science of right.  Although we have 
now entered the domain that is supposed to correspond to our ordinary ethical 
knowledge, Hegel thinks that it is only now that we are entitled to it.  As he states in 
unequivocal terms at the end of the morality chapter, “that this idea is the truth of the 
concept of freedom, this cannot be something presupposed, whether taken from 
feeling or elsewhere, rather – in philosophy – can only be something proven [ein 
Bewiesenes].  This deduction of [the idea] is contained only in the fact that [abstract] right 
and moral self-consciousness show of their own accord that they regress to it as their 
result” (PR §141).  One might say that it is out of an immanent critique of the abstract 
philosophical accounts that we can earn the right to our pre-philosophical intuitions.  
But since these abstract accounts have gripped our public imagination, this immanent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
187 I should add that I think this structure is still underdetermined, although not indeterminate.  So when 
Hegel claims that Kant’s moral theory cannot provide an “immanent doctrine of duties,” he is not suggesting 
that his science of ethics has such a doctrine to offer.  According to my reading, the rational structure of 
ethical life underdetermines our particular ethical duties, but it is determinate enough to restrict what can 




critique is likewise a return to those very critical resources we forgot we have been 
making use of all along. 
 If we regard this movement from the abstract to the concrete through the lens 
of recollection, we are able to make sense of such a complicated mode of criticism in 
which Hegel is engaged, one which simultaneously targets both philosophical 
abstractions as well as public opinion, all while maintaining that we already possess 
adequate ethical knowledge.  We are also in a position to shed some light on Hegel’s 
broader aims.  Above I suggested that there are two sides to recollection, insofar as it 
contributes to the attainment of what Hegel controversially calls “absolute knowing.”  
On the one hand, it is a process of retrieving knowledge that we in some respect 
already possess, but do not recognize to be an instance of knowing.  We both recall this 
knowledge and vindicate its status as knowledge by imposing a rational or systematic 
structure on its content.  It is a structure that is to a certain extent implicitly possesses 
insofar as it lends itself to systematic reconstruction, but it is a structure that must 
nevertheless first be explicitly drawn out in order to fortify it against the lure of 
abstraction and its skeptical aftermath. 
I want to conclude by noting that this process is not merely one of vindicating 
our intuitions, so to speak, by regressively situating them within a systematic whole.  It 
is also one of vindicating our reflective practices through which we determine what is 
to count as knowledge and what is not.  Hegel takes himself to do so precisely by 
showing them to be sufficiently malleable to revise these intuitions.  As we have seen, 
this is what makes recollection a means to absolute knowing, for absolute knowing is 
knowledge that knowing is an absolute and thus self-sufficient activity.  The Philosophy of 
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Right is sometimes criticized for failing to retain this sense of open-endedness that the 
Phenomenology of Spirit promises, because it seems to be in the business of demonstrating 
the rationality of certain conceptions of freedom once and for all.  But I think it would 
be a mistake to conclude that Hegel rules out the possibility of revising even the very 
normative criteria he is here trying to justify.  This is already something he suggests in 
one of his lectures on the Philosophy of Right, where he offers a striking variation on his 
Doppelsatz, stating that “what is actual becomes rational and the rational becomes 
actual”.188  There he is not vouching for a certain conception of freedom, but for the 
very movement from one conception to another.  In other words, what makes actuality 
rational is its ability to revise itself through its own means. 
Although I did not stress this characterization, there is a sense in which the task 
of recollection bears on the one Hegel officially assigns the scientist of right – 
reconciliation.  As I mentioned, Hegel’s remarks about reconciliation are frequently 
read as evidence of his normative aspirations, where the next question to ask is what 
actuality would have to be like in order to merit our reconciliation.  But if we think 
about reconciliation in relation to recollection, we find that the story Hegel is telling is 
not as direct as this suggests.  His reveals that we are alienated not in the first instance 
from actuality, but from ourselves, more specifically our practical selves.  This is in turn 
to be alienated from actuality, namely, from our actual principles, those we actually live 
by.  What makes Hegel’s story an indirect one has to do with his acknowledgment that 
these principles are not initially before our eyes.  We are alienated from them precisely 
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because we do not recognize the extent to which we are committed to them, and the 
extent to which they do inform what we do.  So recollection does serve the ends of 
reconciliation by allowing us to get a clearer view of ourselves as active participants in 
the social world.  In doing so, is also demonstrates that our form of ethical life is 
rational because it is self-sufficient, replete with all the resources its members require to 
overcome its own shortcomings.  This is, however, not something we can know, or be 















There have been several questions directing this study, questions invited (though not 
always asked) by Hegel’s own account of modern ethical life.  The first concerns the 
threat of blindness and the presence of insight even in unreflective action.  I hope to 
have shown that the habit of the ethical, according to Hegel’s conception, 
accommodates such insight and moreover heightens it by lending it a reliable form.  In 
this way habit is not at odds with the standard of knowledge introduced by the 
requirements of subjective freedom.  It is even an expression of knowledge that is more 
subjectively free than its reflective counterpart, one that has yet to fully incorporate the 
principles to which it is supposedly committed.  This suggests that habitual action need 
not be blind, even when it is unreflective. 
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 The second question concerns the compatibility between our unreflective and 
our reflective attitudes.  This is perhaps the easier question to answer, because there is 
little to suggest that Hegel deems them incompatible, even if it is true that we 
frequently cannot exhibit both attitudes at once.  Habit according to Hegel first puts us 
in a position to reflect because it introduces the needed distance to our own 
determinations, but it is not the only mode of engagement open to us within the social 
world.  In fact, Hegel thinks that creatures who are thoroughly habituated tend to grow 
indifferent to the very principles to which they are supposedly committed.  Habit 
enables this commitment, but it can also squash it, too.  This means that more robust 
forms of reflection must be a part of social participation, even of participation that 
looks at face value to be in the service of perpetuating inherited customs.  Simply put, 
even reproducing a culture involves evaluating the culture one is reproducing.   
 This question about the compatibility between our reflective and our 
unreflective attitudes was lurking in the background of the first two chapters, although 
it was never my focus, mainly because I could not see its force.  The third question 
concerns the possibility of adopting a distinctly critical attitude toward core features of 
modern ethical life, one that is not simply evaluative, but that goes so far as to object to 
elements of the social world and judge them to be inadequate.  This question is more 
difficult to answer, because Hegel himself does not seem to account for this possibility, 
not because he wants to exclude it on principled grounds, but because he has 
confidence in the resilience of modern ethical life.  His confident derives not only from 
observing the social world and noting its striking stability, but also from investigating its 
very structure and discovering that it incorporates a remarkable flexibility as well. 
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 In fact one of my main aims has been to show that Hegel cannot have 
principled grounds for foreclosing the prospect of social change.  I argued for this from 
two angles.  The first arrives at this conclusion by considering the nature of critique and 
examining its dependence on experience.  What we find is that critique must await the 
continued unfolding of experience, since it cannot always anticipate the practical 
contradictions that anchor it.  The second arrives at this conclusion through the lens of 
the scientific method.  Although this it is not something I stressed in my treatment of 
philosophical reflection, it is worth noting that such reflection remains indebted to 
experience for similar reasons as the critical variety.  On the one hand, Hegel does 
think that we can think through the requirements for actualization and in this way 
evaluate a given principle, even if we stop short of actualizing it in practice.  This is his 
own strategy for justifying modern ethical life in the Philosophy of Right.  The key, 
however, is that such a justification remains no less provisional than the deliverances of 
critique. 
 In the end we need to reconsider the dependence of science on experience.   
What we will discover, I think, is that there is a significant place left for experience in 
the Philosophy of Right, even if this text is not explicitly tracking such experience, and 
even if Hegel does not refer to it as “experience”.  In the last chapter of this text Hegel 
claims that it is world history, so history as a whole, that issues the final verdict of 
ethical life.   As he puts it, “World history is a court of judgment because, in its 
universality which has being in and for itself, the particular… is present only as ideal, and 
the movement of spirit within this element in the demonstration of this fact” (PR 
§341).  I read this a concession to the open-endedness of ethical life and an admission 
!
251 
that not all of its flaws will be visible to us until we try to live out our commitments and 
run into the kinds of practical contradictions that may require revision.  As we have 
seen through the example of poverty, these practical contradictions may take time to 
surface. 
 Since Hegel stresses that philosophy cannot leap ahead of its own time, is not 
difficult to see that this would have significant implications for its capacity to justify 
ethical life as it is.  Sometimes he characterizes the perspective of philosophical 
reflection as retrospective, surveying our historical development.  But in the Philosophy of 
Right he characterizes it as even more firmly rooted in the present.  “As far as the 
individual is concerned, each is in any case a child of his time; so philosophy, too, is its own 
time grasped in thought” (PR , 26).  Interestingly enough, Hegel associates the effort to 
leap ahead of one’s own time with that of constructing a world as it ought to be.  What 
he means, I take it, is that a philosophy that is sufficiently self-conscious of its historical 
situation will not make such pronouncements – not because it has nothing to say about 
normative matters, but because it will recognize that there might be more to say about 
them down the line, when we have had even more experience than we currently do. 
 So this perspective of world history as the ultimate court of judgment is a 
different one from the perspective Hegel as philosopher occupies.  This means that 
whatever verdict of ethical life he may dispense could become trumped by the verdict 
of an even higher court.   So we might say that the perspective of world history serves 
as a placeholder for the standpoint of the system as a whole, one of which even 
philosophy ultimately falls short.  Philosophy has the important task of systematizing 
and in this way vindicating what we know, but Hegel suggests that all philosophical 
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justifications are doomed to remain provisional simply because we cannot always tell in 
advance which among our principles are going to stand the test of time.   
 Apel calls this the aporia of philosophy, for philosophy so conceived has 
nothing to tell an agent engaged in deliberation, so someone who must regard the 
future as lying open to him.189  But this is not necessarily a shortcoming.  Hegel as I 
read him does not think philosophy needs to be able to peer into the future in order to 
be of value.  We as participants in modern ethical life are perfectly capable of coping 
with experiential challenges as and when they arise.  Rather, philosophy’s practical 
import is to give us confidence to embrace our normative resources whenever we do 
deliberate from the standpoint of “our finely situated hermeneutic understanding of the 
world”.190  So Hegel the philosopher is engaged in a reflective project that is 
simultaneously more modest and more ambitious than most.  Even if it cannot have 
the last word on which principles we ought to live by, he thinks that his Philosophy of 
Right can overcome the lure of abstraction once and for all, and it can do so precisely 
by reminding us that can survive every genuine problem for our form of ethical living. 
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